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Unwise or Unconstitutional?: The Copyright Term
Extension Act, the Eldred Decision, and the
Freezing of the Public Domain for Private Benefit*
Arlen W. Langvardt** and Kyle T. Langvardt***

I. INTRODUCTION
Assume that in 2004, a person wishes to borrow and make
use of the expression contained in a work that was created and
published in 1922. Copyright protection on the work took effect
in 1922, in accordance with the Copyright Act of 1909.1 Now
consider these questions:
1. Must the prospective user obtain a license—i.e., a grant
of permission—from the copyright owner in order to avoid
being liable for infringement when the use occurs?
2. What if the facts are the same, except that 1923 was the
year of creation, publication, and copyright commencement?
The answers to the above questions relate directly to the
public policy and constitutional issues on which this article will
focus. We begin the identification of those issues by offering
the following answers to the article’s opening quiz:
1. No, a license is not necessary. Some law students would
be quick to argue that this is a trick question because there is
no copyright owner. This is because there is no longer a valid
copyright on the 1922 work. Even assuming that the copyright
owner properly renewed the copyright in 1950, the copyright
expired at the end of 1997.2 The 1922 work is therefore in the
* This article is published online at http://mipr.umn.edu.
** Professor of Business Law, Indiana University.
*** First-year student, University of Chicago Law School (Fall 2004).
1. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, §§ 9-10, 35 Stat. 1075, 1077-78 (1909)
(amended by the Copyright Act of 1976 and currently codified at 17 U.S.C. §§
101-1101 (2000)) [hereinafter Copyright Act of 1909].
2. The 1909 Act called for a basic copyright duration of 28 years from
publication of the work, with a 28-year renewal term available if the renewal
procedure was properly completed. Copyright Act of 1909, supra note 1, §§ 2324. The 1909 Act was extensively overhauled by the Copyright Act of 1976.
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (amended in various respects
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public domain and any person may freely use it regardless of
the use’s nature or purpose.3
2. Yes, a license is necessary (assuming that the copyright
owner renewed the copyright in 1951 and that copyright law’s
fair use doctrine4 would not protect the use at issue). The
copyright on the 1923 work continues to exist and will run
through 2018. Copyright protection of the 1922 work and the
1923 work both arose pursuant to the Copyright Act of 1909,
but the 1922 copyright has expired and the 1923 is still in
force.5
What accounts for the drastically different durations of the
copyrights on the works described in the above hypotheticals?
The Copyright Act of 1909 established a maximum
copyright term of 56 years from the time of publication of the
copyrighted work.6 Therefore, when copyright protection was
secured on the 1922 and 1923 works, the copyright owners
would have expected that their copyrights would run until 1978
and 1979, respectively. The duration rules changed, however,
more than five decades after the two works acquired copyright
protection. The 1922 work received only the benefit of the 1976
since enactment; current version codified as 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (2000))
[hereinafter Copyright Act of 1976]. The Copyright Act of 1976 provided that
if a work remained under copyright as of January 1, 1978, the 28-year renewal
term called for by the 1909 Act would instead be a 47-year renewal term—
meaning that the total copyright duration would be 75 years rather than 56
years. 17 U.S.C. § 304 (1976) (amended 1998). For further explanation of why
the copyright on the hypothetical 1922 work ran through the end of 1997, see
infra note 7 and infra text accompanying note 58.
3. See, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S.
23, 29-30 (2003) (noting that once a copyright expires and the work enters the
public domain, any party may make unrestricted use of the work).
4. Under the fair use doctrine, use of a copyrighted work for such
purposes as criticism, commentary, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or
research may not amount to copyright infringement, even though the user did
not obtain permission from the copyright owner. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
5. The explanation of why the copyright on the 1923 work continues to
exist begins with the statutes cited supra note 2. Unlike the 1922 work, the
1923 work received the benefit of the 20-year duration extension provided by
the Copyright Term Extension Act. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension
Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102, 112 Stat. 2827, 2827-28 (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304 (2000) (amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304
(1976)) [hereinafter CTEA]. For further explanation of why the copyright on
the hypothetical 1923 work has not expired, see infra note 9 and infra text
accompanying notes 8-9, 59.
6. The 1909 Act established a basic copyright duration of 28 years from
publication of the work, and allowed the option of a 28-year renewal term.
Copyright Act of 1909, supra note 1, § 24.
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enactment that extended the maximum copyright duration for
pre-1978 works to 75 years.7 Twice blessed, the 1923 work
qualified not only for the 1976 statute’s 19-year term extension
but also for the 20-year bonus tacked on by the Copyright Term
Extension Act of 1998 (CTEA).8 The 1923 work came within
the CTEA’s coverage by still being under copyright when the
CTEA took effect in 1998. The 1997 expiration of the copyright
on the 1922 work caused that work to miss qualifying for the
CTEA jackpot by one year.9 Thanks to the CTEA, the 1923
work carries a 95-year copyright duration. This is 39 years
more than the term contemplated by the law in effect at the
time copyright protection on the work was secured.
A blunt two-part answer may be offered in response to the
“What accounts for the drastically different durations?”
question posed earlier. First, an accommodating Congress was
too inclined to please institutional copyright owners and their
lobbyists, so it granted a huge extension in copyright duration
in 1998 without paying adequate attention to the public policy
and constitutional implications of doing so.10 Second, the
Supreme Court was overly concerned about the practical effects
of holding the CTEA unconstitutional, so it opted in its Eldred
v. Ashcroft11 decision for an exceedingly deferential posture
toward Congress’ enactments pursuant to the Copyright
Clause.12 In case the reader has not already guessed, the
7. See supra note 2. As of January 1, 1978, the 1922 work was still
under copyright, in what would have been the last year of its renewal term.
By still being “alive,” in a copyright law sense, as of January 1, 1978, the 1922
work obtained the benefit of the 1976 Act’s 19-year duration extension.
Copyright Act of 1976, supra note 2. The renewal term that would have been
28 years therefore became a 47-year renewal term. As a result, the copyright
on the 1922 work ran through the end of 1997. See id. § 305 (copyrights run
through end of calendar year in which they otherwise would expire).
8. CTEA, supra note 5, §§ 102, 112 (codified as 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304).
9. CTEA, supra note 5, § 102(d). By still being under copyright as of
January 1, 1978, the 1923 work qualified for the 1976 Act’s 19-year duration
extension. See supra note 7. What would have been a renewal term of 28
years from 1951 thus became a renewal term of 47 years from 1951.
Copyright Act of 1976, supra note 2, § 302. The 47-year renewal term meant
that the 1923 work was under copyright as of October 1998. The CTEA took
effect in October 1998, granting a 20-year duration extension to all existing
copyrights that remained valid as of the statute’s effective date. CTEA, supra
note 5, § 102(d), at 112 Stat. 2827-28. The 1923 work therefore met the
necessary condition for obtaining the CTEA bonus.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 47-53, 60-62, 277-295.
11. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 97-111, 131-135, 162-163, 340-411.
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authors sympathize with the blunt objections raised in this
paragraph.
This article offers critical analysis of the CTEA, a law that
increased copyright duration by 20 years for works created
after the CTEA’s 1998 effective date and for preexisting works
still under copyright as of 1998.13 The CTEA amounts to a
massive giveaway to corporate copyright owners and heirs of
creators of copyrighted works at a steep cost to society. Among
the CTEA’s undesirable effects is the freezing of the public
domain. We are in the initial stages of a two-decade period in
which no copyrights will expire and no works will enter the
public domain. This throws off the balance contemplated by
the framers in the Constitution’s Copyright Clause and serves
as one of the reasons why the CTEA should have been regarded
by courts as not merely unwise but unconstitutional.14
In addition, this article examines the Eldred decision in
which the Supreme Court held that the CTEA passed
constitutional muster despite its questionable public policy.15
The Eldred assessment set forth here reveals serious
deficiencies in the Court’s analysis and demonstrates why
Justice Breyer had the better of the argument. In his dissent,
Justice Breyer asserted that the CTEA reflected “failings of
Recognizing that Eldred, even if
constitutional kind.”16
wrongly decided, has resolved nearly all questions concerning
the CTEA’s constitutionality, this article will explore that
decision’s implications for the future of copyright law and
policy. In doing so, we offer recommendations for future
copyright-related courses of action on the part of Congress,
courts, copyright owners, and users of copyrighted works.17
II. COPYRIGHT DURATION: THE HISTORICAL RECORD
A. THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE AND THE 1790, 1831, AND 1909 ACTS
Placing the CTEA in proper perspective requires
consideration of the history of congressional enactments
13. CTEA, supra note 5, §§ 302, 304(b).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 166-173, 210-222, 246-252, 266267, 274-276, 290-295, 395-399.
15. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 222. For extensive examination of Eldred, see
Part III of this article.
16. Id. at 243 (Breyer, J., dissenting). We explore Justice Breyer’s dissent
in a later subsection. See infra Part III.C.
17. See infra Part V.

LANGVARDT

2004]

05/12/2004 12:52 PM

UNWISE OR UNCONSTITUTIONAL?

197

dealing with copyright duration. The U.S. Constitution grants
Congress the power to legislate with regard to copyrights and
patents in Article I, § 8: “Congress shall have Power . . . To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
The
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”18
“promot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful Arts” portion of
the clause has been characterized as a limitation on the grant
of power to Congress because it states the objective that
congressional exercises of the power must fulfill.19 This portion
of the clause and its proper role will receive further attention
later in the article.20 Congress is also cabined by the Copyright
Clause’s “limited Times” language: Congress cannot
constitutionally make copyright protection perpetual.21 Thus,
the matter of copyright duration has a constitutional
dimension.
Congress enacted the first federal copyright law in 1790. It
granted rights to creators of new works as well as creators of
preexisting works.22 The 1790 Act established a copyright
duration of 14 years from the date of the work’s publication,
with a 14-year renewal term being available if the creator
survived the basic term.23 In 1831, Congress amended the
copyright duration rule to provide for a basic term of 28 years
but made no change in the length of the possible renewal
term.24 The duration rule established by the 1831 Act applied
to works created after the statute’s effective date and to
preexisting works that were still in their initial copyright term
at the time the statute took effect.25
After the 1831 Act, 78 years elapsed before Congress again
lengthened copyright duration. In the Copyright Act of 1909,
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
19. See e.g., Eldred, 537 U.S. 212; Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1,
5 (1966).
20. See infra Part IV.B.
21. See e.g., Eldred, 537 U.S. at 199-209 (suggesting that when the Court
affirmed past copyright term extensions as being constitutionally valid in
accordance with “limited Times,” it did not imply that the Constitution
authorized perpetually unlimited times).
22. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed by Act of Apr. 29,
1802, ch. 36, Act of Feb. 15, 1819, ch. 19, Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, and by Act
of June 30, 1834, ch. 157).
23. Id.
24. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, §§ 1-2, 4 Stat. 436, 436-37.
25. Id. §§ 1, 16.
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Congress added 14 years to the previous maximum duration of
42 years.26 The 1909 Act established a maximum copyright
duration of 56 years from publication—28 years for the basic
term plus another 28 for the renewal term provided that the
renewal right was properly exercised.27
B. THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976
The Copyright Act of 1976 took effect January 1, 1978.
With it, Congress effected a major overhaul of copyright law.28
Congress concluded that for future works, copyright duration
should be determined on some basis other than the basic-termplus-renewal approach of previous copyright law.29 Two key
factors led to this conclusion. First, the potentially harsh
nature of the renewal requirement meant that a copyright
owner’s slip-up in filing renewal paperwork could result in the
receipt of only 28 years of copyright protection. Second, the
basic-term-plus-renewal approach was incompatible with the
duration provision called for by the Berne Convention, an
important international agreement that the United States
seemed likely to join in the near future.30 Congress therefore
26. Copyright Act of 1909, supra note 1.
27. See id. Failure to take appropriate steps to renew the copyright
during the final year of the basic term meant that the work passed into the
public domain at the end of the basic term. See id.
28. Copyright Act of 1976, supra note 2. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
186, 264 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (referring to 1976 Act as having
“thoroughly revised copyright law”). Details concerning the many changes
made by the 1976 Act, other than those dealing with copyright duration, are
largely beyond the scope of this article. However, we occasionally address a
rules-change made by the 1976 Act if it bears at least a general relationship to
the matter of duration. See, e.g., infra note 31 and accompanying text.
29. See e.g., H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 134-35 (1976) (listing rationales for
changing to duration based on the life of the author).
30. See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 9.02 (1995) (noting the “clumsy renewal structure” of the 1909 Act); Patrick
H. Haggerty, The Constitutionality of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term
Extension Act of 1998, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 651, 658 (2002) (the 1909 renewal
system resulted in a “substantial burden and expense to the author;” further,
the United States needed to join the Berne Convention); Eldred, 537 U.S. at
194-95 (the 1976 Act aligned the United States with the Berne Convention)
(Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 259, 264-65 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (the 1976 Act
allowed the United States to conform to “an important international treaty”);
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 135-36 (the extended copyright term was required
by the Berne Convention); S. REP. No. 94-473, at 118 (1975) (without the
proposed “life-plus 50” term, the United States would not be able to adhere to
the Berne Convention). The Berne Convention required subscribing nations to
provide, in their respective copyright laws, that copyright protection would
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established a different set of duration rules for works created in
1978 or thereafter.31 The basic rule for the duration of works
created on or after January 1, 1978 became the life of the
creator plus 50 years.32 Joint-creator works produced in 1978
or later were to receive copyright protection for the life of the
last surviving creator plus 50 years.33 In choosing a “life plus
50” framework for the basic rule and the joint-creator rule,
Congress borrowed from the Berne Convention’s duration
provision.34
The 1976 Act’s revised duration rules included a separate
provision dealing with works-for-hire.35 Works-for-hire created
on or after January 1, 1978 would be protected for 75 years
from first publication of the work or 100 years from the work’s
creation, whichever came first.36 Anonymous or pseudonymous
works created on or after January 1, 1978 have the same
duration.37
last for a minimum of 50 years beyond the creator’s life. Berne Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, revised at Paris,
July 24, 1971, art. 7, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne
Convention]. The United States did not formally join the Berne Convention
until 1989, after Congress made other necessary changes in U.S. copyright
law. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568,
102 Stat. 2853 (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). Nevertheless, the
duration changes made in the 1976 Act proved critical to that effort. Eldred,
537 U.S. at 195; id. at 259, 264-65 (Breyer, J., dissenting); H.R. Rep. No. 941476, at 135-36; S. Rep. No. 94-473, at 118.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 32-37. The 1976 Act also departed
from prior law by making creation of the work, rather than the publication
thereof, the key event triggering the commencement of copyright protection.
Compare Copyright Act of 1976, supra note 2, § 102 with Copyright Act of
1909, supra note 1, §§ 9-10. As will be seen, the longstanding duration rule
that called for a basic term of 28 years from publication plus a possible
renewal term continues to govern copyrighted pre-1978 works, though the
1976 Act lengthened the renewal term for qualifying pre-1978 works.
Copyright Act of 1976, supra note 2, § 304; see also infra text accompanying
notes 38-41. Works created prior to 1978 but not published until 1978 or later
were made subject to the newly developed rules for works created on or after
January 1, 1978. Copyright Act of 1976, supra note 2, § 303.
32. Copyright Act of 1976, supra note 2, § 302(a).
33. Id. § 302(b).
34. Berne Convention, supra note 30, art. 7.
35. The requirements for a work to constitute a work-for-hire to exist are
currently set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). When a work-for-hire, exists, the
copyright owner is the employer or the party for whom (or for which) the
employee or the independent contractor prepared the work 17 U.S.C. § 201(b)
(2000).
36. Copyright Act of 1976, supra note 2, § 302(c).
37. Id.
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Congress also revisited the duration rule for pre-1978
works (the 28-plus-28 rule set forth in the 1909 Act).38 The
maximum 56-year duration established in the 1909 Act seemed
likely to be a shorter period of copyright protection than the
average term of protection under the life-plus-50 rule for works
created in 1978 or thereafter.39 Therefore, as part of the
Copyright Act of 1976, Congress modified the 1909 Act’s
duration rule by providing that if a pre-1978 work was under
either its basic term or renewal term as of January 1, 1978, the
renewal term would be 47 years rather than 28.40 The
maximum duration for qualifying pre-1978 works thus became
75 years from publication.41
The duration change just described accounts for the 75year duration of the copyright on the work referred to in the
first of the two hypotheticals with which this article opened.
Let us return briefly to that first hypothetical. In view of the
28-plus-28 rule of the 1909 Act, the work created and published
in 1922 would have received 56 years of copyright protection
and would then have passed into the public domain if not for
the extension provided for by the 1976 Act. Because the 1922
work’s copyright remained valid as of January 1, 1978, the
renewal term that would have been 28 years under the 1909
Act became 47 years under the 1976 Act. This meant that the
copyright on the 1922 work ran for 75 years, through the end of
1997.42

38. Copyright Act of 1909, supra note 1, § 23.
39. Symposium, The Constitutionality of Copyright Term Extension: How
Long Is Too Long?, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 651, 698-99 (2000)
(comments of Jane C. Ginsburg).
40. Copyright Act of 1976, supra note 2, § 304.
41. Copyright Act of 1976, supra note 2, § 304. The foregoing explanation
simplifies a somewhat more complex historical reality. The major copyright
overhaul that finally took place in the 1976 Act required more than a decade of
legislative preparation to accomplish. Confident that the overhaul almost
certainly would include duration modifications but not knowing exactly when
the full statute would be ready for enactment, Congress, beginning in 1962,
passed a series of annual extensions of durations on copyrights that were in
their renewal terms. RALPH S. BROWN & ROBERT DENICOLA, CASES ON
COPYRIGHT 481 (7th ed. 1998). These annual extensions kept the copyrights
on many works alive long enough to enable them to receive the 75-year
duration established in the 1976 Act for qualifying pre-1978 works. Id.;
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 196 n.2 (2003).
42. See citations and explanation in supra note 7.
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C. THE COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION ACT OF 1998
The 1976 Act granted an additional 19 years of copyright
protection to qualifying pre-1978 works and substituted new
rules that lengthened the average copyright term for works
created in 1978 or thereafter. In doing so, the 1976 Act
increased copyright duration to a greater degree than had the
The jump in
earlier extensions enacted by Congress.43
copyright term from 56 years to 75 or more years was not
enough, however, as far as some copyright owners were
concerned. The 1990s witnessed a significant behind-thescenes lobbying effort, mounted largely by corporate copyright
owners, for another statutory extension of copyright duration.44
Among the leading proponents of a term extension was The
Walt Disney Company.45 Its copyright on the “Steamboat
Willie” cartoon, which featured the first depiction of the Mickey
Mouse character, was set to expire in the very early years of
the 21st Century unless a term extension became law.46 In
addition, other Disney copyrights were destined for the same
fate in steady succession if the duration rule remained as it
was.47
The lobbyists and the sponsors of the relevant legislation
stressed the supposed benefits that both corporate and
individual copyright owners would receive from a duration
extension.48 They relied on the support of organizations such
43. The extensions established in the 1909 and 1831 statutes had each
been 14 years in length. Copyright Act of 1909, supra note 1, § 24; Act of Feb.
3, 1831, ch. 16, §§ 1, 16, 4 Stat. 436, 439.
44. For accounts of the lobbying effort, see Dennis S. Karjala, Eldred v.
Ashcroft: Intellectual Property, Congressional Power, and the Constitution:
Judicial Review of Copyright Term Extension Legislation, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
199, 203-04, 229, 232-33, 235 (2002); Daren Fonda, Copyright Crusader,
BOSTON GLOBE MAGAZINE, Aug. 29, 1999; Bill McAllister, A Capital Way to
Stop a Headache, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1998, at A21; Brigid McMenamin,
Mickey’s Mine!, FORBES MAGAZINE, Aug. 23, 1999, at 43; Dinitia Smith,
Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey Mouse Joins the Fray,
N.Y. TIMES, March 28, 1998, at B7, B9; John Solomon, Rhapsody in Green,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 3, 1999, at E2.
45. See generally, supra note 44.
46. See generally, supra note 44.
47. See generally, supra note 44.
48. See 144 CONG. REC. S12377 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of
Sen. Hatch, co-sponsor of the CTEA); 141 CONG. REC. S3390-92 (daily ed. Feb.
22, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch when extension bill was first considered in
1995); 141 CONG. REC. S3393 (statement of Sen. Feinstein, co-sponsor of
CTEA, when extension bill was first considered in 1995); Fonda, supra note
44; McAllister, supra note 44, at A21; Smith, supra note 44, at A1.
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as the Motion Picture Association of America, the estates of
well-known composers such as George and Ira Gershwin, and
the estates of less famous creators.49 The CTEA’s proponents
also paraded before congressional committees an assortment of
musical artists who urged enactment of the duration
extension.50 The well-financed backers of the legislation had
little difficulty drowning out the objections of those who
questioned the wisdom and constitutionality of extending
copyright duration yet again.51 As a result, the CTEA became
49. See supra note 48.
50. Quincy Jones provided testimony to a House subcommittee. Hearing
on H.R. 989 Before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 233-39 (1995) [hereinafter
Hearing on H.R. 989] (statement of Quincy Jones in regard to CTEA
forerunner when bill was under consideration in 1995). Bob Dylan, Don
Henley, and Carlos Santana expressed their views to a Senate committee.
Hearing on S. 483 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong.
55-56 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 Senate Hearings] (statement of Bob Dylan in
regard to CTEA forerunner when bill was under consideration in 1995); id. at
56-57 (statement of Don Henley regarding same bill); id. at 57 (statement of
Carlos Santana regarding same bill). The hearings dealing with what later
became the CTEA occurred in 1995, when congressional committees first
considered extending existing and future copyrights by 20 years. See S. 483,
104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 989, 104th Cong. (1995). The extension bill became
stalled over another copyright issue, namely, whether restaurants, bars, and
other small businesses should have to pay performance fees to song copyright
owners when they played the radio or television at their establishments.
Karjala, supra note 44, at 204 n.21; Fonda, supra note 44. That issue was not
resolved until 1998, when Congress settled on the terms of the Fairness in
Music Licensing Act (FMLA). Congress then revived the CTEA proposal and,
in short order, enacted it along with the FMLA. CTEA, supra note 5, §§ 102(b)
& 102(d), 112 Stat. 2827-28; Fairness in Music Licensing Act, Pub. L. No. 105298, §§ 201-07, 112 Stat. 2830 (amending 17 U.S.C. § 110). In doing so,
Congress did not conduct further hearings of an extensive nature on the
duration-extension issues. Fonda, supra note 44. See McMenamin, supra note
44, at 43; Solomon, supra note 44, at E2.
51. See Fonda, supra note 44, at 25-27; McAllister, supra note 44, at A21;
Smith, supra note 44, at B7; Solomon, supra note 44, at E2. When it enacted
the CTEA, Congress “acceded to the demands of noncreative heirs and
assignees.” Karjala, supra note 44, at 199. Professor Dennis Karjala worked
tirelessly in seeking to inform Congress of the problems with the CTEA when
it was first proposed in 1995 and when it resurfaced in 1998. See, e.g.,
Statement of Copyright and Intellectual Property Law Professors In Opposition
to H.R. 604, H.R. 2589, and S. 505, The Copyright Term Extension Act,
Submitted to the Committees on the Judiciary, Senate and House of
Representatives, 105th Cong. (Jan. 28, 1998) [hereinafter Statement of
Copyright Law Professors] (statement of Dennis S. Karjala, representing group
of approximately 60 copyright and intellectual property law professors);
Written Testimony Before the House of Representatives Committee on the
Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property, on H.R. 989, A
Bill to Amend Title 17, United States Code, With Respect to the Duration of
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law with almost no opposition in Congress and with minimal
public fanfare.52 One assumes, however, that there was plenty
of fanfare in certain corporate boardrooms and offices.53
Congress officially named the CTEA the “Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act,” in memory of the late
entertainer-turned-Congressman, who had favored the
legislation.54 Bettering the previous length-of-extension record
by one year, the CTEA tacked on 20 years to the copyright
terms of both pre-1978 works and works created in 1978 or
thereafter.55 The CTEA thus applied both retrospectively (to
certain works that existed prior to its enactment) and
prospectively (to works created after it took effect in 1998).
For a pre-1978 work to qualify for the 20-year extension
established in the CTEA, the work’s copyright must still have
been valid in either the basic term or the renewal term as of
Copyright, 104th Cong. (July 13, 1995) (written testimony of Dennis S.
Karjala, representing group of approximately 45 copyright and intellectual
property law professors); see link to Opposing Copyright Extension, at
http:www.law.asu.edu/HomePages/Karjala (site maintained by Dennis S.
Karjala, Professor of Law, Arizona State University) (last visited Apr. 9, 2004).
In the constitutional challenge that made its way to the Supreme Court,
Professor Lawrence Lessig took the lead. See infra notes 398, 415; infra text
accompanying notes 416-417, 422.
52. See Fonda, supra note 44, at 25-26; Solomon, supra note 44, at E2.
For discussion of the circumstances surrounding the CTEA’s 1998 enactment
after bills proposing the same duration extension had been put on legislative
hold in 1995, see supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
53. See Fonda, supra note 44, at 25-28; McMenamin, supra note 44, at 43;
Solomon, supra note 44, at E2.
54. CETA, supra note 5. Originally, Bono had favored making copyright
protection perpetual, though one assumes he must have backed off from that
position upon being informed that the Constitution prohibited Congress from
taking such action.
See Copyright Term, Film Labeling, and Film
Preservation: Hearing on H.R. 989 et al. Before the Subcommittee on Courts
and Intellectual Property of the House Judiciary Committee, 104th Cong. 94
(1995) (statement of Rep. Sonny Bono, raising question about whether
copyrights should ever expire). See also 144 CONG REC. H9952 (daily ed. Oct.
7, 1998) (statement of Rep. Mary Bono, who succeeded her late husband in the
House, noting that Sonny Bono had favored perpetual copyright protection but
that she had been “informed by staff” of the unconstitutionality of such a move
by Congress).
55. 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304 (2000). Professor Karjala has observed that no
pro-CTEA speakers—whether witnesses at hearings or members of
Congress—attempted to make a special case for the statute’s prospective
application. Instead, witnesses and members of Congress focused in their
statements on the supposed need to extend the duration of existing copyrights.
See Karjala, supra note 44, at 204, 216. This fact seems to demonstrate the
real object of congressional attention on the question of duration extension.
See id.
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October 1998.56 Many of the pre-1978 works that had received
the 1976 Act’s 19-year term extension also qualified for the
CTEA’s 20-year extension. Under the CTEA, the renewal term
for qualifying pre-1978 works has become 67 years, with the
total copyright duration for such works now being 95 years.57
We return, for illustrative purposes, to the hypotheticals
with which this article began. As explained in the earlier
discussion of the first hypothetical, the 1922 work qualified for
the lengthened renewal term of 47 years established by the
1976 Act’s extension of the 28-year renewal term called for by
the statute under which the work’s copyright arose. The 47year renewal term ran through the end of 1997. Accordingly,
the copyright on the 1922 work expired just prior to the CTEA’s
1998 enactment, meaning that the work did not qualify for the
20 additional years of protection contemplated by the CTEA.58
The story is significantly different, however, for the work
described in the second hypothetical. That work’s year of
creation, publication, and copyright acquisition was 1923. The
1951 renewal of the copyright on the work meant that the work
clearly remained under copyright as of January 1, 1978. The
renewal term therefore would have lasted for 47 years from
1951, if not for the CTEA’s further sweetening of the pot.
Measuring 47 years from the time of copyright renewal in 1951
would yield a date in 1998. Because copyrights run until the
end of the relevant year, the copyright on the 1923 work would
have expired at the end of 1998 if the CTEA had not been
enacted. But because the 1923 work was still under copyright
as of the October 1998 effective date of the CTEA, the 1923
work qualified for the CTEA’s 20-year bonus. The copyright on
that work therefore will not expire until the end of 2018.59
Consider, too, the similar good fortune of The Walt Disney
Company, whose copyright on the “Steamboat Willie” cartoon
would have entered the public domain on January 1, 2004 if the
CTEA had not been enacted.60 Instead, that copyright will
remain valid through 2023. Also put off for 20 years each are
the other copyright expirations that, if not for the CTEA,
Disney would regularly have experienced after the expiration of
56. 17 U.S.C. § 304(a), (b).
57. Id.
58. See supra note 7.
59. See supra note 9.
60. Fonda, supra note 44, at 25; McAllister, supra note 44, at A21;
Solomon, supra note 44, at E2.
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the Steamboat Willie copyright. The same is true of many
other owners—whether corporate persons or natural persons—
of pre-1978 work copyrights that would have expired beginning
January 1, 1999 had the CTEA not come to the rescue.
The CTEA’s application to qualifying pre-1978 works, as
detailed in the preceding paragraphs, has produced a
noteworthy effect: a frozen public domain. Since the CTEA’s
enactment, no works have entered the public domain. None
will do so until the thaw begins on January 1, 2019.61 This
CTEA effect will receive further attention later in the article.62
We now turn to the CTEA’s application to works created on
or after January 1, 1978. Here, the CTEA did not cause the
immediately visible and dramatic effect it produced regarding
certain pre-1978 works: significantly delaying the entry into
the public domain of works that were on the verge of entering
In view of the life-plus-50 rule established in the
it.63
Copyright Act of 1976 for most works created in 1978 or
thereafter, January 1, 2029 was the earliest time any work in
that category could have entered the public domain.64 For the
vast majority of works in that category, the time of copyright
expiration would have been much later. The CTEA’s addition
of 20 years to the duration of copyrights on works created on or
after January 1, 197865 thus put off an inevitability that
61. Copyrights run until the end of the relevant calendar year. 17 U.S.C.
§ 305 (2000). Therefore, any work whose copyright survived into 1998
qualified for the CTEA’s 20-year bonus, which applied not only to future
copyrights but also to existing copyrights that were still in effect as of the
statute’s 1998 effective date. Id. §§ 302 & 304. Any copyright that would have
expired at the end of 1998 will, thanks to the CTEA, run through 2018. Id. §
304(b). Hence, no works have entered the public domain since January 1,
1998 (the date of entry of works whose copyrights expired at the end of 1997).
The public domain will receive no additions until January 1, 2019. See id.
62. See infra text accompanying notes 173, 210-222, 274-276, 290-295,
395-396, 411-415.
63. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
64. See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000). For illustrative purposes, consider the
case of a person who created a copyrighted work in 1978 and then died that
same year. The life-plus-50 rule, operating in conjunction with the rule that
copyrights exist until the end of the relevant year, would have dictated a
copyright duration running through 2028. Id. § 305. Hence, January 1, 2029
would have been the underlying work’s date of entry into the public domain—
the earliest possible public domain entry date under the pre-CTEA rule
governing the duration of works created in 1978 or thereafter. Post-CTEA,
such works cannot enter the public domain until January 1, 2049 at the
earliest. 17 U.S.C. § 302.
65. In regard to works created in 1978 or thereafter, the CTEA’s
application was both retrospective (to works created between January 1, 1978
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already seemed rather distant.
Even so, the long-term
significance of this aspect of the CTEA will be considerable, as
will be discussed extensively in this article.
With the enactment of the CTEA, the duration rule for
most copyrighted works created on or after January 1, 1978 has
become life of the creator plus 70 years.66 The CTEA similarly
adjusted the rule for joint-creator works.67 That duration rule
now speaks in terms of the life of the last surviving creator plus
70 years (increased from 50).68 Finally, the CTEA added 20 to
the relevant numbers of years set forth in the rules governing
the duration of copyrights on works-for-hire and anonymous
and pseudonymous works.69 Those rules now call for a
duration of 95 years from first publication (increased from 75)
or 120 years from creation (increased from 100), whichever
comes first.70
Congress may have acted unwisely when it enacted the
CTEA, but did it act unconstitutionally? Eldred v. Ashcroft71
presented that fundamental question. In the following section,
we offer an in-depth examination of Eldred.
III. THE ELDRED V. ASHCROFT DECISION
The plaintiffs in Eldred were providers of products or
services that involved the use of public domain works.72 They
filed suit against the United States Attorney General in an
effort to have the CTEA declared unconstitutional.73 The
and the CTEA’s 1998 enactment) and prospective (to works created after the
CTEA’s enactment). 17 U.S.C. § 302. Pre-CTEA works created from 1978 on
were made subject to the same qualifying condition applied to pre-1978 works:
that they still were under copyright at the time the CTEA came on the scene.
Id. See id. § 304(a), (b). Unlike the pre-1978 works, some of which qualified
for the CTEA jackpot and some of which did not, all pre-CTEA works created
on or after January 1, 1978 would have satisfied the qualifying condition.
Under the life-plus-50 rule that existed prior to the CTEA, no copyright on a
work created in 1978 or thereafter could have expired any earlier than the end
of 2028. See supra note 64.
66. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a).
67. Id. § 302(b).
68. Id.
69. Id. § 302(c).
70. Id.
71. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
72. Id. at 193.
73. Id. The lead plaintiff, Eric Eldred, operates a website on which he
provided free access to copies of a wide range of public domain works. See
http://www.eldritchpress.org (last visited Apr. 9, 2004). For a profile of

LANGVARDT

2004]

05/12/2004 12:52 PM

UNWISE OR UNCONSTITUTIONAL?

207

above-described 20-year freeze on the public domain caused the
plaintiffs immediate concern because they very soon would
have had unrestricted ability to use many works that were on
the verge of entering the public domain at the time the CTEA
was enacted. As previously explained, however, the CTEA
delayed those works’ entry date into the public domain by two
decades. In addition, the CTEA’s long-term consequences for
the public domain troubled the plaintiffs.74
Recognizing that merely demonstrating why the CTEA was
bad policy would not enable them to win the case, the plaintiffs
stressed, as grounds for judicial intervention, what they
regarded as constitutional infirmities in the CTEA. The U.S.
District Court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments that the CTEA
violated the Constitution’s Copyright Clause and First
Amendment, and granted the Attorney General judgment on
the pleadings.75 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit affirmed and later denied both rehearing and
rehearing en banc.76
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide two
questions: “whether the CTEA’s extension of existing
copyrights exceeds Congress’ power under the Copyright
Clause; and whether the CTEA’s extension of existing and
future copyrights violates the First Amendment.”77 With Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy,
Souter, and Thomas joining an opinion authored by Justice
Ginsburg, the Court affirmed the decision of the Court of
Appeals and held that the CTEA violated neither the Copyright
Clause nor the First Amendment.78 The following subsections
summarize Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion and the
separate dissents of Justices Stevens and Breyer. After those
subsections, we subject the decision to careful analysis.
Eldred, see Fonda, supra note 44.
74. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 266 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Eldred v. Reno,
239 F.3d 372, 373-74 (D.C. Cir. 2001), rehearing and rehearing en banc denied,
255 F.3d 849 (2001), aff’d sub nom. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
See also Fonda, supra note 44 (discussing Eldred’s concerns about CTEA).
75. Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3-4 (D.D.C. 1999).
76. Eldred, 239 F.3d at 375-76, 377-78 (D.C. Cir. 2001), rehearing and
rehearing en banc denied, 255 F.3d 847 (2001).
77. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 198. The first of these questions reflected Eldred’s
decision to focus (in the Supreme Court proceedings) on the CTEA’s
retrospective application. Id. at 193.
78. Id. at 187-91 (syllabus); see also id. at 194,198, 204-05, 208-09, 221-22.
Justices Stevens and Breyer dissented. Id. at 222 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id.
at 242 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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A. THE GINSBURG MAJORITY OPINION
Early in her opinion, Justice Ginsburg emphasized that the
petitioners (referred to here collectively as “Eldred”) did not
contest the validity of the CTEA insofar as it applied to
copyrights arising after the statute’s effective date.79 Eldred’s
position was that the CTEA’s unconstitutionality resided in its
The court was
application to existing copyrights.80
unsympathetic to Eldred’s primary contention: that the
Copyright Clause bars Congress from extending the terms of
existing copyrights.81
With the Court not previously having had occasion to
decide whether Congress could constitutionally lengthen the
duration of existing copyrights,82 Justice Ginsburg began by
observing that the CTEA was merely the latest in a long series,
stretching back nearly as far as the Constitution itself, of
retroactive extensions of term length.83 The first in the series,
she asserted, was the Copyright Act of 1790. The 1790 Act,
which set a basic copyright term and provided for the
possibility of a renewal term, applied not only to new works but
also to already existing works that had been subject to state
copyright.84 Similarly, Justice Ginsburg noted, the duration
extensions of the 1831 Act, the 1909 Act, and the 1976 Act
applied to existing as well as future works.85
Justice Ginsburg characterized Eldred’s argument as one
that “essentially reads into the text of the Copyright Clause the
command that a time prescription, once set, becomes forever
‘fixed’ or ‘inalterable.’”86 Rejecting such a view, the Court
reasoned that a congressional decision to extend the term of
existing copyrights did not in and of itself create tension with

79. Id. at 193.
80. Id. at 193, 198. See id. at 221-22. In the lower courts, Eldred had
made a broader challenge, arguing that the CTEA was unconstitutional in its
retrospective and prospective applications. See Eldred 239 F.3d at 373-74.
81. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 204; see also id. at 208, 219.
82. Id. at 202.
83. Id. at 194-96.
84. Id. at 194, 200.
Justice Stevens disputed Justice Ginsburg’s
characterization of the 1790 Act as the first in a series of duration extensions
for existing copyrights. Instead of being a duration extension, he said, the
1790 Act created the federal copyright regime. Id. at 230-32 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). See infra text accompanying notes 181-182.
85. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 194, 200-01, 204.
86. Id. at 199-200.
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the Copyright Clause’s “limited Times” provision.87 Justice
Ginsburg then added an observation to which she would return
later: “there [was] no cause to suspect that a purpose to evade
the ‘limited Times’ prescription prompted Congress to adopt the
CTEA.”88
As a possible further indication that Congress may
constitutionally apply a term extension to existing copyrights,
the Court noted that during the first part of the 19th Century,
Congress had extended the duration of individual patents on
various occasions.89 Congress, moreover, had done so with
judicial approval in cases in which Chief Justice Marshall and
Justice Story sat as circuit justices.90 Because the patent
authority of Congress stems from the same constitutional
source as its copyright authority, the Court concluded that the
early judicial decisions on patent term extensions were relevant
to the proper resolution of the current CTEA-related issues.91
Justice Ginsburg also pointed out that in an 1843 decision, the
Supreme Court had approved the retrospective application of a
change in requirements for patentability.92 If changes in
patent law could be applied in that fashion, Justice Ginsburg
reasoned, the same should be true of a new provision on
copyright duration.93
According to the Eldred majority, the congressional
rationale for applying copyright duration adjustments to
existing works has traditionally been founded in a principle of
equity: that it would be unfair to grant more favorable terms of
87. Id. The Court stated that if a time period would be considered limited
as applied to future copyrights, it still would be limited as to existing
copyrights even though it extended the expiration point established in prior
law. Id. This assumes, of course, that the extension did not go so far as to
eliminate any expiration point and thereby make copyrights perpetual in
duration. See id.
88. Id. at 199-200; see id. 209-10 & n.16. For consideration of the
meaning and potential implications of the Court’s statements in this regard,
see infra text accompanying notes 340-349, 459-464; see also infra note 411.
89. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 201-202.
90. Id. at 202. The well-aged cases cited by the Court were Evans v.
Jordan, 8 F. Cas. 872, 874 (C.C. Va. 1813) (No. 4,564) (Marshall, Circuit
Justice), aff’d, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 199 (1815); Blanchard v. Sprague, 3 F. Cas.
648, 650 (C.C. Mass. 1839) (No. 1,518) (Story, Circuit Justice); and Evan v.
Robinson, 8 F. Cas. 886, 888 (C.C. Md. 1813) (No. 4,571). Eldred, 537 U.S. at
202.
91. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 201.
92. Id. at 202-03. McClurg v. Kingsland, 1 How. 202 (1843), was the 160year-old decision cited by the Court. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 202-03.
93. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 203-04.
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protection to authors whose works acquired copyright
protection the day those terms took effect than to authors
whose works came under copyright a short time earlier.94
Since the 19th Century, Congress had frequently acted on this
The Court regarded the CTEA’s retroactive
principle.95
application as being in line with the “consistent historical
practice” of Congress.96 Taking into account “text, history, and
precedent,” Justice Ginsburg stated, “we cannot agree with
[Eldred’s] submission that extending the duration of existing
copyrights is categorically beyond Congress’ authority under
the Copyright Clause.”97
Having satisfied itself that the CTEA complied with the
“limited Times” provision of the Copyright Clause, the Court
turned its attention to whether the CTEA’s retroactive
component was a rational exercise of Copyright Clause
authority.98 As Justice Ginsburg recounted, Congress had
concerns regarding U.S. copyright law’s duration provisions in
relation to the copyright term provided for in the European
Union.99 A 1993 EU directive had instructed all member states
to adopt a term of life of the creator plus 70 years.100 The EU
operates under the rule of the shorter term, which means that
if a work is under copyright outside the EU, the EU regards the
copyright as expired once either the EU term or the foreign
term has passed.101 In other words, even though an EUcopyrighted work would pass into the EU’s public domain only
after the work’s author had been dead 70 years, a U.S.copyrighted work would pass into the EU’s public domain a
mere 50 years after the author’s death—so long as life-plus-50
94. Id. at 204.
95. Id. The Court stressed that the copyright duration extensions set
forth in the 1831, 1909, and 1976 Acts had involved attempts on the part of
the Congress to “place[] existing and future copyrights in parity.” Id. at 194,
208.
96. See id. at 204.
97. Id.
98. Id. Justice Ginsburg wasted little time in pointing out that the
Court’s review in this regard would involve paying considerable deference to
Congress and that she disapproved of Justice Breyer’s proposal for a form of
heightened review. Id. at 205 & n.10. She asserted that her colleague’s
“stringent version of rationality is unknown to our literary property
jurisprudence.” Id. Justice Breyer’s proposal receives discussion at infra
notes 206-209, 409 and accompanying text.
99. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 205-206.
100. Id. at 205.
101. Id.
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remained the duration set by U.S. law. Congress presumably
concluded that extending the term of copyright by 20 years
would afford U.S. authors the same protections in Europe as
those provided to EU authors, and would make the U.S. a more
attractive location for the creation and dissemination of
copyrightable works.102
Justice Ginsburg also observed that Congress had certain
“demographic, economic, and technological” trends in mind
when it considered the CTEA.103 For one, an extended term
would give copyright owners added incentive to put out new
editions of copyrighted works, to restore them, and to bring
about their greater public distribution.104 In light of new
technologies, media, and means of distribution, this aim
appeared especially important.105 Some members of Congress,
moreover, expressed concern that in view of increases in life
expectancies and the tendencies of people to have children later
in life, the life-plus-50 term could be insufficient to ensure that
royalties from an author’s work would not be cut off before all
of his or her children and grandchildren die.106 Accordingly,
Congress concluded that life-plus-70 would be a more enticing
term to family-minded potential authors.107 In reaching this
conclusion, Congress evidently took into account the committee
hearing testimony of “prominent artists” such as Quincy Jones,
Bob Dylan, Don Henley, and Carlos Santana, who “expressed
the belief that the copyright system’s assurance of fair
compensation for themselves and their heirs was an incentive

102. See id. at 205-06 (majority opinion). In his dissent, Justice Breyer
stressed that contrary to the impression the Court may have left, the CTEA’s
supposed harmonization of U.S. law with EU law was woefully incomplete. Id.
at 257-60 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See infra text accompanying notes 243-245,
319-320.
103. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 206.
104. Id. at 207.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 207 n.14.
107. Id. Justice Breyer noted in his dissent that for would-be creators, the
lengthened term would not furnish any meaningful work-creation incentive
beyond what the already substantial copyright duration would have provided.
Id. at 255-56 (Breyer, J. dissenting). He also stressed that the lengthened
term could not possibly furnish an incentive for the creation of an already
created work. Id. Discussion of Justice Breyer’s dissent appears at in Part
III.C. For critical analysis of the Eldred majority’s treatment of the Copyright
Clause’s incentive requirement and the incentive issues presented by the
CTEA, see infra text accompanying notes 325-339.
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to create.”108 The Register of Copyrights, Marybeth Peters, also
offered committee hearing testimony that extending the
duration of existing copyrights could furnish additional income
that would help finance the creation of new works.109
The Eldred majority made no attempt to determine
whether the conclusions reached by Congress were
unassailable or whether the supporting testimony and
considerations taken into account by Congress reflected
soundness in all respects. After noting that the inquiry into
whether the CTEA was a rational exercise of Copyright Clause
authority required the Court to “defer substantially” to the
judgments of Congress, Justice Ginsburg stressed that the
CTEA “reflects judgments of a kind Congress typically makes,
judgments we cannot dismiss as outside [its] domain.”110
Justice Ginsburg appeared to acknowledge that there was
room for doubt about whether the 20-year duration extension
called for by the CTEA was good public policy.
She
emphasized, however, that the Court was “not at liberty to
second-guess congressional determinations and policy
judgments of this order, however debatable or arguably unwise
they may be.”111 Holding that the CTEA passed the lenient
rationality test, the Court issued a less-than-ringing
endorsement: “[W]e cannot conclude that the CTEA . . . is an
impermissible exercise of Congress’ power under the Copyright
Clause.”112
The Court then turned to other Copyright Clause
arguments raised by Eldred—arguments that Justice Ginsburg
regarded as resting on “several novel readings” of the clause.113
Addressing Eldred’s concern that retroactive extensions of
copyrights could be strung together in a way that would make

108. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 207-08 n.15. This quartet’s comments and
apparent influence on Congress will receive further attention later in the
article. See infra text accompanying notes 277-285.
109. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 207-08 n.15. The comment attributed to Peters is
a curious one. A general system of copyright protection may, of course, lead to
income from a particular work—income that could help support a creator at
the time he or she is creating another work. Any income from the extra 20
years of copyright protection on an earlier work, however, could not possibly
help a long-deceased creator produce another work by writing from the grave.
See id. at 255 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 205.
111. Id. at 208.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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for an effectively perpetual term, Justice Ginsburg wrote that
there was no reason to suspect Congress of attempting to make
an end-run around the “limited Times” constraint.114 Earlier
retroactive extensions, the Court emphasized, did not create
perpetual terms, and the CTEA was no different.115
Justice Ginsburg dismissed Justice Breyer’s calculation
that a CTEA-regime copyright is already “virtually perpetual”
because the economic incentive provided by a term of 95 years
is equal to 99.8% of a perpetual term’s value.116 The 1976 Act,
however, created an incentive that was 99.4% of the value of a
perpetual term; the 1909 Act, 97.7%; the 1831 Act, 94.1%.117
Justice Ginsburg suggested that if a figure near the 100% mark
could make a duration extension unconstitutional because it
supposedly would not be a limited time for purposes of the
Copyright Clause, then not only the Sonny Bono Act but also
the 1976 Act’s term extension would be invalidated.118 Even
the earlier statutory extensions of duration would be suspect.119
The Court did not believe that such an approach would square
with the intent of the Constitution’s framers.120 “It is doubtful,”
quipped Justice Ginsburg, “that those architects of our Nation,
in framing the ‘limited Times’ prescription, thought in terms of
the calculator rather than the calendar.”121
Up next for consideration and rejection were three Eldred
114. Id. at 208-09; see id. at 209-10 n.16. Later discussion in the article
will focus on whether this statement by Justice Ginsburg leaves an opening for
a constitutional attack on a later term extension, if Congress enacts another
one. We will also consider whether the presence of congressional intent to
evade the limited times requirement should be seen as a necessary element of
a Copyright Clause-based challenge. See infra text accompanying notes 340349, 442-454, 459-470.
115. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 209. Justice Ginsburg noted the government’s
observation that the CTEA’s life-plus-70 term could be expected to yield a 95year copyright term on average.
Id. n.17.
She also mentioned the
government’s assertion that a 95-year term resembles accepted durations in
other areas of the law, such as 99-year leases of real estate and bequests
satisfying the rule against perpetuities. Id. Justice Ginsburg pointed out,
however, that “[w]hether such referents mark the outer boundary of ‘limited
Times’ is not before us today.” Id.
116. Id. at 255-56 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 209-10 n.16.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. As we will explain later, both Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer
missed a key point in the economic analysis. See infra text accompanying
notes 325-347; infra note 326.
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arguments centering, in the Court’s view, around the
contention that Congress “may not extend an existing copyright
absent new consideration from the author.”122 The first of
these arguments relied on Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Co.,123 a decision concerning the
copyrightability of the white pages of a telephone directory.
There, the Court wrote that “[t]he sine qua non of copyright is
originality,”124 and that copyright was unavailable only to “a
narrow category of works in which the creative spark of
originality is utterly lacking or so trivial as to be virtually
nonexistent.”125 Works already in existence, Eldred asserted,
are no longer original; therefore, they should not qualify for
copyright protection of additional duration beyond what they
were given at the time of copyright acquisition.126 Justice
Ginsburg responded by observing that Feist was concerned
with copyrightability per se rather than with the duration of
copyright.127 Because the initial copyright-worthiness of the
works receiving an extended copyright duration was not
being—and could not credibly be—contested, Justice Ginsburg
considered the originality argument irrelevant to the issues in
Eldred.128
In the second of the three arguments grouped together by
the Court for discussion purposes, Eldred focused on the
“promot[ion] [of] the Progress of Science” language of the
Copyright Clause.129 Eldred contended that the CTEA did not
comply with this constitutional provision because, in extending
122. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 210.
123. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
124. Id. at 345.
125. Id. at 359.
126. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 211.
127. Id.
128. Id. Justice Ginsburg’s answer to Eldred’s originality argument would
seem to mean that once a work meets the originality requirement and
qualifies for copyright protection, Congress is free in succeeding years to
bestow on the copyright owner almost any added legal benefits it wishes to
bestow, without expecting the copyright owner to create or provide anything
new in return. See id. Although Congress of course could not enact a statute
that would expressly make copyright perpetual, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
8, the Court’s disposition of the originality argument might be read as
permitting Congress to string together enough duration extensions that
copyright protection could become effectively perpetual. Perhaps, however,
the Court’s comments about intent to evade the limited times requirement—
an intent the Eldred majority believed that Congress did not have with regard
to the CTEA—might then come into play. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 209.
129. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 211-12.
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the duration of existing copyrights, Congress did not stimulate
authors to create new works.130 Instead, the CTEA merely
added greater value to existing works.131
The Court
acknowledged that in earlier decisions, it had referred to the
Copyright Clause as “‘both a grant of power and a
limitation,’”132 and had stated that copyright’s “‘primary
objective’” is “[t]o promote the Progress of Science.”133
However, Justice Ginsburg stressed, it is Congress and not the
courts that should decide how best to accomplish this
objective.134 What mattered, for Copyright Clause purposes,
was whether Congress had enacted a copyright “system” that
would “promote the Progress of Science.”135
Noting again the supposed justifications that Congress had
taken into account in enacting the CTEA, the Eldred majority
considered it reasonable to conclude that the CTEA complied
with the objective of the Copyright Clause.136 Justice Ginsburg
pointed once more to Congress’ long history of retroactive term
extensions and emphasized that the previous lack of disputes
regarding the rights created by the various extensions provided
strong support for the constitutionality of lengthening the
durations of existing copyrights.137 Continuing to stress the
importance of history to a proper determination of whether
legislative action complies with a constitutional provision,
Justice Ginsburg quoted a 1926 decision:
[T]his Court has repeatedly laid down the principle that a
contemporaneous legislative exposition of the Constitution when the
founders of our Government and framers of our Constitution were
actively participating in public affairs, acquiesced in for a long term of
years, fixes the construction to be given [the Constitution’s]
provisions.138

In the Court’s view, “Congress’s unbroken practice since
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 212 (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966)).
133. Id. at 212 (quoting Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499
U.S. 340, 349 (1991)).
134. Id. at 212-13.
135. Id. (quoting Graham, 382 U.S. at 6). For criticism of the Court’s focus
on the overall copyright “system” as opposed to individual enactments within
that system, see infra text accompanying notes 400-404.
136. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 213.
137. Id. The significance of the lack of previous disputes is open to
question. See infra text accompanying notes 186, 387-389.
138. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 213 (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52,
175 (1926)).
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the founding generation thus overwhelms [Eldred’s] argument
that the CTEA’s extension of existing copyrights fails per se to
‘promote the Progress of Science.’”139
Turning to the third of what it regarded as Eldred’s three
related arguments, the Court examined the contention that the
Copyright Clause contemplates a quid pro quo arrangement
under which the author of an original work is granted
copyright protection for a limited time, in exchange for a
dedication of that work to the public following the expiration of
the copyright term.140 The retroactive component of the CTEA,
Eldred asserted, violates the terms of that arrangement by
“bestow[ing] an unpaid-for benefit on copyright holders and
their heirs.”141 Justice Ginsburg answered that a review of the
long history of copyright term extensions reveals the benefit’s
paid-for nature.142 Because there have been retroactive term
extensions in the past, Justice Ginsburg maintained, the
author of a work would reasonably expect that she was being
offered legal rights whose duration would be measured not
merely by the rules in effect at the time copyright was acquired
but also by any later-enacted term extensions.143 For the
Court, therefore, the possibility of term extension is part of the
quid that authors receive in exchange for the quo of dedicating
the work to the public upon the copyright’s expiration.144
According to this view, the CTEA is not an unpaid-for benefit at
all. Indeed, it was part of the deal when, for example,
Gershwin’s “Rhapsody in Blue” became eligible for copyright in
1924.145
139. Id. at 213-14. In his dissent, Justice Stevens disagreed with the
majority’s assertion that Congress had displayed an “unbroken practice” since
a time shortly after the ratification of the Constitution. See id. at 230-34
(Stevens, J., dissenting); infra text accompanying notes 174-184. Later in the
article, we take the position that instead of applying the Myers principle to the
question whether Congress could retroactively extend copyright duration, the
Eldred majority should have applied it in an effort to determine what the
Framers would have regarded as a “limited [t]ime[]” for purposes of the
Copyright Clause. See infra text accompanying notes 410-415.
140. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 214.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. Justice Ginsburg found evidence for this expectation in copyright
assignment agreements, a standard form that provides for the possibility of
term extension. Id. at 214 n.21.
144. See id. at 214-15. For a criticism of this line of reasoning, see infra
text accompanying notes 340-349.
145. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 215 (stating that “the author of a work created
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Justice Ginsburg also observed that any quid pro quo
requirement in the copyright realm differs from the patent quid
pro quo in two respects. First, a patent entitles a qualifying
inventor to monopoly rights that are more sweeping than those
received by the creator of a copyrighted work.
Second,
disclosure of the details of the patented invention is the “price”
paid by the inventor for those sweeping rights, whereas
disclosure of a work is the “desired objective” of copyright
These differences caused the Eldred majority to
law.146
conclude that a patent’s quid pro quo may be “more exacting”
than that of a copyright’s.147 If so, the Court reasoned, the 19th
Century congressional practice of “[repeatedly extending]
existing patents without constitutional objection suggests even
more strongly that similar legislation with respect to copyrights
is constitutionally permissible.”148
Having discovered no Copyright Clause barrier to the
CTEA’s extension of the duration of existing copyrights, the
Court proceeded to make short work of Eldred’s argument that
the CTEA violated the First Amendment rights of members of
the public.149 Justice Ginsburg emphasized that the close
temporal proximity in which the Copyright Clause and the
First Amendment were adopted indicates that the Framers
regarded “copyright’s limited monopolies [as] compatible with
free speech principles.”150 She went on to quote Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises151 for the proposition that
“[t]he Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free
expression. By establishing a marketable right to the use of
one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to
create and disseminate ideas.”152
The Court’s rejection of Eldred’s First Amendment
argument depended heavily on the customary judicial view that
copyright
law
contains
built-in
First
Amendment

in the last 170 years would reasonably comprehend, as the ‘this’ offered her, a
copyright not only for the time in place when protection is gained, but also for
any renewal or extension legislated during that time”).
146. Id. at 216-17.
147. Id. at 217 n.22.
148. Id. For critical examination of the Court’s quid pro quo analysis, see
infra text accompanying notes 340-372.
149. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 218-19.
150. Id. at 219.
151. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
152. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219 (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 539).
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accommodations.153 One such accommodation noted by the
Court, again with a nod to Harper & Row, was the familiar
idea-expression dichotomy.154 This distinction makes clear that
the copyright on a work protects only the work’s expression, not
the ideas, facts, themes, and general concepts addressed
therein. All users are free to make whatever use they desire of
the ideas, facts, and other unprotected matter contained in the
The second of the built-in First Amendment
work.155
accommodations mentioned by the Eldred Court was copyright
law’s fair use doctrine. Under this doctrine, users of the
protected expression in a copyrighted work may have a defense
against infringement liability.156 In the Court’s view, the fair
use doctrine furthers the interests of users of copyrighted
works in much the same way that the First Amendment would,
thus making it unnecessary to subject copyright law generally,
and the CTEA specifically, to further First Amendment-based
scrutiny.157
In the closing paragraphs of the majority opinion, Justice
Ginsburg commented again on the Copyright Clause issues.158
Though brief, the comments revealed what may have been a
major concern that prompted the Court to rule as it did.
Justice Ginsburg observed that if Eldred’s “vision of the
Copyright Clause held sway, it would do more than render the
CTEA’s duration extensions unconstitutional as to existing
works.”159 Eldred’s assertion that the CTEA provisions were
not severable “would make the CTEA’s enlarged terms invalid
even as to tomorrow’s work.”160 Then came what the majority
may have seen as the clincher: “The 1976 Act’s time extensions,
which set the pattern that the CTEA followed, would be
vulnerable as well.”161 The Court was unwilling to issue a

153. Id.
154. Id. See also 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) (“In no case does copyright
protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure,
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery.”);
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556; Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499
U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991).
155. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b); see e.g., Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219.
156. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219-20.
157. See id.
158. Id. at 221-22.
159. Id. at 221.
160. Id. at 221-22.
161. Id. at 222.
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decision that could produce such a domino effect.162
Further underscoring the deferential approach it had
chosen to take, the Court observed that “the Copyright Clause
empowers Congress to determine the intellectual property
regimes that, overall, in that body’s judgment, will serve the
ends of the Clause.”163 Justice Ginsburg acknowledged Eldred’s
having “forcefully urge[d] that Congress pursued very bad
policy in prescribing the CTEA’s long terms,” but emphasized
that “[t]he wisdom of Congress’s action . . . is not within our
province to second guess.”164
B. THE STEVENS DISSENT
Justice Stevens was not convinced by the majority’s
characterization of the CTEA as a statute that may have been
unwise but was not unconstitutional.165
Instead, Justice
Stevens emphasized that the Copyright Clause contemplates
not only the furnishing of incentives for the creation of new
works but also the existence of a rich public domain to which
all persons have ready access.166 He maintained that the
162. See id. For the view that the Eldred majority was too concerned about
the possible implications for the 1976 Act, see infra text accompanying notes
373-383.
163. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 222. With this statement, the Court again
indicated that the focus of its Copyright Clause analysis would be on the
general scheme of copyright, rather than on the individual enactment—here,
the CTEA—within that scheme. See id. at 213. We examine the shortcomings
of that focus at infra text accompanying notes 400-404.
164. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 222.
165. See generally Eldred, 537 U.S. at 223-37 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
166. Id. In asserting that the Copyright Clause promotes a vibrant public
domain by encouraging the production of works whose copyrights expire as
soon as reasonably possible, Justice Stevens relied on Supreme Court
decisions dealing with patent law. He cited Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2
Pet.) 1 (1829), in which the Court held that an inventor who had been
commercially exploiting his invention could not unreasonably postpone the
filing of his patent application in an effort to delay commencement of his
exclusive rights until he needed them to ward off competition, because
allowing the inventor to do that would push back the time of the invention’s
entry into the public domain. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 224-25 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stevens also cited Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989), in which the Court wrote that “the ultimate
goal of the patent system is to bring new designs and technologies into the
public domain through disclosure.” Eldred, 537 U.S. at 225 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Because the same clause in the Constitution provides Congress
its copyright authority and its patent authority, Justice Stevens regarded the
patent decisions’ emphasis on nourishing the public domain as equally
applicable to the realm of copyright. Id. at 227.
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CTEA’s extension of the duration of existing copyrights
promoted neither the production of new works nor the
Justice Stevens
enhancement of the public domain.167
concluded, therefore, that the retroactive aspect of the CTEA
found no support in the Copyright Clause.168 Instead, it
amounted to “a gratuitous transfer of wealth from the public to
authors, publishers, and their successors in interest.”169
Continuing along the same analytical lines, Justice
Stevens took the position that the bargain envisioned in the
Copyright Clause involved creators, the public, and the
government.170 It would be impermissible for the government,
before the expiration of a given’s creator’s copyright, to take
away a particular right already guaranteed under that
copyright.171 Likewise, Justice Stevens asserted, it should be
impermissible for the government to alter the terms of the
bargain by increasing the duration of existing copyrights and
thus delaying the public’s ability to exercise its right to make
unrestricted use of the underlying works of authorship.172
That, according to Justice Stevens, was what Congress did,
unconstitutionally, in the CTEA.173
Justice Stevens also disagreed with the majority’s
interpretation of the history of congressional extensions of
patent and copyright duration. He noted that patent duration
extensions had not always been applied retroactively.174
167. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 226-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
168. See id.
169. Id. at 227.
170. See id. at 226-27.
171. Justice Stevens stated the following regarding patent law:
It would be manifestly unfair if, after issuing a patent, the Government as a
representative of the public sought to modify the bargain by shortening the
term of the patent in order to accelerate public access to the invention. The
fairness considerations . . . would presumably disable Congress from making
such a retroactive change in the public’s bargain with an inventor without
providing compensation for the taking. Those same considerations should
protect members of the public who make plans to exploit an invention as soon
as it enters the public domain from a retroactive modification of the bargain
that extends the term of the patent monopoly.
Id. at 226. These arguments apply to copyright laws as well since, the
“authority to issue copyrights stems from the same Clause in the Constitution
that created the patent power.” Id. at 223. Thus, “[i]f Congress may not
expand the scope of a patent monopoly, it also may not extend the life of a
copyright beyond its expiration date.” Id. at 222-23.
172. See id. at 226-27.
173. See id. at 234-38.
174. Justice Stevens used as an example an 1861 statute that provided for
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Moreover, Justice Stevens asserted, many of the 19th Century’s
retroactive extensions of the durations of individual patents
had been applied to public domain items and thus were clearly
unconstitutional.175 Justice Stevens contended that the Eldred
majority should not have relied on the supposed history of
patent duration extensions when that history did not really
reflect consistency on the retroactive application issue and, in
any event, contained examples of extensions that would not
pass constitutional muster today.176
Regarding the majority’s focus on the congressional
tendency to apply copyright term extensions to already existing
works, Justice Stevens conceded that Congress had so applied
the extensions provided for in the 1831, 1909, and 1976 Acts.177
He refused to subscribe, however, to the majority’s
characterization of the 1790 Act as a retroactive extension of
copyright duration.178 That statute, he insisted, was different
because it created an entirely new federal copyright system.179
Justice Stevens noted that the 1790 Act, far from being a
blanket extension of duration, actually had the effect of
shortening the period of protection for many works that until
then had been entitled to perpetual common-law protection.180
He argued that even though it followed fairly closely on the
heels of the adoption of the Copyright Clause, the 1790 decision
of Congress to allow already existing works to qualify for the
newly created federal copyright should not be regarded as a
strong indicator of the constitutionality of a retroactive
a longer patent duration but applied only prospectively (i.e., to inventions
developed after the statute’s effective date). Id. at 237.
175. Id. at 233-35. The statutory extension of Oliver Evans’ patent in
1808, for instance, restored patent protection to an invention that had spent
more than four years in the public domain. Id. So it was, wrote Justice
Stevens, for the great majority of the individual patent extensions granted by
Congress during the 19th Century.
Id. at 235.
He argued that
notwithstanding the usual presumption of validity attaching to acts of
Congress, a history so obviously lacking in constitutional legitimacy should
have no bearing on the matter at hand. See id.
176. Id. at 233-35.
177. Id. at 235 (“The federal Copyright Act was first amended in 1831.
That amendment, like later amendments, not only authorized a longer term
for new works, but also extended the terms of unexpired copyrights.”).
178. Id. at 231 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the 1790 Copyright Act
as a “general rule creating new federal rights that supplanted the diverse
state rights that previously existed” but “did not extend or attach to any of
those pre-existing state and common-law rights.”).
179. Id.
180. See id. at 230, 234-35 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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extension of existing copyrights’ duration.181
The Eldred majority also placed more weight than it
should have, Justice Stevens contended, on the history of
retroactive copyright term extensions.182 As noted in the
preceding paragraph, he regarded that history as having begun
with the 1831 Act rather than with the 1790 Act. By 1831,
none of the same persons who had been delegates to the
Constitutional Convention were serving in Congress.183 Justice
Stevens asserted that the 1831 Act’s application to existing
copyrights should not receive any heightened presumption of
constitutionality under the contemporaneous construction
doctrine relied on by the majority.184 Moreover, Justice Stevens
pointed out that courts, particularly the Supreme Court, had
not ruled on the constitutionality of the retroactive applications
of the duration extensions in the 1831, 1909, and 1976 Acts.185
The lack of prior judicial challenges should not somehow cloak
the CTEA with protection against constitutional attack, he
maintained.186
Justice Stevens was not impressed by the majority’s
offering of supposed justifications for the legislative judgment
exercised by Congress when it made the CTEA applicable to
existing copyrights. Noting that the Court had mentioned the
CTEA’s possible furnishing of incentives to restore and
preserve certain copyrighted works, Justice Stevens observed
181. See id. at 231-33 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
182. See id. at 231-36.
183. Id. at 237.
184. Id. at 236 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens identified another
reason not to regard the 1831 Act as a strong indicator of the probable
constitutionality of retroactive extensions of copyright duration. He noted
that the legislative history of the 1831 Act reveals its having been predicated
on an interpretation of copyright as the legal mechanism for protecting an
author’s supposed natural right, of a perpetual nature, to the “fruits of his
labor” or the “sweat of his brow.” Id. at 236. Such an interpretation of
copyright, Justice Stevens observed, was “rejected by this Court in 1834.” Id.
at 236.
185. Id. at 235-37 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
186. See id. at 235 (Stevens, J., dissenting). According to Justice Stevens,
“the fact that Congress has repeatedly acted on a mistaken interpretation of
the Constitution does not qualify our duty to invalidate an unconstitutional
practice when it is finally challenged in an appropriate case.” Id. at 235
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)). He
added that “‘no one acquires a vested or protected right in violation of the
Constitution by long use, even when that span of time covers our entire
national existence.’” Id. at 236 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of New
York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)).
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that this asserted justification for the CTEA applied mainly
with regard to old movies.187 He also pointed out that such
supposed incentives would not promote the creation of any
truly new works and that any new expression in a restored or
preserved edition would be protected by a copyright on that
edition anyway.188 Justice Stevens stressed that even if the
perceived need to preserve aging movies would warrant
congressional action, “the remedy offered—a blanket extension
of all copyrights” went far beyond what that need would
justify.189
Justice Stevens also labeled the majority’s equity
rationale—that Congress made the copyright duration
extension apply to existing works in order to treat existing and
future copyrights the same as a matter of simple fairness—a
“classic non sequitur.”190 He emphasized that “[t]he reason for
increasing the inducement to create something new simply does
not apply to an already-created work.”191 If anything, Justice
Stevens contended, the equity argument favored Eldred
because “[m]embers of the public were entitled to rely on a
promised access to copyrighted . . . works at the expiration of
the terms specified when the exclusive privileges were
granted.”192 The owners of copyrights on already existing
works have no entitlement to anything beyond “the exclusive
terms that were promised as an inducement to their creativity,
and have no equitable claim to increased compensation for
doing nothing more.”193
Commenting on the issues actually before the Court and on
the implications of the decision in Eldred, Justice Stevens
noted that the grant of certiorari called for the Court to decide
whether
the
CTEA’s
retroactive
application
was
187. Id. at 239-40 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 239 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 240. We offer a narrower “remedy” later in the article. See
infra text accompanying notes 478-482.
190. 537 U.S. at 240.
191. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
192. Id.
193. Id. According to Justice Stevens, the equity argument made by the
government and endorsed by the majority requires the “untenable
assumptions . . . that the public interest in free access to copyrighted works is
entirely worthless and that authors, as a class, should receive a windfall solely
based on completed creative activity.” Id. at 241. He therefore took the
position that “[e]x post facto extensions of existing copyrights, unsupported by
any consideration of the public interest, frustrate the central purpose of the
[Copyright] Clause.” Id.
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constitutional.194 The case, therefore, did not really present the
question whether the “extraordinary length” of the duration
enhancements in the CTEA amounted to the “functional
equivalent of perpetual copyrights.”195 Even so, he observed, “a
categorical rule prohibiting retroactive extensions would
effectively preclude perpetual copyrights.”196 He warned that
“unless the [Copyright] Clause is construed to embody such a
categorical rule, Congress may extend existing monopoly
privileges ad infinitum under the majority’s analysis.”197
Justice Stevens summed up his dissent by contending that
the Eldred majority had failed to safeguard free access to the
public domain and had ignored the key purpose of the
Copyright Clause.198 He expressed the concern that the Court
had “quitclaimed to Congress its principal responsibility in this
area of the law” and had effectively made the Copyright
Clause-related actions of Congress “judicially unreviewable.”199
This caused Justice Stevens to conclude that it was “not
hyperbole to recall the trenchant words of Chief Justice John
Marshall: ‘It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.’”200
C. THE BREYER DISSENT
In launching a dissent that prompted various comments
from the justices in the majority,201 Justice Breyer
acknowledged the majority’s view that his conclusions
194. See id. at 241-42. Evidently responding to the majority’s concern that
holding the CTEA’s retroactive application unconstitutional would also call
into question the validity of the 1976 Act, Justice Stevens emphasized that
“the validity of earlier retroactive extensions of copyright protection [was] not
at issue in this case.” Id. at 241-42 n.14. He also appeared to assert that even
if a decision to strike down the retroactive aspect of the CTEA would have cast
doubt on the 1976 Act, the Court could legitimately have found a way to
protect the reliance interests that reasonably would been built up during the
more than 25 years since the enactment of that statute. No such reliance
interests needed to be considered with regard to the CTEA, Justice Stevens
stated, because the enactment was only four years old and had been subject to
a judicial challenge for most of that time. Id.
195. Id. at 241.
196. Id. at 242.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 242.
199. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
200. Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
201. See e.g., id. at 193 n.1 (majority opinion); see also id. at 199 n.4, 205
n.10, 207 n.15, 209 n.16.
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suggested only a lack of wisdom—but no unconstitutionality—
in the congressional decision to enact the CTEA.202 Legal
distinctions, he observed, “are often matters of degree,” and in
the CTEA’s case, “the failings of degree are so serious that they
amount to failings of constitutional kind.”203 Justice Breyer
regarded the Copyright Clause as granting Congress broad
powers that nevertheless had limits—limits exceeded by the
CTEA.204
Justice Breyer contended that the Copyright Clause could
not properly be interpreted without keeping in mind the
promotion-of-expression objective it shares with the
Constitution’s First Amendment.205 He noted that the two
constitutional provisions may “reinforce each other, the
[Copyright Clause] serving as an ‘engine of free expression’ . . .
[and the First Amendment] assuring that government throws
up no obstacle to its dissemination.”206 Sometimes, however, a
statute enacted under the copyright authority “may set Clause
and Amendment at cross-purposes, thereby depriving the
public of the speech-related benefits that the Founders,
through both, have promised.”207 Justice Breyer asserted that
when a copyright statute allegedly restricts speech, the statute
should receive more careful examination than the Eldred
majority gave the CTEA.208 He therefore proposed a three-part
test for use in such situations, writing that the statute should
be regarded as “lack[ing] the constitutionally necessary
rational support (1) if the significant benefits that it bestows
are private, not public; (2) if it threatens seriously to
undermine the expressive values that the Copyright Clause
embodies; and (3) if it cannot find justification in any
significant Clause-related objective.”209
202. Id. at 243 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
203. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 243.
206. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Harper & Row, Publ’s, Inc. v. Nation
Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)).
207. Id.
208. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer noted that it was not
important to decide whether a label such as “intermediate scrutiny” should be
given to the more careful examination he envisioned. Id. What was
important, he stressed, was to “recognize that [the CTEA] involves not pure
economic regulation, but regulation of expression, and [that] what may count
as rational where economic regulation is at issue is not necessarily rational
where we focus on expression.” Id.
209. Id. at 245 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Next, Justice Breyer applied his test to the CTEA and
sought to demonstrate that the CTEA met all three conditions.
He began by discussing Supreme Court precedents establishing
that “copyright statutes must serve public, not private,
ends,”210 and by pointing out similar statements in legislative
history.211
Then Justice Breyer identified two types of
expression-related costs that the CTEA imposed on the
public.212 The first type comes in the form of royalties “that
may be higher than necessary to evoke creation of the relevant
work.”213 Justice Breyer stressed that although only about 2%
of copyrighted works between 55 and 75 years old retain a
commercial value (i.e., generate royalties), that 2% produces
roughly $400 million per year in royalties.214 He therefore
offered the “conservative[] estimate that 20 extra years of
copyright protection will mean the transfer of several billion
extra royalty dollars to holders of existing copyrights.”215
Rather than “com[ing] from thin air,” the added royalty
payments “ultimately come from those who wish to read or see
or hear those classic books or films or recordings that have
survived.”216
210. See id. at 247; see generally id. at 246-47 (citing Stewart v. Abend, 495
U.S. 207, 228 (1990), Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 429 (1984), Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151,
156 (1975), and Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)).
211. See id. at 247 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222, at
6-7 (1909) (House Report on Copyright Act of 1909) and H.R. REP. NO. 100609, at 22 (1988) (House Report on Berne Convention Implementation Act)).
212. Id. at 248 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
213. Id. at 248. Justice Breyer observed that copyright statutes typically
do this, but that “there are special reasons for thinking [such costs] especially
serious here.” Id.
214. Id. at 248-49. Justice Breyer cited a Congressional Research Service
study reporting the $400 million figure and various other numbers used in his
dissent. Id. at 248 (citing E. RAPPAPORT, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
REPORT FOR CONGRESS, COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION: ESTIMATING THE
ECONOMIC VALUES, at 8, 12, 15 (1998) (hereinafter CRS REPORT)).
215. Id. at 249 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See CRS REPORT, supra note 214,
at 16. Moreover, these same copyrights together would have produced “many
billions of dollars in royalty ‘reward’” before the CTEA was enacted. Eldred,
537 U.S. at 249.
216. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 249 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer noted,
as an example, the $500,000 paid by United Airlines for a license to play
George Gershwin’s 1924 “Rhapsody in Blue” in advertisements and for similar
purposes. See id. That “cost of doing business,” Justice Breyer noted, would
logically be “reflected in the ticket prices of those who fly.” Id. He stressed
that lengthening copyright duration would likely lead to “unnecessarily high
prices [that would] unnecessarily restrict distribution of classic works.” Id. In
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The second type of expression-related cost, wrote Justice
Breyer, is the permissions requirement, which involves
identifying and communicating with holders of the rights to
works that one may want to reproduce or otherwise use.217
Vast numbers of older copyrighted works, both classics and the
obscure or out-of-print, remain of interest to potential users
who “include not only movie buffs and . . . jazz fans, but also
historians, scholars, teachers, writers, artists, database
operators, and researchers of all kinds.”218 Assuming they wish
to avoid litigation, these potential users may find it necessary
to expend time and money tracking down the copyright owner,
perhaps only to learn that the owner is impossible to locate or
is unwilling to give permission to use the work. Would-be
licensees may simply give up on the idea of using the
copyrighted work if the effort and costs involved in identifying
and locating the copyright owner and working out a licensing
agreement become too unattractive.
The permissions
requirement, Justice Breyer observed, thus stands as a
significant obstacle to the ability of users of copyrighted works
to “make the past accessible for their own use or for that of
others.”219
Justice Breyer conceded that costs of the sort produced by
the permissions requirement would be associated with any
copyright law, regardless of the copyright term’s length.220
“But,” he protested, “to extend that term, preventing works
from the 1920’s and 1930’s from falling into the public domain,
will dramatically increase the size of the costs just as—
perversely—the likely benefits from protection diminish.”221
Justice Breyer offered this further explanation:
The older the work, the less likely it retains commercial value, and
the harder it will likely prove to find the current copyright holder.
contrast, lower-priced editions of classic works would be expected once those
works enter the public domain. Id. (citing CRS REPORT, supra note 214 at 3).
217. See id. at 249.
218. Id. at 249-50. By using Congressional Research Service figures,
Justice Breyer noted, one could estimate that as of 2018, approximately
350,000 copyrighted works would be 75 years old or older. Id. Eventually, the
number of copyrighted works at least 75 years of age would be in the millions.
Id.
219. Id. at 250. Justice Breyer noted various examples of the burdens
imposed by the permissions requirement that are a necessary part of a
copyright regime but that may become unreasonable if copyright duration
becomes overly lengthy. See id.
220. Id. at 251.
221. Id.
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The older the work, the more likely it will prove useful to the
historian, artist, or teacher. The older the work, the less likely it is
that a sense of authors’ rights can justify a copyright holder’s decision
not to permit reproduction, for the more likely it is that the copyright
holder making the decision is not the work’s creator, but, say, a
corporation or a great-grandchild whom the work’s creator never
knew. Similarly, the costs of obtaining permission, now perhaps
ranging in the millions of dollars, will multiply as the number of
holders of affected copyrights increases from several hundred
thousand to several million.222

Contesting an assertion by the majority, Justice Breyer
contended that the fair use doctrine does not meaningfully
lessen the costs associated with the CTEA’s 20-year extension
of the permissions requirement.223 The fair use doctrine
sometimes permits uses of copyrighted materials without the
copyright owner’s permission, but the doctrine’s application is
neither routine nor sweeping.224 It therefore cannot be counted
on as a way of avoiding the costs about which Justice Breyer
complained.225 Moreover, as he noted, the fair use doctrine
would not help “those who wish to obtain from electronic
databases material that is not there.” 226 This may occur when
the permissions requirement has had the effect of keeping
material out of the databases.
Justice Breyer then considered whether Congress could
reasonably have concluded that the costs imposed by the CTEA
were outweighed by legitimate countervailing considerations.227
He left no doubt that in his view, the CTEA produced scant
copyright-related benefit. The traditional “economic spur”
rationale for copyright, he argued, cannot justify the CTEA.228
222. Id. at 251-52. Justice Breyer predicted that the CTEA would produce
huge costs for users of databases, and that the quality of education would
suffer “as our children become ever more dependent for the content of their
knowledge upon computer-accessible databases—thereby condemning that
which is not so accessible, say, the cultural content of early 20th-century
history, to a kind of intellectual purgatory from which it will not easily
emerge.” Id. at 252.
223. See id. at 252-53 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
224. Cf id. at 252 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the exemption
applies “only where the copy is made for the special listed purposes” and
rhetorically asking “[who] can rely on so limited an exemption” in light of such
open-ended limiting phraseology).
225. See id. at 252-53.
226. Id. at 253. Similarly, Justice Breyer did not regard copyright law’s
idea-expression distinction as likely to minimize the damage to be done by the
CTEA. See id.
227. Id. at 254.
228. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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“No potential author,” Justice Breyer contended, “can
reasonably believe that he has more than a tiny chance of
writing a classic that will survive commercially long enough for
the copyright extension to matter.”229 He based this conclusion
on the fact that only 2% of copyrighted works retain
commercial value when they are between 55 and 75 years old,
and on the assumption that the percentage of works remaining
commercially viable beyond the 75-year mark “must be far
smaller.”230 In addition, Justice Breyer believed that “any
remaining monetary incentive is diminished dramatically by
the fact that the relevant royalties will not arrive until 75 years
or more into the future, when, not the author, but distant heirs,
or shareholders in a successor corporation, will receive
them.”231 Relying upon the concept of present value, Justice
Breyer argued that the marginal economic incentive provided
by the CTEA to authors is so tiny as to approach zero, and that
whatever copyright-related benefit the incentive would produce
must be similarly puny.232 Justice Breyer insisted that a
“potential Shakespeare, Wharton, or Hemingway” who had not
been stimulated to create under the pre-CTEA state of the law
would not now be moved to create by the CTEA’s paltry
additional incentive.233
The majority’s reliance on broad propositions about
incentives in general was insufficient, in Justice Breyer’s view,
to justify the CTEA’s significant lengthening of copyright
duration. It should not be enough that “somehow, somewhere,
some potential author might be moved by the thought of great229. Id.
230. Id. Prior to the CTEA’s 20-year extension of copyright duration, 75
years was the maximum duration for pre-1978 works, 17 U.S.C. § 304 (1976)
(amended 1998), and the average term for works created in 1978 or thereafter.
537 U.S. at 254.
231. 537 U.S. at 254 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 254-55.
233. Id. at 255. “What monetarily motivated Melville,” Justice Breyer
continued, “would not realize that he could do better for his grandchildren by
putting a few dollars into an interest-bearing bank account?” Id. As for the
Court’s reference to testimony before Congress that income earned from one
work may help support an author during his or her creation of other works,
Justice Breyer found it “mysterious” that such testimony would be cited in
support of the CTEA. Id. Given the retroactive application of the CTEA and
the long duration extension for which it provided, the author who actually
created the copyrighted work would no doubt be dead by the time the extra 20
years of royalties materialized—if they materialized at all. How, Justice
Breyer asked, would the additional income traceable to the CTEA help a
deceased author create any new works? Id.
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grandchildren receiving copyright royalties a century hence.”234
If that justification were sufficient to support copyright term
extensions, then what about “some potential author [who might
be] moved by the thought of royalties being paid for two
centuries, five centuries, 1,000 years, ‘til the End of Time’ “?235
The problem was that “from a rational economic perspective
the time difference among these periods makes no real
difference.”236 The 20-year extension provided for in the CTEA
“will produce a copyright period of protection that, even under
conservative assumptions, is worth more than 99.8% of
protection in perpetuity.”237 This effect of the CTEA raised
serious questions, according to Justice Breyer, about whether
the statute complied with the “limited Times” proviso in the
Copyright Clause.238
Summing up his discussion of the economic incentives
purportedly provided by the CTEA, Justice Breyer stated that
“the incentive-related numbers are far too small for Congress to
have concluded rationally, even with respect to new works, that
the extension’s effect could justify the serious expressionrelated harms” produced by the CTEA.239 He then emphasized
that “in respect to works already created—the source of many
of the harms previously described—the statute creates no
economic incentive at all.”240
Next, Justice Breyer addressed the other alleged
justifications for the CTEA.
The CTEA’s purported
harmonization effects, he contended, failed to pick up the slack

234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
237. Id. at 255-56 (emphasis in original).
238. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer questioned the relevance of
the majority’s comments that nothing indicated an intent on the part of
Congress to evade the “limited Times” directive when it enacted the CTEA.
Id. at 256. Justice Breyer implied that whether Congress possessed such an
intent should not be determinative. See id. Even so, Justice Breyer observed
that Congress “may have sought to test the Constitution’s limits.” Id. He
cited statements in which the late Sonny Bono, Mary Bono (Sonny Bono’s
widow and successor in the House of Representatives), other representatives,
and composer Quincy Jones indicated their desire to have copyrights last
forever or as close thereto as possible. Id. Later in the article, we will
comment further on the significance of these statements. See infra text
accompanying notes 279, 293-296, 412.
239. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 257 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
240. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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left by the weak incentive-related justifications.241 Though
conceding that the life-plus-70 rule called for in the CTEA was
consistent with the prevailing copyright duration in the
European Union (EU), Justice Breyer stressed that the CTEA
achieved harmonization with the EU’s copyright term only as
to works created in 1978 or thereafter by natural persons.242
The CTEA effected no harmonization with the EU regarding
works-for-hire created in 1978 or thereafter because the lifeplus-70 rule does not apply to such works.243 Perhaps even
more importantly, he noted, the CTEA did not achieve
harmonization with the EU regarding pre-1978 works because
the life-plus-70 rule does not apply to those works either.244
“Despite appearances,” Justice Breyer explained, “the statute
does not create a uniform American-European term with
respect to the lion’s share of the economically significant works
that it affects—all works made ‘for hire’ and all existing works
created prior to 1978.”245
241. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
242. Id. at 257-58.
243. Id. Under the CTEA, works-for-hire are protected for a term of 95
years from first publication or 120 years from creation, whichever comes first.
17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (2000). In the EU, some rights in works-for-hire carry a lifeplus-70 duration, whereas others exist for periods ranging from 50 to 70 years.
Council Directive 93/98, Harmonizing the Term of Protection of Copyright and
Certain Related Rights, arts. 1-3, 1993 O.J. 290 [hereinafter EU Council
Directive 93/98].
244. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 257 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The CTEA instead
calls for a duration of 95 years for qualifying pre-1978 works. 17 U.S.C. §
304(a), (b). Compare EU Council Directive 93/98, supra note 243, arts. 1-3.
245. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 257 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
Justice Breyer emphasized that because “uniformity [in copyright duration]
comes so late, if at all, . . . bringing American law into conformity
with . . . European law will neither encourage creation nor benefit the longdead author in any other important way.” Id. at 258. He further noted that
even if the CTEA’s harmonizing effects were broader, most of the arguments
for harmonization—such as those urging that Europe’s then-superior terms of
protection could have given pre-harmonization authors an incentive to publish
overseas first instead of in the United States—would fall flat anyway. He
believed that “few, if any, potential authors would turn a ‘where to publish’
decision upon . . . [differences] in the length of the copyright term.” Id. at
259. In a present value sense, the commercial worth of the 20-year difference
in terms “amounts at most to comparative pennies.” Id. No “rational
legislature” could give significant weight to such a trivial incentive-related
justification. Id. Moreover, Justice Breyer observed, even if a work’s
publication in the United States were to come after publication in the EU, the
Berne Convention still promises “full protection” as long as the second
publication takes place at least 30 days after the first. Id. See Berne
Convention, supra note 30, arts. 3(4), 5(4). In such a situation, the supposed
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Commenting on the asserted justification that copyright
term extension may provide incentives to publishers and
filmmakers to revisit older works by re-releasing or restoring
them,246 Justice Breyer argued that the Copyright Clause did
not permit Congress to act on a revisitation-by-publishers
theory of progress promotion, regardless of its promise or lack
thereof.247 In his view, the Copyright Clause “assumes an
initial grant of monopoly, designed primarily to encourage
creation, followed by termination of the monopoly grant in
order to promote dissemination of already-created works.”248
The Clause also “assumes that it is the disappearance of the
monopoly grant, not its perpetuation, that will, on balance
promote the dissemination of works already in existence.”249
Although Justice Breyer acknowledged “the empirical
possibility” that a copyright term extension might in some
instances help a publisher resurrect a still-copyrighted but not
especially visible work, he asserted that the disappearance-ofthe-monopoly rationale underlying the Copyright Clause
prevented Congress from basing legislative action “primarily
upon that empirical possibility.”250 If Congress could use that
possibility as a primary basis for legislation, there would be too
great a danger that repeated copyright extensions would be
granted in favor of publishers and that copyrights would

disincentive to publish first in the United States would not even be present in
theory. See 537 U.S. at 257-59 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
246. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 260 (Breyer, J., dissenting). This justification,
offered by the Motion Picture Association of America as amicus curiae, see id.
at 239 n.13, and at least implicitly endorsed by the majority, see id. at 206, is
discussed later in the article. Although we leave some room for the assertion
of this rationale in support of possible legislative action by Congress, we show
it to be unpersuasive when offered in an attempt to justify a blanket extension
of copyright duration. See infra text accompanying notes 315-318, 478-482.
247. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 260 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
248. Id.
249. Id. (emphasis in original).
250. Id. Justice Breyer came to these conclusions on the basis of the
Copyright Clause’s “limited Times” and “to Authors” language, the antimonopolistic attitudes characteristic of the intellectual environment in which
the Copyright Clause was written, and Supreme Court precedent. Id. (citing
Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228 (1990), and Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)). Justice Breyer viewed
the “to Authors” language as casting grave doubt on a legislative rationale
that “rests entirely upon incentives given to publishers perhaps long after the
death of the work’s creator.” Id. at 261 (Breyer, J., dissenting). For our view
of the proper role and effect of the “to Authors” language, see infra text
accompanying notes 445-454.
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effectively become perpetual.251
Justice Breyer therefore
rejected the argument that extending copyright duration would
generally promote, not hinder, the dissemination of existing
works. He regarded any such rationale for copyright term
extension as “constitutionally perverse” and as “unable,
constitutionally speaking, to justify the blanket extension”
contemplated by the CTEA.252
Justice Breyer made short work of other supposed
justifications for the CTEA. He dismissed the CTEA’s possible
export-related benefits and other boons of a financial nature for
the entertainment industry as irrelevant for Copyright Clause
purposes.253 Such matters, he noted, are the business of
Congress’ commerce authority, and not of its copyright
Referring to Justice Ginsburg’s account of
authority.254
“demographic, economic, and technological changes” justifying
term extension,255 Justice Breyer wrote that technological
changes seemed to weigh against term extension and that a
life-plus-50 copyright regime would appear to have already
corrected for a lengthening average life span.256
Having responded to each of the asserted rationales for the
CTEA, Justice Breyer emphasized that there “is no legitimate,
serious copyright-related justification for this statute.”257
Therefore, in his view, the Court would not have been
improperly intruding on congressional authority if it had struck
down the CTEA. The Eldred majority’s deferential stance
toward Congress involved inadequate consideration of the
CTEA’s “rationality in light of the expressive values underlying
the Copyright Clause, related as it is to the First
Amendment.”258 Greater “vigilance” on the part of the Court,

251. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 260 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The “difficulty of
finding any kind of logical stopping place” was a further reason for the Court
not to accept “such a uniquely publisher-related rationale.” Id. at 262.
252. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. See id. at 207 & n.14 (majority opinion); see also supra text
accompanying notes 103-109.
256. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 263 (Breyer, J., dissenting). He also observed that
the CTEA’s proponents had provided “no explanation of why the 1976 Act’s
term of 50 years after an author’s death—a longer term than was available to
authors themselves for most of our Nation’s history—is an insufficient
potential bequest.” Id.
257. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
258. Id. at 264.
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Justice Breyer contended, “is . . . necessary in a new Century
that will see intellectual property rights and the forms of
expression that underlie them play an ever more important role
in the Nation’s economy and the lives of its citizens.”259
Justice Breyer was unmoved by the majority’s concern that
striking down the CTEA would have consigned the 1976 Act to
the same fate. He observed that the 1976 Act, unlike the
CTEA, served to accomplish an important international
objective by satisfying a condition the United States needed to
fulfill in order to join the Berne Convention, which required
signatory nations to guarantee a life-plus-50 term.260 This
accomplishment thus yielded a balance of benefit and harm
much more favorable than that produced by the CTEA.261 After
issuing a reminder that this case did not require the Court to
consider the constitutionality of the 1976 Act, Justice Breyer
observed that even if the 1976 Act’s validity were in question,
“the law provides means to protect those who have reasonably
relied upon prior copyright statutes.”262
Near the end of his dissent, Justice Breyer responded to a
majority opinion footnote suggesting that his argument had
pushed beyond the limits of the case by addressing the CTEA’s
prospective application rather than only its retrospective
application.263 What appeared to Justice Ginsburg as a lack of
argumentative restraint, Justice Breyer responded, served to
show that even if one were to assent to the equity principle
relied on by the majority, the CTEA could only be defensible in
259. Id.
260. Id. at 264-65.
261. Id. See Berne Convention, supra note 30, art. 7(1). Justice Breyer
also argued that the 1909 and 1831 copyright term extensions produced
balances of benefit and harm that were similarly more favorable than that of
the CTEA. The 1909 and 1831 Acts provided, according to Justice Breyer,
significant marginal incentive to authors while minimizing the damage to the
public domain by imposing a renewal requirement on copyright holders. An
effect of the renewal requirement was that many works entered the public
domain at the end of the basic 28-year period because no renewal application
was filed. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 264.
262. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 265 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Noting that he did
not share the majority’s “aversion to line-drawing” with regard to the
permissible length of copyright term extensions, Justice Breyer contended that
the difficulty of “draw[ing] a single clear bright line” need not have stopped
the Court from striking down the CTEA. Id. He believed that the Court
should simply have decided that “this particular statute goes too far. [S]uch
examples . . . of what goes too far . . . sometimes offer better constitutional
guidance than more absolute-sounding rules.” Id.
263. Id. See also id. at 193 n.1, 199 n.4 (majority opinion).
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its retrospective application if it were likewise defensible in its
By showing the prospective
prospective application.264
application to be indefensible, he simultaneously condemned
the retrospective application and its supposed attempt to
provide parity between existing copyrights and new copyrights.
“Where the case for extending new copyrights is so weak,”
Justice Breyer asked, “what ‘justice,’ what ‘policy,’ what ‘equity’
can warrant the tolls and barriers that extension of existing
copyrights imposes?”265
Justice Breyer concluded by predicting that the CTEA
would likely “cause serious expression-related harm,” hinder
“traditional dissemination” of copyrighted works, “inhibit new
forms of dissemination through the use of new technology,” and
interfere with efforts to preserve, and teach students about, the
nation’s history and culture.266 “It is easy to understand,”
Justice Breyer stated, “how the [CTEA] might benefit the
private financial interests of corporations or heirs who own
existing copyrights. But I cannot find any constitutionally
legitimate, copyright-related way in which the statute will
benefit the public.”267
IV. ASSESSING THE CTEA AND THE ELDRED DECISION
In the introduction to this article, we indicated that we
take a dim view of the CTEA and the Supreme Court’s decision
in Eldred to sustain it against constitutional attack. Although
the Eldred majority appeared to recognize that Congress took
an unwise step in enacting the CTEA, the Court mishandled
the constitutional issues.268 In this section, we subject the
CTEA and Eldred to close inspection and lay out the reasons
for our harsh evaluations of the actions of Congress and the
264. This refers to the notion that in making the CTEA and other duration
extensions applicable to existing copyrights, Congress was simply attempting
to place existing copyrights in parity with those that would come into
existence after the enactment of the duration extension. See id. at 204-05, 208
(majority opinion). For further analysis of this asserted rationale for the
CTEA, see infra text accompanying notes 390-399.
265. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 266.
266. Id. (Breyer, J. dissenting).
267. Id. Justice Breyer stressed that with regard to existing works, “the
serious public harm and the virtually nonexistent public benefit could not be
more clear.” Id.
268. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003) (“[P]etitioners forcefully
urge that Congress pursued very bad policy in prescribing the CTEA’s long
terms.”).
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Court.
A. WHAT WAS CONGRESS THINKING?
Occasionally, legislation can be a long-overdue update of
an existing statute, the effectiveness of which would be
seriously compromised had the legislature declined to take
action. Such a description does not fit the CTEA, however. The
CTEA, which was the fourth copyright duration extension in a
series of extensions that began 167 years earlier, took effect
only two decades after the extension provided in the Copyright
Act of 1976. 269 Moreover, the CTEA provided a record-length
term extension of 20 years, surpassing, by one year, the length
of the previous extension.270
In a period of less than a quarter-century, the CTEA and
the 1976 Act lengthened copyright duration by 39 years, in
marked contrast to the previous go-it-slow tendencies of
Congress with regard to term extensions. The first extension, a
14-year increase beyond the previous maximum duration of 28
years, came in 1831,271 41 years after Congress created
copyright protection at the federal level. After the 1831
extension, it would be another 78 years before Congress would
lengthen the maximum copyright term, again by 14 years.272
More than six more decades would pass until the 1976 Act and
its extension of 19 years.273
What, then, was Congress’s justification for allowing the
CTEA’s 20-year bonus so closely on the heels of the 1976 Act’s
lengthy extension? Congress and the proponents of the CTEA
pointed to the supposed rationales detailed elsewhere in this
269. Besides the CTEA, the series includes the (1) Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch.
16, §§ 1, 16, 4 Stat. 436, 439; supra notes 24-25; (2) Copyright Act of 1909,
supra note 1; and (3) Copyright Act of 1976, supra note 2. We have followed
the lead of Justice Stevens in not including the 1790 Act in the series, because
that statute, rather than being an extension of copyright duration, created the
federal copyright regime. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 231 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The series also does not include the various annual extensions that Congress
enacted beginning in 1962, in anticipation of what became the Copyright Act
of 1976. See supra note 41.
270. Compare 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304 (CTEA’s 20-year extension) with
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, §§ 302, 304, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976)
(increasing duration of copyright on pre-1978 works by 19 years and
substituting new rule contemplating longer average duration for copyrights on
works created in 1978 or thereafter).
271. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, §§ 1, 16, 4 Stat. 436, 439.
272. Copyright Act of 1909, supra note 1.
273. Copyright Act of 1976, supra note 2.
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article.274 The asserted justifications passed constitutional
muster—though in our view, they should not have—because
they were evaluated by a Supreme Court majority that was not
bowled over by the government’s arguments in favor of the
CTEA but was nevertheless inclined to give Congress
exceedingly broad latitude. Regardless of whether one believes
that the CTEA was constitutional, though a bad idea,275 or that
it was unwise and unconstitutional, one cannot escape the
conclusion that Congress did not serve the public well when it
enacted the CTEA. Our lawmakers set up a massive giveaway
to private interests and imposed that giveaway’s considerable,
long-enduring costs on a public that neither received nor will
receive any new benefit in return.276
The CTEA’s legislative history and the recitation of
justifications in the Eldred majority opinion offer indications
that Congress was star-struck.277 Disney, other similarly
interested corporate copyright owners, and the organizations
274. See supra text accompanying notes 94-112, 136-139.
275. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 208 (“[W]e cannot conclude that the CTEA . . .
is an impermissible exercise of Congress’ power under the Copyright Clause.”).
276. See id. at 223-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 242-67
(Breyer, J., dissenting). In their separate dissents, Justice Stevens and
Justice Breyer both rely on the assertion that the Copyright Clause requires
the interest in private protection to be balanced against the interest in public
access. Id.; see also Karjala, supra note 44 at 201 (referring to the CTEA as
providing favored copyright owners with “a windfall at an incalculable but
heavy cost” to the public). For a discussion of that cost, see id. at 233. Other
commentators have referred to the CTEA as “guarantee[ing] an income stream
to . . . favorite[s] of the legislature,” such as Disney and the Motion Picture
Association of America, among others. Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry,
Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The Intellectual Property Clause as
an Absolute Constraint on Congress, U. ILL. L. REV. 1119, 1170 (2000).
277. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 206-07 & nn. 11, 14 & 15; 144 CONG. REC.
S12377 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch, co-sponsor of the
CTEA); 141 CONG. REC. S3390 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1995) (statements of Sen.
Hatch and Sen. Feinstein when extension bill was first considered in 1995);
Hearing on H.R. 989, supra note 50; 1995 Senate Hearings, supra note 50. See
also Marci A. Hamilton, Copyright Duration Extension and the Dark Heart of
Copyright, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 655, 656 (1996) (commenting that
after the 1995 introduction of term extension bill, “[i]t is almost as though
Congress cannot hear any copyright voices beyond that of the entertainment
industry”).
Note that the hearings dealing with what later became the CTEA occurred in
1995, when congressional committees first considered extending existing and
future copyrights by 20 years. See S. 483, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 989, 104th
Cong. (1995). For explanation of the delay between the 1995 bill proposing a
copyright duration extension and the 1998 enactment of the CTEA, see supra
note 41.
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allied with them (referred to here, for convenience purposes, as
simply “Disney”) possessed institutional star power, not to
mention the financial resources and political influence that
made for a powerful lobbying campaign. In carrying out that
campaign, Disney resourcefully stressed the full list of
stakeholders who could benefit from a 20-year extension of
copyright duration. The proposed extension would apply to all
copyright owners, not merely corporate owners such as Disney.
The sales pitch emphasized the creative process and the
individual authors, songwriters, composers, and visual artists
who deserved extended copyright protection. A copyright term
extension, the argument continued, would be good for all
creators and, of course, for their heirs who ultimately will own
the relevant copyrights.278
So, Disney the institutional star, hoping to widen the
appeal of the proposed term extension and make the CTEA less
closely resemble special-interest legislation drafted for Disney’s
benefit, let human stars take much of the public lead in the
promotional push. Celebrities weighed in, for instance, with
congressional hearing testimony in support of the CTEA. Few
in Congress would disagree when Quincy Jones calls the CTEA
“a good start” toward copyright protection of even greater
duration,279 when Bob Dylan comments on the importance to
creators of knowing that they may benefit their heirs numerous
years hence,280 or when Don Henley and Carlos Santana
indicate that they would like their far-removed descendants to
have a chance to collect royalties stemming from their creations
of many decades earlier.281 Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), a
278. See Fonda, supra note 44; McAllister, supra note 44; Smith, supra
note 44, at B9; Solomon, supra note 44.
279. Hearing on H.R. 989, supra note 50 at 277 (statement of Quincy
Jones) (observing that “[i]f we can start with 70, add 20, it would be a good
start”).
See id. at 234 (statement of Quincy Jones) (commenting on
Representative Hoke’s “Why not forever?” remark, by noting that “I’m
particularly fascinated with [the representative’s] statement. . . . Why not
forever?”).
280. See 1995 Senate Hearings, supra note 50 at 55-56 (statement of Bob
Dylan).
281. See id. at 56-57 (statements of Don Henley and Carlos Santana). Of
course, their far-removed descendants would have had that chance even
without the CTEA’s 20-year bonus. Copyrights on those artists’ works,
whether pre-1978 or dating from 1978 on, were already subject to very long
durations. See 17 U.S.C. § 304 (2000) (75-year duration for copyrights on pre1978 works; now 95 years after CTEA); id. § 302 (life-plus-50-years duration
for works created in 1978 or later; now life-plus-70 after CTEA). In his Eldred
dissent, Justice Breyer correctly noted that remarks such as those made by
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successful songwriter on the side,282 may have shared a special
sense of identification with Dylan.283 But Senator Hatch and
his party deserve no more blame than other senators and
representatives.
Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-Cal.), for
example, and others of her party were equally enthusiastic and
uncritical backers of the CTEA.284
The clincher for Congress may have been that the CTEA
also appeared to benefit copyright owners who were “little
guys” or were the heirs of such figuratively diminutive persons.
With the CTEA applying across the board to all owners of
copyrights on new works and pre-existing works still under
copyright as of the CTEA’s 1998 effective date,285 Congress
could reason that not only was it taking care of Disney et al., it
was protecting Jones, Henley, Dylan, and Santana (and their
grandchildren, great-grandchildren, and so forth), and it was
doing a great thing for “regular” creators (and their distanttime heirs) who would remain largely unknown to the public.
Dylan, Henley and Santana in supposed support of the CTEA were really only
comments about general incentives furnished by a scheme of copyright
protection. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 255 (2003) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (“The Court . . . refers to testimony before Congress . . . that the
copyright system’s incentives encourage creation . . . [but this] amounts to no
more than a set of undeniably true propositions about the value of incentives
in general.”). The musical artists’ remarks did not speak directly to the
incentive value of the added 20 years. Therefore, the comments should not
have been given credence in the determination of whether the CTEA was a
permissible exercise of Copyright Clause authority. See id. 255-56 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). It seems highly unlikely that Dylan, Henley, Santana, or Quincy
Jones would have been moved by the CTEA’s 20-year bonus to write any piece
of music that he would not otherwise have written.
282. For
a
listing
of
the
Senator’s
many
songs,
see
http://www.hatchmusic.com/songs.
Background on Sen. Hatch’s musical
pursuits appears at http://www.hatchmusic.com/history.
283. Senator Hatch was a co-sponsor of the bill that became the CTEA and
was probably its most outspoken advocate in the Senate. During the
legislative process, he commented at length on the supposed merits of
copyright duration extension and punctuated his remarks with references to
various copyrighted songs that would soon enter the public domain if not
saved from that fate. 144 CONG. REC. S12377 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998)
(statement of Senator Hatch regarding bill that became CTEA); 141 CONG.
REC. S3390 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1995) (statement of Senator Hatch regarding
20-year extension bill considered in 1995).
284. See id.
285. 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304(a), 304(b) (2000). According to Professors Heald
and Sherry, the retroactive aspect of the CTEA “has the same effect as a direct
subsidy to Disney or ASCAP but takes a form that diminishes public
awareness of the effect of the law and therefore erodes political
accountability.” Heald & Sherry, supra note 276, at 1175.
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It would be unlikely that any copyright owner would object to
such a term extension, unless he is inclined to consider the
bigger picture we address later in the article.
Not having heard protests from copyright owners, human
or corporate, Congress probably was too inclined to assume
that the CTEA was a largely uncontroversial bill. Certainly,
there were objections raised in congressional hearing testimony
by academics and others who voiced concerns about the effect
on the public domain.286 But those objections, made by less
well-known—not to mention less well-financed and less
glamorous—spokespersons,287 could be discounted as seeking to
further the interests of users of works rather than those of the
works’ creators. Users of works, after all, may sometimes seem
less worthy of legal protection than those who actually
produced the copyrighted works and gave them value—
especially if the observer is not inclined to pay much attention
to the balance drawn by the Framers in the Copyright
Clause.288 It appears that the objections to the CTEA were
listened to politely and then summarily dismissed. The CTEA
passed with essentially no opposition and took effect, by its
terms, immediately upon being signed into law by President
Clinton.289
Congress thus did Disney’s bidding and enacted what was
effectively special-interest legislation to further private
concerns, perhaps all the while thinking that it had benefited
society by striking a blow for creativity. In the process,
Congress was frighteningly uncritical in its acceptance of the
arguments and rationales offered by the CTEA’s proponents.
Concern about what was really contemplated by the Copyright
Clause appeared to be confined to the narrow issue of whether
copyright protection could be made to last forever.290 Perpetual
286. E.g., the Dennis Karjala-led group of professors who provided
Congress the Statement of Copyright Law Professors. See supra note 51.
287. We are referring here, remember, to a group of professors. See id.
288. With its admonition that copyright protection must endure for a
“limited [t]ime[],” the Copyright Clause contemplates the existence of a public
domain. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This means that the rights of users of
formerly copyrighted works have constitutional stature, and that the passage
of works into the public domain, an event that Senator Hatch considered so
undesirable, see supra note 283, is the fate ordained by the Constitution.
Moreover, the rights of creators and those of users of works need not be
regarded as mutually exclusive. See infra text accompanying notes 473-475.
289. See supra note 41. Testimony against the CTEA simply “fell on deaf
ears.” Hamilton, supra note 277, at 656.
290. See 144 CONG REC. H9952 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Rep.
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protection had been the goal of Sonny Bono, the deceased
representative to whom tribute was paid in the CTEA’s official
name.291 Mary Bono, who succeeded her late husband in the
House and helped lead the successful push for the CTEA, had
to be “informed by staff” that a law expressly protecting
copyrights forever would be unconstitutional.292 She remarked
that perhaps at a later time, Congress should take up a
copyright duration proposal of the “forever, less one day”
variety—a suggestion supposedly made by Motion Picture
Association of America executive Jack Valenti.293 Finally, in
enacting the CTEA, Congress appeared to give little thought to
the implications of granting another term extension to huge
numbers of copyrights that had already received a lengthy
extension under the 1976 Act.
Adopted by a Congress that paid insufficient attention to
the full range of issues at stake and seemed overly concerned
about preserving the potential stream of royalties for farremoved heirs and other eventual owners of copyrights,294 the
CTEA has placed a noteworthy freeze on the public domain. No
works will enter the public domain until January 1, 2019. In
this sense, the CTEA has drastically thrown off the balance
contemplated by the Copyright Clause.295 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court held in Eldred that any failings of Congress in
regard to the enactment of the CTEA fell on the permissible
Mary Bono, noting that her late husband, Sonny Bono, had favored perpetual
copyright protection but that she had been “informed by staff” of the
unconstitutionality of such a move by Congress); Hearing on H.R. 989, supra
note 50, at 94 (citing Rep. Sonny Bono as asking why copyrights should ever
expire and cited by the Eldred Court at page 256); Hearing on H.R. 989, supra
note 50, at 94 (statement of Rep. Berman, expressing his “guess [that] we
could . . . just make a permanent moratorium on the expiration of copyrights”);
cf. Eldred, 537 U.S. at230 (quoting statement of Rep. Hoke, asking “Why 70
years? Why not forever? Why not 150 years?”).
291. See 144 CONG REC. H9952 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Mary Bono); see also Hearing on H.R. 989, supra note 50, at 94.
292. See 144 CONG REC. H9952 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Mary Bono).
293. See id.
294. See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. S12377 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement
of Senator Hatch regarding bill that became CTEA); 141 CONG. REC. S3390
(daily ed. Feb. 22, 1995) (statement of Senator Hatch regarding 20-year
extension bill considered in 1995); Karjala, supra note 44 at 199, 235.
295. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 223-28, 240-41, 242 (Stevens, J., dissenting);
id. at 243-46, 265-67 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See also Heald & Sherry, supra
note 276, at 1165 (observing that the Copyright Clause contemplates an
“inviolable” public domain).
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side and resulted in a statute that probably was not wise public
policy but did not violate the Copyright Clause.296 We now
explore the Copyright Clause more fully, in order to expose the
CTEA’s unconstitutional nature and the errors committed by
the Court in Eldred.
B. THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE AND POSSIBLE PROMOTION-OFPROGRESS THEORIES
It has been asserted by some that the policy arguments
against the CTEA are stronger than the constitutional ones.297
This claim, however, can be misleading. Even though the bulk
of the constitutional arguments may resemble policy
arguments, the presentation of the debate as a constitutional
one provides an effective means of responding to “moral rights”
policy arguments that, at first glance, might seem to weigh in
the CTEA’s favor. The Copyright Clause specifies the end that
the statutory regime of copyright must serve: promotion of the
“Progress of Science.”298 Therefore, auxiliary policy aims—such
as harmonization and ensuring that the author’s greatgrandchildren have control over the author’s work—must
either be dismissed as constitutionally inappropriate or be
shoe-horned into some larger, more utilitarian scheme.
For the most part, this article works with the traditional
view of copyright as furnishing an incentive for the production
of creative works that, at the appropriate time, will pass into
the public domain. Under this view, the term of copyright can
be thought of as the fulcrum of a scale balancing private
licensing against public access with the aim of producing the
greatest quantity of publicly accessible creative work.299 This
traditional view is admittedly narrow, however, in its

296. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221.
297. See, e.g., Symposium, Mickey Mice? Potential Ramifications of Eldred
v. Ashcroft, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 771, 797 (2003)
(comments of David O. Carson); Marci Hamilton, Mickey Mouse versus Wired
Magazine: The Supreme Court Considers Whether a Law Extending the
Copyright Term is Constitutional, FINDLAW’S WRIT: LEGAL COMMENTARY (Oct.
24, 2002), at http://writ.findlaw.com/hamilton/20021024.html.
298. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. For a careful examination of the
Copyright Clause language, see generally Lawrence B. Solum, Intellectual
Property, Congressional Power, and the Constitution: Congress’s Power to
Promote the Progress of Science: Eldred v. Ashcroft, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1
(2002).
299. For the classic account, see William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL. STUD. 325 (1989).
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perspective on intellectual property and its benefits. Before
delving into criticism of the majority opinion in Eldred, we
should concede that the Copyright Clause’s “progress”
provision, in and of itself, does not shut out other
nontraditional views altogether.300 These nontraditional views
would take copyright to “promote the Progress of Science” in
ways that have nothing to do with inducing authors to create
new works. In doing so, these views would expand the notion of
the “Progress of Science” beyond its traditional Copyright
Clause sense, which tends to equate it with public access, or
perhaps even more strictly, with the public domain.301
William M. Landes and Judge Richard A. Posner give a
lucid airing to such a view in a recent article302 in which they
discuss the economic bases for property as such and proceed to
draw an analogy to intellectual property in particular. Take a
parcel of land, for instance. The land has existed forever, yet
someone is allowed the exclusive right to it. Obviously, the
exclusive right was never an incentive for the land’s creation.
Nevertheless, granting someone the exclusive right to the land
produces a more desirable social outcome. Now imagine that
everyone had rights to the land. Everyone would have free,
unlimited use of it, and the land would quickly become
“overgrazed,” drained of all value, useful to no one.303
The principle’s applicability to copyright is questionable,
however, and it should be noted that Landes and Posner do not
place too much weight on it. They also point out that there are
notable counterexamples.
For instance, the works of
Shakespeare seem to retain their “value” despite endless

300. Below, we propose that a new emphasis be placed on the Clause’s “to
Authors” provision—to the effect that most conceivable non-incentive-related
means of “promot[ing] the Progress of Science” would be judged impermissible.
It is important to note, however, that even though completely ruling out the
nontraditional theories of “progress” would produce the same effect, we do not
propose such a ruling-out. See infra text accompanying notes 445-454.
301. See, e.g., Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228 (1990); see also Eldred,
537 U.S. at 245-46 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In taking a broad view of the
copyright power’s scope, though, we should be wary of going too far. Even if
the Framers could have accepted theories of “promot[ion of] Progress” beyond
the incentive-for-creation model, the “limited [t]imes” restriction indicates that
the public domain was central to the Framers’ idea of “Progress.” See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
302. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable
Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471 (2003).
303. Id. at 485.
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rehashing and recycling.304
In our view, though, the
“overgrazing” principle’s problems come yet closer to the fore
when Landes and Posner name works that would conform to it:
“the Mona Lisa, the opening lines of Beethoven’s Fifth
Symphony, and several of Van Gogh’s most popular
paintings.”305 One is compelled to ask what “value” these
classic works have really lost. The Mona Lisa’s “devaluation,”
for instance, results merely from its having become, in part, an
article of kitsch in the popular mind. Here, the devaluation
refers solely to consumers’ response to the work (or possibly
even the number of less refined consumers who can identify it
readily) and not to any change in the Mona Lisa itself. The
overgrazed parcel of land, on the other hand, is devalued
because it literally undergoes an unfavorable physical
transformation. This discrepancy is crucial. In his discussion
of It’s a Wonderful Life, a film the rights over which went
unenforced for a time, one commentator unwittingly calls its
significance into sharp and painful detail: “Before [certain
parties] began enforcing their claim to the underlying rights in
the film, local stations and cable channels looking for no-cost
programming broadcast the film endlessly, with the result that,
‘to put it politely, the film’s currency was being devalued.’”306
To put it less politely, some people watched It’s a
Wonderful Life a few too many times on TV, and they grew
tired of it. But a desire to prevent such a “devaluing”—
effectively a desire to restrict access to works so that the
public’s opinion of them is not adversely affected by overexposure to them—should not be used to justify expansions of
the exclusive rights afforded by copyright. It seems doubtful,
for instance, that society would be better off if our access to the
Mona Lisa were more restricted and if that work had remained
solely one of fine art rather than also becoming an oftencountered item of popular culture. Creativity, after all, is
more likely to be promoted by freedom to use the Mona Lisa as
one sees fit than by restrictions on access to it.307 A rationale of

304. Id. at 488.
305. Id.
306. Scott Martin, Eldred v. Ashcroft: Intellectual Property, Congressional
Power, and the Constitution: The Mythology of the Public Domain: Exploring
the Myths Behind Attacks on the Duration of Copyright Extension, 36 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 253, 273 (2002) (quoting Bill Carter, Where Have You Gone,
Tyrone Power?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1994, at D10).
307. See, e.g., Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228 (1990).
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preventing “overgrazing” of works of authorship thus appears
not to correspond well with the constitutional notion of
promoting the “Progress of Science.”308
Admittedly, exclusive rights may have certain supposed
benefits to the “Progress of Science” that are more material in
nature, and it would be unfair for us not to acknowledge that
the writer quoted above in regard to It’s a Wonderful Life went
on to note that during the movie’s period of no exclusivity,
many of the versions being shown had fallen into disrepair and
were substandard in quality.309 It can be argued, for instance,
that if one has the exclusive rights to a certain film, then the
film is more likely to be restored when that becomes necessary
and more likely to be distributed in new digital formats. What
about films in the public domain? Suppose, for the sake of
argument, that restored editions of public domain films
received legal protection under an enactment separate from
copyright law.310 If a firm were to restore a public-domain film,
then it would have the exclusive rights to the restored edition
under the hypothetical legal rule being assumed here, and
would charge a price high enough to cover the costs of
restoration. Other firms, though, would continue to distribute
lower-quality (i.e., non-restored) editions of the old film. They
would have no restoration costs to cover and they would be able
to charge a price lower than that charged for the restored
edition. Given the choice, consumers might place greater
importance on price than on quality. If this were so, then no
firm would have an incentive to restore the work.311 The
demand for the restored edition would be undercut by the
demand for the cheaper, albeit lower-quality, editions.
The natural reaction to this hypothetical is to conclude
that if demand is insufficient to give the restored edition a
significant market niche, the restoration is unimportant in any
308. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Stewart, 495 U.S. at 228.
309. Martin, supra note 306, at 273.
310. This hypothetical enactment would address restored editions with no
new expression added—no insertion of commentary by film experts, no
inclusion of new footage, etc.—because the presence of new expression in the
restored edition would trigger copyright protection for that new expression.
See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 240 n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
311. Obviously, there would be no economic incentive to restore the film if
exclusive rights were not enforced over the restored edition. In the absence of
such rights, prices on the restored edition would quickly be bid down by
copiers to a price lower than that necessary for the restorers to recoup the
investment made in restoration.
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case. If in the long run consumers would prefer that a restored
edition exist, it might seem to make sense for the restorers to
be granted temporary exclusive rights not only to the restored
edition of the film, but also to the film itself. This would allow
the restorers to cut off the supply of all the lower-quality,
lower-priced editions. Until expiration of the restorer’s rights
in the film under this hypothetical legal regime, all consumers
of the film would pay a kind of “tax” in the form of monopoly
pricing and would thereby subsidize a restoration project whose
benefits would be felt long after the tax disappeared.
The above argument, a variant on Landes’ and Posner’s,312
offers substantial support to the theoretical system of renewals
discussed in their article, for under that system the burden of
renewal would ensure a narrowing of copyright’s coverage to
works that remain commercially viable.313 The argument in
support of a narrowly defined restorer’s right—even one that
would not present the constitutional difficulties of the
hypothetical right discussed in the preceding paragraph314 —
does not provide support, however, for the legal protection
provided by the CTEA’s late-in-the-game blanket term
extension. As Justice Breyer emphasized in his Eldred dissent,
only 2% of all works published continue to generate royalties by
The
the time their copyrights enter CTEA territory.315
remaining 98% have little chance of being revisited by the
rights-holders during the final years of copyright. At the same
time, many of them, though not cost-effective investments for
their current rights-holders, would stand a far better chance of
restoration or other revisitation if they were in the public
domain. Eric Eldred, the plaintiff in Eldred, is one such
disseminator of public domain works.316 The film Metropolis,
long in the public domain, was recently remastered and
restored by the Murnau Foundation and given a small-scale
theater and DVD release317 that may not have been cost312. See Landes & Posner, supra note 302, at 488-90.
313. See id. at 517.
314. The hypothetical right under discussion would present serious
constitutional problems to the extent that it would grant protection over an
underlying work that was already in the public domain. See U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 8; Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23
(2003).
315. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 248 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
316. Brief for Petitioners at 5, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No.
01-618) available at 2002 WL 1041928. See Fonda, supra note 44.
317. Press Release, Kino International, Kino on Video to Release Digitally
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effective for a large-scale corporate rights-holder of the type
that owns most copyrights on films.
Even if the CTEA does fund certain works’ revisitation, it
does so only at a significant price to the vast majority of other
works—the 98% of works whose chances of revisitation would
be greater if they entered the public domain sooner. It seems
reasonable, moreover, to project that as more and more works
are stored in digital formats, restoration and other kinds of
revisitation will become cheaper and less necessary. If this is
indeed the case, then the CTEA, which will apply to
innumerable future works in no need of revisitation, looks even
more overbroad.318
Another nontraditional theory holds that greater
international harmonization of and cooperation concerning
copyright policy promotes the “Progress of Science.”
Harmonization, for instance, simplifies licensing and
distribution agreements somewhat. In addition, making some
concessions and playing an active role in the negotiation of
international treaties may allow the United States considerable
sway over other nations’ copyright policies. Such effects may
influence the “Progress of Science” abroad, and the benefits
could be felt domestically.319 The problem, however, is that the
benefits, as far as the “Progress of Science” is concerned, may
be great or may be small; it is a question that has yet to be
answered with good empirical data.
On the other hand, there can be no question as to the
considerable costs of an additional 20 years of copyright. Any
sincere argument for term extension employing the
“international copyright system” rationale would have to take
account of data demonstrating that its benefits were at least as
substantial as the duration extension’s costs. But the CTEA
does not even reach the point of making such a showing
relevant, for as Justice Breyer observed, the CTEA’s
“harmonization” of U.S. copyright duration with that of the

Restored
Metropolis
with
Orchestral
Soundtrack,
at
http://www.silentera.com/info/kinoMetropolis.html (e-release June 5, 2002)
(last visited Apr. 9, 2004).
318. Cf. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 240 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (commenting that
even if providing incentives to restore old films would merit action by
Congress, CTEA is far too sweeping to be justified on such basis).
319. Shira Perlmutter, Participation in the International Copyright System
as a Means to Promote the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts, 36 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 323, 329-30 (2002).
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European Union is pitifully incomplete.320
The CTEA
harmonized only the terms of copyright on post-1977 works
created by natural persons. These works comprise a mere
subset of commercially viable works, and only a tiny subset of
works belonging to that subset will still be in print by the time
the harmonized period begins.321
It can be granted that the copyright power, as an “engine of
free expression,”322 could conceivably operate otherwise than as
a means of setting incentives for authorship. Though the
argument would be weak, one could contend that these kinds of
effects will result from the CTEA’s grant of incentives to
certain rights-holders to “revisit” old films and from its intercontinental harmonization of the terms of copyright on post1977 works attributed to natural persons.323 But the CTEA’s
application is not so restricted. If there remains a case to be
made for the full sweep of the CTEA’s term extensions, the
possible nontraditional arguments we have just examined will
not do. Therefore, we now turn to the traditional copyright
model. In order for the bulk of the CTEA to pass even a
rational basis test, it must have its grounding in the standard
“incentive for creation” model.324 As we shall show, such
grounding is nowhere to be found.
C. THE CTEA, THE TRADITIONAL INCENTIVE MODEL, AND
ELDRED’S ERRONEOUS ANALYSIS
The creation-incentive value of even the prospective
application of the CTEA (i.e., the application to works created
after the CTEA’s effective date) is questionable at best. Recall
that the creation-time value given by a CTEA-regime copyright
equals 99.8% that of a hypothetical perpetual term.325 Justice
Ginsburg misrepresents the economic analysis as culminating
in a ludicrous assertion that the term of copyright is somehow
99.8% perpetual,326 and with a reasonable but misplaced
320. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 257-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
321. See id. at 258 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
322. Harper & Row, Publ’s, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
323. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 206. But see id. at 239-240 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); id. at 253-54, 225-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
324. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 429 (1984).
325. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 210 n.16 (majority opinion); id. at 256 (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
326. Id. at 210 n.16 (majority opinion).
Justice Ginsburg’s
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remark about calculators and calendars, wholly dismisses the
numbers.327 Contrary to Justice Ginsburg’s suggestion, the
economic analysis does not directly apply to the “limited
[t]imes” question. Instead, it relates to the copyright power’s
utilitarian basis.328 The figure of 99.8%, then, speaks to
incentive rather than term length and does not, in and of itself,
point to any great evil. Indeed, even a much shorter term of
copyright could yield this figure if interest rates were higher.329
A proper look at the economic analysis would also take account
of two other figures, namely, the length of the term extension
and the average percentage of a perpetual term’s creation-time
value—99.4%—provided by a pre-CTEA copyright. Under this
view, the public gives up 20 years’ full access so that the
creation-time value of copyright on an ideal work can increase
by about 0.4%.330
We write of “creation-time value” rather than “incentivevalue” because it is unlikely that the two values are directly
correlated. One should recall that works tend not to collect a
steady stream of royalties up through their 95th year and that
only 2% of all works survive to the 56th.331 The 0.4% of
additional incentive would have to be adjusted downward by
the likelihood of premature commercial death and the nearcertainty of commercial slowdown.332
By this rational-economic measure, the CTEA’s prospective
application provides little additional incentive. We should be
careful, however, to account for other possible frameworks. A
misrepresentation involved her treatment of the numbers, but Justice Breyer
made the same misstatement in an outright manner, writing that “ [t]he
economic effect of this 20-year extension . . . is to make copyright not limited,
but virtually perpetual.” Id. at 243 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
327. Id. at 210 n.16 (majority opinion).
328. The economic analysis of a work’s incentive value may inform the
“limited times” analysis indirectly, though, if one regards as unlimited any
term outliving a work’s ability to produce substantial retroactive incentive
value. See infra text accompanying notes 410-415, 439-454.
329. For the sake of demonstration, if the interest rate, absurdly, were set
at 25%, then a 28-year term would yield the 99.8% figure.
330. We mean, in other words, roughly a 0.4% increase on the old
premium. See Heald & Sherry, supra note 276, at 1173-74 (asserting that the
prospective application of the CTEA furnishes no added economic incentive
beyond what prior law provided, and noting that “adding . . . 20 years [to the
copyright term] buys the public nothing”).
331. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 248, 254 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
332. This would be so unless, of course, the creator has reason to expect
significant enough inflation in the next 95 years to offset the improbability’s
rarefying effect.
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“boundedly rational” artist, for instance, may lose sight of the
role of interest, overlook the possibility of accruing money over
time by saving, and assume that the 20 years of term extension
will give him revenues proportional to those that he expects to
make in the first 20 years.333 But then, few artists would dare
hope that their works’ commercial viability would live out the
entire 95 years, and not even they would have the audacity to
attempt to negotiate any kind of long-term financial agreement
based on so highly speculative a projection of commercial
longevity. And the extra years of term length would scarcely
improve the artist’s bargaining position with publishing
houses, which we could reasonably expect to possess the
rational-economic view of things.
Even so, another artist may, irrespective of economics,
simply take pleasure in the thought of his or her estate owning
the rights to his or her work for a long time. But the “moral”
incentive here would not likely be furthered greatly by the
CTEA, which merely postpones the date of passage into the
public domain by 20 years. A look to the history of copyright
renewals suggests, moreover, that the moral incentive was not
of great importance to the majority of authors anyway.
Regarding works registered for copyright between 1883 and
1965, only 11% of authors took the opportunity to renew their
copyrights, even though the price of renewal was slight.334
Interestingly, renewals during that period would have
prolonged the life of their copyrights by 28 to 47 years, longer
than the CTEA’s 20-year prolongation.335 We have no way of
knowing what proportion of these authors chose to renew for
moral reasons, but it is a conservative wager that some of the
aforementioned 11% were motivated by royalties to be gained
from the additional years of duration. Yet it would appear that
at least 89% of authors cared little for the moral or economic
value of a significantly long period of copyright effective during
their lifetimes. Thus, if 28 to 47 years’ income gain were
insufficiently attractive motivation for renewal, the CTEA’s
additional 20 years appears overly broad for the moral
incentive it delivers, namely, the knowledge that one’s family
will continue to exercise some measure of control over one’s
333. From this view, the CTEA would sweeten the pot by 26.6%, in sharp
contrast with the 0.4% discussed at supra note 330 and accompanying text.
334. Landes & Posner, supra note 302, at 473.
335. See supra note 2 for review of the 1909 and 1976 Copyright Acts’
duration terms.
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work for an additional 20 years from the fiftieth year after
death.
The citation by Congress and the Supreme Court of
demographic trends toward a longer life span336 should have
little impact on the analysis of the CTEA’s incentive effect.
Recall that only 2% of works retain commercial viability after
their 55th year.337 The works of venerated graybeards Bob
Dylan, Carlos Santana, and Quincy Jones may indeed outlast
their creators’ grandchildren, but a shrewder Congress would
have recognized that those works are in the minority. Had
Congress listened to other artists, particularly contemporary
artists who rely more heavily on sampling than their
predecessors did, it might have learned that many artists are
more concerned with heightened access than with heightened
protection. Hip-hop artist Chuck D of Public Enemy, for
instance, has railed against tight restrictions on sampling338
while aligning himself with file-sharing services such as
Audiogalaxy.com.339
Thus, the CTEA’s prospective application has questionable
creation-incentive value in terms of the actual economic and
moral rewards it would give artists. The CTEA’s retrospective

336. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 206-07, 207 n. 14.
337. See id. at 254. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
338. In the audio track Caught, Can I Get a Witness?, Chuck D takes a
Jeffersonian view of audio recordings:
Caught, now in court ‘cause I stole a beat
This is a sampling sport
But I’m giving it a new name
What you hear is mine
P.E. [Public Enemy] you know the time . . .
I found this mineral that I call a beat
I paid zero
I packed my load ‘cause it’s better than gold
People don’t ask the price, but its [sic] sold . . .
We ain’t goin’ for this
They say that I stole this
Can I get a witness?
PUBLIC ENEMY, Caught, Can I Get a Witness?, on IT TAKES A NATION OF
MILLIONS TO HOLD US BACK (Columbia/Def Jam Recordings 1988), available
at http://www.lyrics.net.ua/song/133388 (last visited Apr. 9, 2004).
339. Biography of Keynote Speaker, Chuck D, First Joint Convening of
Americans for the Arts and the National Assembly of State Arts Agencies,
July 28-31, 2001, at http://www.participate2001.org/innerpages/keynotes/d.html
(last
visited
Feb.
22,
2004);
see
also
Audiogalaxy,
at
http://www.audiogalaxy.com (last visited Apr. 9, 2004) (Audiogalaxy.com is a
music search and file sharing web site).
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application, viewed within the confines of the economic model
only, is of even more questionable value, particularly if its
primary goal is to augment the incentive of a lengthened
prospective term with a further incentive for future authors:
that they might benefit even more from later-enacted term
extensions.340 This further incentive fails on two grounds.
First, if future authors bet on later extensions to their
copyright term as their incentive to create, the bet would have
to be of enough value to overcome the probability that the
benefit would never be received. Yet as discussed above, a
majority of authors would probably find the “moral value” of
even a significant term extension to be minimal, and the
marginal economic value would be extremely small even if the
term were extended to perpetuity.341 Second, in order for
Congress to maintain a reasonable expectation of extension,
Congress would have to extend existing copyright terms
regularly and make sure each time that a significant number of
copyrights benefited from the extension.342 These periodic
extensions, strung together, would seem dangerously close to
an effectively perpetual copyright. Viewed in the fairest light,
340. Sen. Orrin Hatch suggests that the CTEA delivers just that:
Contrary to the argument made by the CTEA’s detractors, this
extension was not a naked windfall to copyright holders. Rather, it
fulfills the justified expectation that Congress will periodically review
and revise the copyright term. In so doing, Congress not only
confirmed the expectation of existing copyright holders, it also
preserved its ongoing good faith in the eyes of the creators of
copyrightable works. Accordingly, such an extension does advance
the goal of enhancing the incentive for the creation of new
copyrighted works.
Orrin Hatch & Thomas R. Lee, “To Promote the Progress of Science”: The
Copyright Clause and Congress’s Power to Extend Copyrights, 16 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 1, 21 (2002). The Senator’s attempt to justify the CTEA in this fashion
merely clothed, in transparent semantics, what the authors assert is a “naked
windfall.” His rationale that copyright holders have a “justified expectation” of
extensions would seem to require Congress to string together extension after
extension, but even the Eldred majority would not approve of such action by
Congress. See supra text accompanying notes 86-88, 110-115; infra text
accompanying notes 342-343, 400-415, 459-467.
341. See Brief of Amici Curiae George A. Akerlof et al. at 10, Eldred (No.
01-618) (remarking that overall, a twenty-year extension “seems unlikely to
have a significant effect” on both pre-creation and post-creation incentives).
342. See Michael H. Davis, Extending Copyright and the Constitution:
“Have I Stayed Too Long?”, 52 FLA. L. REV. 989, 1031 (2000) (arguing that
because such a “bet” on retroactive extensions would be a “bizarrely rarefied
long shot” for authors, repeated extensions would not necessarily produce
more incentives to create nor correspondingly more copyrights that would
benefit).
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the retroactive component’s incentive to future authors simply
approaches nil. Viewed more harshly, it suggests something
akin to the congressional bad faith of which Justice Ginsburg,
in the Eldred decision, professed to find no trace.343 Surely at
some level Congress was influenced by overt requests for
perpetual copyright.344
In his challenge to the retroactive component, petitioner
Eldred asserted just this concern.
He alleged that the
Copyright Clause “imbeds a quid pro quo,” and that the CTEA,
in light of arguments similar to those we have just advanced,
represents a “quid pro nihilo.”345 As noted above, Justice
Ginsburg disagreed, arguing that the CTEA involved a quid pro
quo and, in effect, that the beneficiaries of the CTEA’s term
extensions paid for the CTEA before they knew they would be
receiving its benefit.346 Given Congress’ history of retroactive
term extensions, she countered, an author could have a
reasonable expectation at the time of creation that he or she
would eventually benefit from some extension of copyright.347
Certainly, some authors would know that Congress has
extended durations in the past and would hope that Congress
might do so again in the future. But it makes neither legal nor
practical sense to speak of a possible future extension as if it
were part of a contract with the authors. Having reason to
343. Justice Ginsburg focused instead on the lack of clear evidence in the
House and Senate reports that Congress intended copyright protection to be
perpetual, and on assertions in the congressional debates that copyright
duration should be limited. She therefore concluded that the CTEA does not
establish an unlimited duration. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 209 n.16, 209-10.
344. Shortly before the enactment of the CTEA, Rep. Mary Bono made
telling remarks regarding the CTEA, the copyright duration preference of her
late husband (former Rep. Sonny Bono), and a future course of action she
wished to see Congress undertake:
Copyright extension is a very fitting memorial for Sonny. . . .
Actually, Sonny wanted the term of copyright protection to last
forever. I am informed by staff that such a change would violate the
Constitution. . . . As you know, there is also Jack Valenti’s proposal
for the term to last forever less one day. Perhaps the Committee may
look at that next Congress.
144 CONG. REC. H9951-52. Quincy Jones almost certainly would like the idea
of a continuing pattern of duration extensions. See Hearing on H.R. 989,
supra note 50 at 277 ( “If we can start with 70, add 20, it would be a good
start”); id. at 234 (approving an earlier speaker’s suggestion that copyright
duration last forever).
345. Petitioner’s Brief at 23, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No.
01-618) available at 2002 WL 1041928.
346. See supra notes 140-145 and accompanying text.
347. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 214-15.
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hope for a possible future benefit does not amount to payment
for the hoped-for benefit. No strict expectation would be
violated if an author did not receive a hoped-for extension, and
no one would accuse Congress of not upholding its end of the
bargain if it left copyright duration set at the level guaranteed
to authors at the time their works acquired copyright
protection.348 If future extensions were truly part of the
public’s bargain with authors, Congress might be
constitutionally bound to a perpetual series of retroactive term
extensions.
In order for Justice Ginsburg’s characterization of the
CTEA’s retroactive component as a quid pro quo to make sense,
Congress must be seen as having an intent to string together
an effectively perpetual copyright. One would prefer to believe
Justice Ginsburg when she noted that this “clearly is not the
situation before us.”349 Yet if this “is not the situation,” then
either Congress intends to violate the terms of its supposed
agreement with the creative community,350 or Justice
Ginsburg’s quid pro quo theory is bankrupt.
Presumably conscious of the CTEA’s doubtful conformity
with any quid pro quo requirement, the Court attempts to shift
some weight away from its earlier argument by noting that its
use of quid pro quo language has typically appeared in patent
Patents are
cases rather than in copyright cases.351
distinguishable from copyrights, Justice Ginsburg argued, so
the quid pro quo point may be misplaced in the copyright
context.352 She observed that a copyright is effective from the
time of creation, whereas a patent is effective only from the
point of the disclosure required as part of the patent approval
process.353 In the patent context, then, disclosure is the quo
exacted from the inventor; in the copyright context, disclosure
is the desired objective but is not formally required for
copyright protection to adhere to a work.354
348. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 240-41 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
349. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 209 (quoting Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 379
(D.C. Cir. 2001)).
350. See id. at 214-15 (noting that congressional history of granting
retroactive extensions of copyright duration could give rise to expectations on
part of creators that further such extensions would be enacted).
351. See id. at 216.
352. See id. at 216-17.
353. See id. (noting that the Patent Act first requires disclosure for the
grant of a patent; copyright runs from the date of creation).
354. See id.
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Justice Ginsburg seemed to suggest that copyright law has
no quo comparable to that of patent law.355 The Justice
quibbles over semantics, for even though copyright vests in the
author at creation when the work is fixed,356 the copyright
owner normally has little need to enforce his or her rights
against another party until the work has been disclosed, that
is, published. The exclusive right over an unpublished work
gives the author little reward, because typically no one
unsanctioned by the author has access to the work. To the
extent the author holding exclusive rights can reap rewards
from the public for the work’s use, payment does not begin until
the author discloses his or her work.357 In this respect, then,
copyright and patent are similar. Furthermore, it should make
no difference that patent disclosure requires completion of a
formal legal procedure,358 whereas copyright disclosure does
not.359 The patent approval process serves to ensure that an
invention has been fully disclosed, i.e., that all of its relevant
details are made plain to the public. Copyrighted works, on the
other hand, are fully disclosed from the point of publication; no
further formal disclosure scheme is required.360 Copyright and
patent thus both exact disclosure in order for creators to reap
benefits; the differences between their respective objects simply
allow the process of extraction to be less formalized in the
context of the former than in that of the latter. Therefore,
contrary to Justice Ginsburg’s apparent suggestion, it would be
incorrect to deduce from this formality gap that patent
contemplates a meaningful quid pro quo but that copyright

355. See id.; see also id. at 217 n.22 (conceding that patent and copyright
law involved different exchanges).
356. Id. at 217; 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 201 & 302(a) (2000).
357. A copyright owner has exclusive rights with regard to the use of one’s
work. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). The owner may enforce such rights against
unauthorized users. Id. at §§ 501-06. Such use necessarily presupposes the
disclosure of the work before others can use it, either with permission or
without.
358. Sections 111-154 of the Patent Act describe the process for application
for and issuance of a patent. 35 U.S.C. §§ 111-154 (2000) (as amended at 35
U.S.C.A. §§ 111-154 (West 2001 & Supp. 2003).
359. See supra text accompanying notes 353-354, 356.
360. Although there is a copyright registration process that furnishes
certain legal benefits to copyright owners who complete it, see 17 U.S.C. §§
408-412 (2000), registration with the United States Copyright Office is not
required for copyright protection to begin. Id. at § 408. Rather, copyright
begins once an eligible work has been created and placed in a tangible medium
of expression. Id. at §§ 101, 102, 201, 302(a).
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does not.
The Court further attempted to distance the treatment of
copyright duration from patent law’s quid pro quo exchange.361
The Court noted that patent and copyright grants differ,
because unlike copyright owners, patent holders effectively
obtain temporary monopolies over their knowledge.362
Copyright owners do not gain a similar monopoly.363 Therefore,
in the Court’s view, patent law’s quid pro quo was “more
exacting than copyright’s.”364 The majority seemed to suggest
that because copyright was not a “monopoly of knowledge,”365
judging the CTEA’s extended copyright duration according to
the same quid pro quo balance contemplated by patent law
would be incorrect.366 However, the Court’s argument breaks
down. It is true that patent law does not feature the explicit
expression-versus-idea dichotomy established in copyright
law.367 Contrary to what the Court suggests, however, 368 this
is not because patent protection somehow reaches beyond the
expression of an idea to a monopoly on the underlying idea, i.e.,
the idea beneath the invention’s concept. Patent law reaches
no further than a particular embodiment of an invention.369
Patent and copyright therefore cover similar ground. Even
though the Court may have intended the difference in
copyright’s coverage to devalue the petitioners’ quid pro quo
arguments, the effort fails, for patent and copyright bear too
many conceptual similarities as primary guardians of

361. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 217.
362. See id.
363. See id. (the author gains no monopoly on any knowledge; a reader of
an author’s writing may make full use of any fact or idea she acquires from
her reading).
364. Id. at 217 n. 22.
365. Id. at 217.
366. See id. (“In light of these distinctions, one cannot extract from
language in our patent decisions . . . support” for the petitioners’ claim that
CETA is an improper violation of an implicit copyright quid pro quo bargain).
367. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (“[w]hoever invents . . . any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition off matter . . . may
obtain a patent therefor”) with 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) (copyright on original
work of authorship does not extend to “any idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery”).
368. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 217 (arguing copyright law differs from patent
law in that it does not protect ideas).
369. See 35 U.S.C. § 101; see also § 100 (2000) (defining invention as
“invention or discovery,” and defining process as “process, art or method” and
new uses of existing processes, machines, manufacture, etc.).

LANGVARDT

2004]

05/12/2004 12:52 PM

UNWISE OR UNCONSTITUTIONAL?

257

intellectual property rights.370
In sum, the Court, instead of settling affirmatively on a
response to Eldred’s quid pro quo argument, presents us with
two disjoint responses.
We may either accept Justice
Ginsburg’s demonstration of the retroactive term extension’s
quid pro quo effect, or accept her argument that the quid pro
quo balance articulated in earlier patent decisions is not
applicable in the copyright context.
The first option is
The second asks that we assent to an
unacceptable.371
argument based on a questionable distinction between patent
and copyright law, one that Justice Ginsburg herself stops
short of fully embracing.372
D. OTHER DEFICIENCIES IN THE ELDRED MAJORITY OPINION
It is difficult to come away from a reading of the Eldred
majority opinion without a feeling that the primary reasons for
the decision received less attention in the opinion than the
rationales actually articulated by the Court. Indeed, Justice
Ginsburg used considerable ink commenting instead on Justice
Breyer’s dissent, which the majority repeatedly referenced and
refuted.373 The Court seemed motivated by two underlying,
and related, concerns: first, if the CTEA were held
unconstitutional in its application to existing copyrights, the
term extension set forth in the Copyright Act of 1976 would be
vulnerable as well;374 second, striking down the CTEA would
open up a proverbial can of worms featuring the upsetting of
370. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that the same constitutional
clause provides Congress its authority to enact patent and copyright
legislation, and that regardless of whether Congress legislates regarding
patents or regarding copyrights, the Progress of Science and limited Times
provisions in the clause operate as constraints on congressional power. See
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
371. See Heald & Sherry, supra note 276, at 1169 (observing, in regard to
the CTEA, that “it is difficult to imagine a more overt violation” of the quid pro
quo principle). “The retroactive extension of the copyright term cannot
possible provide any incentive for [authors] to create an already existing
work.” Id.
372. Justice Ginsburg rejects the quid pro quo argument where it would
limit Congress’s ability to extend copyright terms, see Eldred, 537 U.S. 217,
yet continues to analogize copyright term extensions to patent law’s, see id. at
217 n.22 (if patent’s quid pro quo allows extensions, by analogy, it should
allow copyright’s).
373. On at least five occasions, Justice Ginsburg commented on or
answered statements in Justice Breyer’s dissent. See id. at 193 n.1, 199 n.4,
205 n.10, 207 n.15 & 209 n.16.
374. Id. at 209 n.16.
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many parties’ expectations and the prospect of numerous legal
proceedings challenging licensing and transfer agreements
entered into in reliance on the CTEA.375 The Eldred majority
reiterated the first concern, albeit briefly, near the end of
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion after raising it earlier.376 Although
the Court did not expressly note the second concern, it may be,
in part, the rationale that drove the Court to defer to Congress
repeatedly in its opinion.377 Both dissenters referred to it
explicitly, suggesting that any such concern on the part of the
majority was overblown.378
On the first concern, the Court was more worried than it
needed to be about the fate that supposedly would have
befallen the 1976 Act’s term extension if the retrospective
aspect of the CTEA had been held unconstitutional. Although
the Supreme Court of course must be cognizant of the potential
long-term implications of issuing a certain holding in a case,
the Court must also be careful not to allow an issue that is not
before it to dictate the resolution of the issue it must actually
decide. The Eldred case did not call for a ruling on the
constitutionality of the 1976 Act’s term extension.379
Nevertheless, concern about that non-issue almost certainly,
and regrettably, played a pivotal role in the Court’s decision to
sustain the CTEA against constitutional attack.380
375. See id. at 210 (noting that if CETA’s application to existing works
were unconstitutional, the same would be true of “extending the protections of
U.S. copyright law to [foreign authors’] works . . . that had already been
created” by the time of the relevant U.S. copyright enactment) (quoting
Graeme W. Austin, Does the Copyright Clause Mandate Isolationism? 26
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 17, 56 n.13 (2002)) (internal quotations omitted); id. at
221-22 (if the CETA’s retrospective application to existing works were struck
down under the Copyright Clause, it might make the prospective application
vulnerable as well); see also Solum, supra note 298, at 62 (predicting that the
Court could have such concerns prior to the Eldred decision).
376. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 209 n.16, 222.
377. See id. at 193, 196, 208, 212-13, 221-23.
378. See id. at 241 n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“we need not consider
whether the reliance and expectation interests . . . established by prior
extensions . . . would alter the result”); id. at 265 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“the
law provides means to protect those who have reasonably relied upon prior
copyright statutes”).
379. See id. at 241 n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“the validity of earlier
retroactive extensions of copyright protection is not at issue”); id. at 265
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“we are not here considering . . . the constitutionality
of other copyright statutes”).
380. See id. at 209-10 (declining to find the CTEA unconstitutional when it
had not found the previous term extensions in the 1831, 1909, and 1976 Acts
unconstitutional).
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Even if striking down the CTEA would have led to a later
judicial determination that the 1976 Act’s extension was
unconstitutional—a supposed eventuality that is far from
certain—a court deciding a case regarding the 1976 Act could
have devised an appropriate decree to allow for the interests of
those who for many years had relied on the statute’s validity.381
Moreover, there is no guarantee that a later court would have
struck down the 1976 Act’s term extension, despite the
apparent relevance of some of the same arguments leveled
against the CTEA. A court determining the constitutional fate
of the 1976 Act’s duration extension could have distinguished it
from the CTEA (assuming the CTEA had been held invalid) by
pointing out that: (1) the 1976 Act’s term extension was only
one part of a fundamental and multi-faceted restructuring of
U.S. copyright law;382 and (2) in altering the copyright duration
rules, the 1976 Act helped enable the U.S. to sign on to the
Berne Convention, the most important international agreement
regarding copyright.383
Having become too focused on what it mistakenly believed
would be inevitable consequences of a holding that the CTEA
was unconstitutional, the Eldred majority resorted to
rationales that were not developed convincingly. We have
already explored the flaws in the Court’s treatment of incentive
and quid pro quo issues in regard to the Copyright Clause.384
Equally glaring flaws appear in the Court’s heavy reliance on
the history of congressional extensions of copyright and patent
duration on a retrospective basis. As Justice Stevens stressed
in his dissent, that history, besides being less consistent than
the majority made it out to be, contained what today would
clearly be seen as unconstitutional resurrections of formerly
patented items from the public domain.385 Justice Stevens
381. See id. at 241 n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 265 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stevens asserted that any reliance interests in regard to
the CTEA were not worthy of such consideration, however, in view of the short
number of years since passage and the fact that it had been the subject of
litigation since shortly after it took effect. Id. at 241 n.14 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
382. Id. at 264 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The CTEA, in contrast, was simply
a bonus for copyright owners.
383. Id. The 1976 Act thus served a very important end that was far more
meaningful than the token international harmonization supposedly
accomplished by the CTEA. See supra text accompanying notes 243-245, 319320.
384. See supra text accompanying notes 325-372.
385. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 233-39 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

LANGVARDT

260

05/12/2004 12:52 PM

MINNESOTA INTEL. PROPERTY REVIEW

[Vol. 5:2

made sense when he asserted that the majority had placed too
much weight on the historical analysis.386
Even more troublesome is the Court’s suggestion that the
lack of legal challenges to earlier copyright duration extensions
somehow supports a conclusion that the CTEA should be held
constitutional.387 The absence of legal challenges to previous
term extensions, however, does not furnish the CTEA a
stronger presumption of constitutionality than any other
enactment of Congress would normally receive. Neither does it
estop parties such as Eldred from raising constitutional
objections to the CTEA. Assuming for the sake of argument
that a previous term extension would have been held
unconstitutional if it had been challenged shortly after its
enactment, the failure of affected parties to launch a prompt
challenge cannot convert an unconstitutional statute into a
constitutional one.388 Moreover, as mentioned earlier, even if
the previous copyright duration extensions could have
withstood constitutional challenges, such outcomes would not
dictate the same result for the CTEA.389
In connection with its reliance on term extension history
and the lack of previous judicial challenges, the Eldred
majority approvingly noted that when it made the CTEA
applicable to existing copyrights, Congress utilized an equity
rationale under which existing copyrights would receive the
same benefit as copyrights coming into existence after the
CTEA’s effective date.390 The equity rationale, however, is both
flimsy and transparent. Most statutes have only prospective
effect. As a result, a new statutory rule usually applies only to
later-occurring subject matter, with the “old” rule still
governing similar subject matter that dates back to a time
preceding the new rule’s effective date. Lines must inevitably
be drawn, and when they are drawn at the prospective386. See id. at 230-33 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
387. See id. at 217 n.22 (majority opinion).
388. As the Court has observed, “no one acquires a vested or protected
right in violation of the Constitution by long use, even when that span of time
covers our entire national existence.” Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of New
York, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970).
389. For instance, if the 1976 Act had been challenged on constitutional
grounds but was upheld for reasons of the sort noted earlier, see supra text
accompanying notes 382-383, the supposed precedent would not necessarily
mean much in a later challenge of the CTEA, because the justifications
supporting the 1976 Act would not apply to the CTEA.
390. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 200, 204 (majority opinion).
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application-only point, Congress and the courts typically do not
lose sleep over equity-related concerns. Why should copyright
law be any different? As Justice Stevens suggested in his
dissent, there is nothing inequitable about not giving existing
copyrights a term extension, so long as the term promised by
law at the time of copyright acquisition is respected.391
Although Congress has made copyright duration
extensions apply to existing copyrights as well as to future ones
because of supposed concerns about equity, Congress has
produced results that hinge to a great extent on fortuity and
seem more inequitable than those that would result from use of
the standard legislative approach of line-drawing at the
prospective-application-only point. Consider again our two
opening hypotheticals, with the addition of two assumed facts:
(1) that the 1922 work came under copyright in the closing days
of 1922; and (2) that the 1923 work acquired copyright
protection early in 1923. As earlier explanation revealed,392 the
copyright on the 1922 work expired at the end of 1997—75
years from when it began. Under pre-CTEA law, the copyright
on the 1923 work would have expired at the end of 1998, but
because the copyright still existed in 1998 and was thus “alive”
when the CTEA took effect late that year, the duration of the
copyright on the 1923 work was extended to the end of 2018.
Therefore, even though the two works came under copyright
within a very short time of each other, the second work
received 20 more years of copyright protection than the first
did. So much for equity. It is also worth noting that the
differing treatments extended to the copyrights on the 1922
and 1923 works depended upon the fortuity of when Congress
enacted the statute. Had Congress debated the CTEA longer
and not enacted it until early 1999, the copyright on the 1923
work would have been consigned to the same fate as the
copyright on the 1922 work: expiration after 75 years and an
ever-so-close failure to qualify for the CTEA’s 20-year bonus.
It may be argued that the former owner of the expired
copyright on the 1922 work should not be seen as having much
of an equity-related objection because, after all, he, she, or it
did at least benefit from the duration bonus provided for by the

391. See id. at 240 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
392. For explanation of the reasons for the significantly different durations
of the respective copyrights on the 1922 and 1923 works, see supra notes 7, 9,
42, 58-59 and accompanying text.
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Copyright Act of 1976.393 Therefore, the argument might
continue, the ex-copyright owner could be told to “be satisfied
that you received 75 years of protection when you originally
were supposed to have only 56 years.” Try telling that to
Disney, which clearly was not content to receive “only” 75 years
of protection instead of the 56 to which it originally was
entitled under then-applicable law. Disney also wanted the 20
additional years of protection tacked on by the CTEA, as did
the owner of the copyright on the 1923 work in the hypothetical
we have been discussing. The mid-1970s conferral of a 19-year
duration bonus may make it hard to feel especially sorry for the
former owner of the expired copyright on the 1922 work, but it
is understandable why such a party might not see it as
equitable that the copyright on a work very nearly as old
received not only the earlier duration bonus but also the
CTEA’s 20-year windfall. When the government is handing out
gifts, should the identities of the recipients and non-recipients
be so arbitrarily determined?
Of course, the fortuity factor of when bill passage occurs is
also present when Congress enacts a statute and gives it the
usual prospective-only effect. Some parties will have the bad
luck to miss out narrowly on the benefit that the new rule
confers on others who qualify for the treatment called for by the
new rule.
When Congress draws the standard line of
prospective operation, however, the differential treatment of
future activities and past activities, of “new” and “old,” at least
seems more logical. Perhaps because that standard line is
familiar, the outcome it produces also seems more equitable.394
393. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000). Because the copyright on the 1922 work
remained “alive” as of January 1, 1978, the renewal term that began in 1950
became a 47-year term rather than the 28-year term it had been under prior
law. See id. at § 302(b).
394. The above should not be taken as an argument that Congress acted
unwisely and unconstitutionally only insofar as the CTEA’s retrospective
operation is concerned, and that the CTEA’s prospective operation is
unassailable. As we indicate elsewhere in the article, the prospective aspect of
the CTEA is also vulnerable to serious public policy and constitutional
objections. See supra text accompanying notes 263-265, 325-372; infra text
accompanying notes 400-415. Neither are we advocating that Congress should
feel free to enact future copyright term extensions, so long as they are made
purely prospective in operation. Instead, as we urge later, Congress should
bring the copyright duration extension train to a halt. See infra text
accompanying notes 455-456, 471-476. Our real point in this section is that
the supposed equity rationale for the retrospective operation of the CTEA was
superficial and so riddled with deficiencies that the Eldred majority should not
have given it credence in the analysis of the CTEA’s constitutionality.

LANGVARDT

2004]

05/12/2004 12:52 PM

UNWISE OR UNCONSTITUTIONAL?

263

The equity rationale’s problems are not restricted to the
previously identified ones associated with distinguishing
among different holders of existing copyrights. There is also
the public interest, which any credible equity analysis should
consider and which must be taken into account because of the
Copyright Clause.395 Yet when Congress employed the equity
rationale, it seemingly gave no consideration to the public
interest, which centers around the public domain from which
all may freely borrow.396 How is it equitable to delay by 20
years the entitlement of the public to have unrestricted ability
to use certain works—especially when that entitlement had
already been delayed by 19 years under a previous duration
extension? How is it equitable to freeze the public domain so
that no works will enter it until January 1, 2019? With the
Copyright Clause contemplating the existence of a vibrant
public domain, the congressional failure to consider the public
interest in its equity analysis raised constitutional red flags
that the Eldred majority should not have overlooked.
Congressional utilization of the equity rationale in regard
to the CTEA provided convenient cover for an enactment that
would benefit the statute’s outspoken proponents. Let’s face it,
there would have been no CTEA if not for the efforts of Disney
et al., whose desire to lengthen the duration of their otherwise
soon-to-expire copyrights triggered the lobbying push.397
Congress, on its own, would not have come to the conclusion
that another extension of copyright duration was necessary.
Individual artists and associations representing their interests
were not clamoring for a term extension, at least not until
Disney engaged them in the effort. Neither had scholars issued
calls for another duration extension.
Disney succeeded,
however, in convincing a compliant Congress that the CTEA
was a critically important step to take.

395. The “limited [t]imes” language of the Copyright Clause, U.S. CONST.,
art. I, § 8, cl. 8, furnishes a clear indication that the interests of copyright
owners are not to be the sole focus of legislative efforts in the copyright realm.
See, e.g., Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228 (1990); Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
396. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 240 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 266
(Breyer, J., dissenting). See also Stewart, 495 U.S. at 228 (noting that
copyright duration is limited so that the public “will not be permanently
deprived of the fruits of an artist’s labors”).
397. For discussion of the lobbying blitz, see supra text accompanying notes
44-54, 277-289. Others’ accounts of the lobbying effort appear in the sources
cited at supra note 44.
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By making the CTEA applicable to existing copyrights,
Congress treated Disney in a manner similar to a court’s
treatment of a successful plaintiff who convinces the court that
a new legal rule or interpretation is necessary: the plaintiff gets
the benefit of the new rule as a reward, of sorts, for having
brought the case. But Congress is not a court, and Disney was
not a litigant. Congress did not need to reward Disney by
making the CTEA apply to existing copyrights. In doing so and
in also rewarding other holders of existing copyrights, Congress
granted a purely private gift at an enormous public cost in
terms of the freezing of the public domain and the 20 additional
years of licensing and search expenses for users whose
interests have constitutional legitimacy under the Copyright
Clause.398 The Eldred majority chose not to nullify that gift,
and in the process ignored clear indications of its
unconstitutionality.
That Congress would pay so little
attention to the public interest aspect of the Copyright Clause
is disappointing, if not surprising. It is both disappointing and
surprising that the Supreme Court, the ultimate arbiter of
what is and is not constitutional, went to great lengths to recast a statute raising serious Copyright Clause problems as
merely an unfortunate enactment of the sort we have to expect
now and then from our senators and representatives.399
The Eldred Court was extremely deferential to Congress
and its judgments regarding incentives to creators and other
justifications for the CTEA. Writing for the majority, Justice
Ginsburg noted that the appropriate test for Copyright Clause
compliance is whether the “system” of copyright enacted by
398. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 227, 240, 242 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at
244-250, 266-7 (Breyer, J., dissenting). There is a certain irony in the gift
Disney received when the CTEA lengthened copyright duration just in time to
keep the Steamboat Willie copyright and other early Disney copyrights from
falling into the public domain. Disney, after all, has made heavy—and highly
successful—use of public domain material as the basis of its creative efforts in
movies and the like. See Solomon, supra note 44 at E2 (listing, as examples,
The Little Mermaid, The Hunchback of Notre Dame, Cinderella, Pocahontas,
and Beauty and the Beast). Thanks to an accommodating Congress, Disney
can have its cake and eat it too. On a similar note, Professor Lessig has
pointed out that even in the Steamboat Willie cartoon whose copyright Disney
was so eager to preserve, Disney based its creative efforts in part on those of
others. Steamboat Willie was a take-off on, and commentary about, a Buster
Keaton character known as “Steamboat Bill.” Lawrence Lessig, Keynote
Address at the Open Source Convention (July 24, 2002), at
http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/policy/2002/08/15/lessig.html
[hereinafter
Lessig, Keynote Address].
399. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 199-202.
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Congress would tend to furnish an incentive to create.400
Justice Ginsburg later stated that the focus should be on the
whether the copyright regime “overall” tends to promote the
purposes of the Copyright Clause.401 The Court thus saw no
need to conduct a careful review of the relationship (or lack
thereof) between a particular copyright statute such as the
CTEA and the Copyright Clause, so long as the general
copyright regime enacted by Congress seems consistent with
the objectives of the constitutional provision.402 By keeping the
analysis largely restricted to whether the general copyright
system is in tune with the Copyright Clause, the Court allowed
Congress
remarkable
latitude
concerning
individual
enactments within that general system. One cannot imagine
any court ever holding that our overall copyright regime does
not promote Copyright Clause objectives. Indeed, the Clause
itself contemplates that any system of copyright enacted by
Congress will get the job done constitutionally, assuming that
the exclusive rights guaranteed by the system exist only for
“limited [t]imes.”403
It was therefore disingenuous for the Court to say that the
real concern is over whether the general copyright regime
complies with the Copyright Clause when the Clause itself
indicates that a general regime will almost by definition
comply. To be a meaningful check on congressional authority
within the intellectual property realm, the Copyright Clause
must logically be seen as concerned with whether individual
enactments within the general copyright scheme are consistent
with the Clause’s objectives. The approach taken by the Court
in Eldred, however, drains the Clause of its meaning and
significance and hands Congress a free pass to do almost
anything it wishes regarding individual copyright enactments
without having to worry about whether that enactment would
pass muster under the Copyright Clause. Justice Stevens
therefore may not have been exaggerating when he observed
that the Eldred majority had “quitclaimed” to Congress the
Court’s proper role in deciding Copyright Clause issues.404
The extremely lenient review conducted in Eldred resulted
in part from the Court’s payment of insufficient attention to the
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.

Id. at 212.
Id. at 222.
See id. at 204-05, 207-08, 212-13, 221-22.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 242 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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relationship between the Copyright Clause and the First
Amendment. In their own respective ways, these constitutional
provisions promote and encourage expression.405 The Court
accurately noted the existence of precedents indicating that a
formal First Amendment privilege or defense is unnecessary in
copyright infringement cases because copyright law’s fair use
doctrine and expression-versus-ideas distinction adequately
safeguard the same interests arising under the First
Amendment.406 Even so, the Court missed the point. Although
it may be understandable that these precedents would make
the Court hesitant to recognize a First Amendment privilege or
defense in the copyright context, the Eldred majority could
have allowed free speech concerns to inform the Copyright
Clause analysis without creating a First Amendment defense to
copyright infringement liability.
In infringement cases, the fair use doctrine and the
expression-versus-idea principle indeed are viable means of
protecting the free speech interests of users of copyrighted
works.407 However, the freedom-of-expression concern in the
context of the CTEA and the Copyright Clause is different. The
Copyright Clause’s requirement that works enter the public
domain after a “limited [t]ime[]” means that upon the
expiration of the copyright, the public may use all or any
portion of the work for whatever purpose, including (but not
limited to) expressive uses and uses that would not be
protected by the fair use doctrine if the work were still under
copyright.408 With its two-decades-long freezing of the public
domain at its 1998 composition and its 20-year delay in the
405. Id. at 243, 265-66 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
406. Id. at 219-20 (majority opinion). The Eldred Court cited Harper &
Row, Publ’s, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 556, 560 (1985), for its
discussions of the fair use doctrine and the expression-versus-ideas
distinction, and Feist Publ’s, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50
(1991), for its discussion of the latter subject. The relevant statutory sections
are 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (outlining types of uses that may be good
candidates for fair use doctrine and specifying factors courts must use in
making fair use determinations) and 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) (ideas and facts
in copyrighted work not protected).
407. See, e.g., Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556, 560; Feist, 499 U.S. at 34950. See also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994)
(indicating that parody of copyrighted work may be strong candidate for fair
use treatment).
408. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.; Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century
Fox Film Corp., 123 S. Ct. 2041, 2048 (2003); Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207,
228 (1990); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
429 (1984).
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entry of works into the public domain, the CTEA raises a
substantial freedom-of-expression concern to which the Eldred
majority’s citation of the fair use doctrine and the expressionversus-ideas distinction is an unsatisfactory answer.
To
account for the free speech concern presented by the CTEA and
to recognize the relationship between the Copyright Clause and
the First Amendment, the Court should have employed some
sort of heightened review when it determined whether the
CTEA was a rational exercise of Copyright Clause authority.409
409. Justice Breyer suggested a test that would have been appropriate.
See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 245 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer noted that
he would hold the CTEA unconstitutional “(1) if the significant benefits that it
bestows are private, not public; (2) if it threatens seriously to undermine the
expressive values that the Copyright Clause embodies; and (3) if it cannot find
justification in any significant Clause-related objective.” Id. In Justice
Breyer’s view, each element of his proposed test was satisfied. Id. at 266-67.
Eldred’s brief proposed an alternate form of heightened review that
presumably would have led to a striking-down of the CTEA’s retroactive
component as an unjustifiable exercise of Copyright Clause authority. Brief
for Petitioners at 31-32, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618)
available at 2002 WL 1041928. In an abbreviated and unsatisfactory
discussion late in the majority opinion, Justice Ginsburg rejected Eldred’s
proposal. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 217-18. Eldred urged the use of “congruence
and proportionality” review, of the sort employed in cases dealing with
congressional enactments pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See,
e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
Justice Ginsburg maintained, however, that the congruence and
proportionality standard was purely a Fourteenth Amendment-related test
that had never been applied in a case dealing with an exercise of a power
given to Congress in Article I of the Constitution. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 218.
Justice Ginsburg stated that whereas § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives
Congress the power to enforce the substantive provisions of the amendment,
the Copyright Clause “empowers Congress to define the scope of the
substantive right.” Id. With Congress having the power to define the right at
issue under the Copyright Clause, Justice Ginsburg reasoned, it would be
inappropriate for the Court to employ a standard of review that was designed
for a determination of whether Congress employed appropriate (i.e.,
“proportional[] or congruen[t]”) means to enforce rights contemplated by the
relevant constitutional provision. See Flores, 521 U.S. at 533. Therefore, she
concluded that congruence-and-proportionality review should not be utilized.
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 218.
Justice Ginsburg’s cursory treatment of the congruence-and-proportionality
proposal, however, relies on a distinction ill-drawn. Properly made, the
comparison between the Fourteenth Amendment and the Copyright Clause
would show that each grants a certain power to Congress, and that each
contains an end toward which that power must be aimed. Just as the
Copyright Clause allows Congress to define a certain right such that it
“promote the Progress of Science,” U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 8, the
Fourteenth Amendment allows Congress to define enforcement measures that
promote the realization of the rights established elsewhere in the amendment.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. The Copyright Clause and the Fourteenth
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The Eldred majority also failed to give adequate
consideration to the full range of issues raised by the Copyright
Clause’s “limited [t]imes” provision. According to the Court,
the longer duration called for by the CTEA was still “limited”
because it would end at some point.410 Under this form-oversubstance approach, a huge duration extension would be
permissible if it stopped somewhere short of “forever.”411 One
suspects that the Valenti/Bono proposal of “forever, less one
day”412 might go too far, even for the Eldred majority, but how
does one know what crosses the line?
Help in answering that question would be provided by an
approach the Court failed to take in Eldred: examining the
“limited [t]imes” provision of the Copyright Clause in light of
what the Framers probably intended regarding permissible
lengths of time when they used that language. In her
discussion of the history of copyright duration extensions,
Justice Ginsburg noted that statutes enacted by Congress
shortly after the Constitution was ratified should be seen as
reliable indicators of what the Constitution permits (and of
what the Framers intended), because some of the same persons
who served as Framers of the Constitution were members of
Congress at the time of those enactments.413 Instead of
attempting to use this almost-contemporaneous-construction
principle as a way to bolster its conclusion that the Copyright
Clause allows Congress to apply duration extensions to existing
copyrights, the Court should have employed the principle in an
effort to determine what sort of copyright duration the Framers
Amendment may seem dissimilar if viewed with respect to “rights.” But when
the constitutional provisions are viewed with respect to means and ends—the
true objects of the congruence-and-proportionality test—no meaningful
difference appears. See Brief for Petitioners, supra, at 31-32.
Just as Congress lacks the power to redefine the ends specified in the
Fourteenth Amendment, see Flores, 521 U.S. at 519, 534, so it is with the
Copyright Clause. With its single-minded focus on copyright owners and its
neglect of the public interest portion of the copyright bargain, however, the
CTEA effectively amounts to such a redefinition.
410. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 199, 210.
411. See id. The Court appeared, however, to leave an opening for a
challenge to a future extension if it were part of a stringing-together of
extensions evincing an intent to evade the “limited [t]imes” constraint in the
Copyright Clause. See id. at 209 n.16.
412. See supra text accompanying note 293; see also supra note 343. It
seems “unlikely that [the Framers] intended the limited-time provision to be
rendered a dead letter by linguistic manipulation.” Heald & Sherry, supra
note 276, at 1172.
413. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 200-01, 213.
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likely had in mind when they placed the “limited [t]imes”
provision in the Copyright Clause.
The Copyright Act of 1790 clearly qualifies for the almostcontemporaneous-construction principle because of its close
proximity to the drafting and ratification of the Constitution.
The 1790 Act is noteworthy for a feature that the Eldred
majority did not stress: its provision establishing that copyright
protection would last for a basic term of 14 years, with the
prospect of a 14-year renewal term.414 Twenty-eight years thus
could serve as a reasonable benchmark for what the Framers
probably intended as a “limited [t]ime[].” This is not to say
that 28 years is any kind of maximum, or that each of the term
extensions enacted from 1831 on was unconstitutional. It is to
say, however, that if the Framers had something along the
lines of 28 years in mind, the CTEA’s establishment of
copyright durations more than three, four, or even five times
that long seems a far cry from what the Framers meant by
“limited [t]imes.” No such discussion appears, however, in
Eldred.
With its posture of extreme deference toward Congress, its
adoption of a lenient standard of review, and its failure to pay
adequate attention to Copyright Clause language and
objectives, the Eldred Court interpreted a relatively narrow,
condition-restricted grant of congressional power in the
Copyright Clause as contemplating sweeping, almost
unrestricted regulatory authority on the part of Congress. This
seems ironic, coming as it did from a Court that in recent years
has not hesitated to engage in careful scrutiny and secondguessing of enactments of Congress pursuant to the Commerce
Clause, which provides a seemingly much broader and less
restricted grant of power than the grant specified in the
Copyright Clause.415 We are stuck with Eldred, however. It
414. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (“An Act for the
Encouragement of Learning, by securing the Copies of Maps, Charts and
Books, to the Authors and Proprietors of such Copies, during the Times
therein mentioned.”).
415. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, (Copyright Clause, which sets
forth promotion-of-progress, “to Authors,” and “limited [t]imes” constraints
regarding copyright power) with id. cl. 3 (Commerce Clause, giving Congress
power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes”). In United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995), the Court struck down the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act as a
violation of the Commerce Clause, because the statute did not have a
sufficient connection with interstate commerce. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551, 56065, 567. The Lopez Court indicated that even when the Constitution’s grant of
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therefore becomes important to consider where we go from
here.
V. IN ELDRED’S WAKE: WHAT’S NEXT?
In the subsections that follow, we survey the post-Eldred
landscape, identify emerging issues and developments
stemming from the decision, suggest analytical approaches for
courts to use if Congress enacts another copyright term
extension and a constitutional challenge is brought, and offer
recommendations for future action on the parts of Congress,
copyright owners, and the public. We begin by examining a
proposed bill that would re-inject a renewal requirement into
U.S. copyright law.
A. THE PROPOSED PUBLIC DOMAIN ENHANCEMENT ACT
In an op-ed piece published shortly after the Eldred
decision, Lawrence Lessig proposed an “Eric Eldred Act” that
would reintroduce a renewal requirement to the copyright
regime. 416 Professor Lessig’s proposal provided that if a work’s
copyright owner wished to keep the copyright in force, he, she,
or it would be obligated to pay a small tax 50 years after the
power to Congress is broad, the grant of power is not without limits, and that
the Court will not sustain congressional enactments that could be upheld only
if the relevant enumerated power were unlimited. See id. at 552-53, 556-57,
567-68. Professor Lawrence Lessig, who represented the petitioners in Eldred,
believed that the justices who signed on to Lopez would be hard-pressed to
sustain the CTEA because doing so would seem to indicate that the copyright
power granted in Article I, § 8 is essentially unlimited. Such an indication
would be inconsistent with Lopez, not to mention the significant constraints
placed on the copyright power by the literal language of the Copyright Clause.
The petitioners in Eldred made a Lopez-based argument, with Professor
Lessig believing that the justices who had formed the majority in that decision
could be moved to lean the petitioners’ way in Eldred in order to maintain
intellectual, conceptual, and jurisprudential consistency. Professor Lessig
regarded the argument as the probable key to the case. See Lessig Blog, Jan.
16, 2003 entry posted by Lawrence Lessig, at http://www.lessig.org/blog/
archives/2003_01.shtml (last visited, Apr. 9, 2004). But the Eldred majority,
populated largely by those who had been in the majority in Lopez, sidestepped
the Lopez argument by avoiding all mention of it in the Eldred decision. See
id. A dismayed Professor Lessig offered this assessment shortly after Eldred
was decided: “The impossible thing is, How do people on that court [who]
believe Congress’s power is so constrained sign onto an opinion that says
Congress’s power is not constrained?” Linda Greenhouse, 20-Year Extension of
Existing Copyrights Is Upheld, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2003, at A24 (quoting
Lawrence Lessig).
416. Lawrence Lessig, Protecting Mickey Mouse at Art’s Expense, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2003, at A17.

LANGVARDT

2004]

05/12/2004 12:52 PM

UNWISE OR UNCONSTITUTIONAL?

271

work was published.417 If the copyright owner failed to pay the
tax within an appropriate grace period, the work would enter
the public domain.418 Since then, Representatives Zoe Lofgren
(D-Cal.) and John Doolittle (R-Cal.) have proposed the similar
Public Domain Enhancement Act (PDEA),419 which would
require, beginning 50 years into a copyright’s term, that the
copyright owner pay a fee of $1 every ten years in order to keep
the copyright in force.420 Under the PDEA, the Copyright
Office would be expected to make the fee’s payment as
convenient as possible, and would be required to make
information concerning copyrighted works’ status and
ownership readily accessible to the public.421
The PDEA would be a step in the right direction, although
it could signify a compromise with those who would have
copyright last forever. For as Professor Lessig noted in his oped, even though 98% of works would likely be freed to the
public domain after those first 50 years, the Mickey Mouse
copyright would remain intact.422 So would it be with many
more works—the Gershwin pieces, the “Happy Birthday” song,
and others—that have served as rallying points for the CTEA’s
opposition.423 There is thus some danger that the PDEA, by
easing the public burden of copyright while leaving open an
avenue for copyrights to remain intact for very long periods of
time, could give a backhanded push to an effectively perpetual
copyright.
So long as the predicted 2% renewal rate does not rise
dramatically, though, this danger should appear insignificant
to those, ourselves included, who would support the PDEA. Of
course, further term extensions are less likely to meet strong
opposition if the copyright regime is less oppressive. But a
decision to forego the PDEA’s significant promise on the basis
of that principle would be nearly as insensible as a decision to
417. Id.
418. Id. Professor Lessig suggested that the tax be “very small, maybe $50
a work.” He regarded his proposal as one that would cause a sizable number
of works—those as to which the tax had not been paid, probably because the
works were no longer earning a commercial return—to enter the public
domain. Id.
419. H.R. 2601, 108th Cong. (2003).
420. See id.
421. See id.
422. Lessig, supra note 416, at A17.
423. See, e.g., Solomon, supra note 44, at E2; Heald & Sherry, supra note
276, at 1169.
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advocate something rash—say, an abandonment of the “fair
use” doctrine—as a means of galvanizing the opposition to the
next proposed term extension. (We have no intention, of course,
of proposing anything of that nature.) And at any rate, the
CTEA’s history shows that Congress did not take the ills of
term extension very seriously when it was considering a term
extension of huge length and sweeping applicability. It would
be foolish to presume that Congress would not consider
enacting yet another blanket extension. In the post-CTEA era,
the PDEA would be a viable means of lessening the damage
caused, and to be caused, by the CTEA and its possible
progeny.
Of course, there is a remote worst-case scenario for the
PDEA. We refer to the possibility that the predicted renewalrate of 2% would prove, in reality, to be much larger. Recall
that the 2% figure is based on the percentage of works
published more than 50 years ago that remain in print.424
Given the CTEA’s ease of passage in Congress and the statute’s
having survived constitutional attack, copyright owners have
better reason than ever before to believe that the working term
of copyright will be extended additional times, in the direction
of perpetuity. A rights-holder, facing the option to renew,
might therefore renew in 2010 even though he, she, or it might
not have bothered to do so if, say, a 1970-like environment still
existed. It is thus a decent bet that under a PDEA regime, the
renewal rate will be somewhat larger than 2%. The difference’s
magnitude is unforeseeable, but the possibility that the
renewal rate could grow enormous—the very worst-case
scenario, which we discuss below—shows that even if the
PDEA does become law, preventing further term extensions
should still be at the top of copyright activists’ long-term
agenda.
B. WILL PRIVATE PUBLIC DOMAIN SUBSTITUTES BE
DEVELOPED?
It has been said that the Disney corporation pushed for the
CTEA in the hope that “nobody could do to Walt Disney what
Walt Disney did to the Brothers Grimm.”425 For at least the
next 20 years, that hope will be a reality. The obvious problem
424. See Lessig, supra note 416, at A17; Eldred, 537 U.S. at 248 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
425. Lessig, Keynote Address, supra note 398.
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for Disney, though, is that the CTEA has fenced off a wide
range of works that were not under Disney’s copyright, thus
delaying Walt Disney from being able to do to Wanda Gag’s
Millions of Cats (a 1928 children’s book) what Walt Disney did
to the Brothers Grimm. Disney was no doubt aware of this
effect but, seeing that private legislation a la Oliver Evans426
would be a tougher sell, decided to promote the blanket
extension because for Disney, the CTEA’s benefits outweighed
its costs.
Disney’s cost-benefit analysis was sensible, for the
intellectual property that the CTEA has allowed Disney to
retain remains profitable. Although the CTEA has stunted the
growth of the stock of public domain works from which Disney
may draw, that stock, as it now stands, is already large. As for
those copyrighted works from which Disney may wish to
borrow in the future, Disney should, in most cases, have little
trouble summoning up the resources needed to negotiate a
licensing deal.
Moreover, Disney, as a major rights-holder, now has a
sizable library of its own copyrighted material. In a sense, this
library may become a private substitute for the public domain,
which, thanks to the CTEA, will receive no new entries until
the ageless Dick Clark announces the arrival of the year 2019.
If the going gets tough, say, if the CTEA-frozen public domain
does not furnish attractive options for Disney to re-work or
other parties refuse en masse to allow Disney access to their
copyrighted works, Disney may always draw on its own as a
basis for new creative efforts. Disney frequently revisits works
that are readily identified with the company—the film Fantasia
2000, the TV series Goof Troop, and the straight-to-video Lion
King II: Simba’s Pride come quickly to mind—but the company,
owning more and more copyrights on well-aged works, has the
increasingly attractive option of creating works that, though
derived from Disney’s own storehouse, will not appear so
conspicuously to be rehashes. Consider the film Aladdin,
which Disney borrowed from the public domain. The film was a
derivative work, but because the source material was so old,
Aladdin did not suffer from the same sequel-stigma that some
of Disney’s straight-to-video fare might. Now suppose that the
source material had been under Disney’s copyright. Disney
would have been able to prevent the release of any cheaper,
426. See supra note 175.
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straight-to-video Aladdin “knock-offs,” and it would have been
able to collect all the royalties from any resurgence of interest
in the original along with a freshly repackaged 1001 Nights to
boot. To Disney, this kind of scenario would have been optimal,
and as the term of copyright grows ever longer, such a scenario
grows more and more plausible.
Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that the working
term of copyright were extended long enough to approach
perpetuity. An entity as wealthy as Disney, we have shown,
would be able to negotiate access to most works. Yet so long as
the relevant copyright owners were various, those rightsholders’ demands would likewise vary, and Disney’s creative
and marketing freedom would be hindered somewhat.
Furthermore, even if Disney were borrowing from older public
domain works, Disney would not be able to keep others from
borrowing from those same public domain works. It would thus
be in Disney’s best interest to hold the copyrights on as many
works as possible, whether immediately marketable or not, or
at least to ensure that the rights over them are in the hands of
friendly entities. The result would be another type of “private
public domain” of works to which Disney has unlimited rights.
Through agreements among friendly rights-holders, private
public domains could be networked into a larger enclosure
accessible at low cost only by participants in the agreement.
To be sure, this is the very worst-case scenario. But it is
possible, and it shows that the PDEA, though a commendable
proposal, leaves open certain disturbing possibilities that a
solid term ceiling or extension prohibition would not.
C. THE GOLAN CASE: IS THE CTEA STILL VULNERABLE TO
CONSTITUTIONAL ATTACK?
In 2001, before the Supreme Court’s decision in Eldred, a
Denver conductor named Lawrence Golan filed suit against the
government.427 He alleged that the CTEA, by extending the
protections on works expected to enter the public domain, had
made the costs of renting certain orchestral scores
prohibitive.428 In its initial form, Golan’s complaint regarding
the CTEA contained contentions similar to those raised in

427. See Complaint, Golan v. Ashcroft, (D. Colo. filed Sept. 19, 2001) (No.
01-B-1854).
428. See id. at 22-26.
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Eldred.429 Since Eldred, Golan has amended his complaint so
that it challenges not merely the CTEA’s retroactivity, but
rather the CTEA-regime term itself.430
We believe that a challenge to current copyright terms as
such could have great promise but that Golan’s particular
argument does not.431 It starts with the economic rationales
presented in Justice Breyer’s Eldred dissent and stresses the
current average-length copyright’s incentive-value, which is
99.8% that of a perpetual copyright.432 Golan takes a work’s
total value to be equal to the incentive-value of a perpetual
copyright.433 Under the terms of the current regime, then,
copyright holders receive at least 99.8% of a work’s total value,
and the public therefore is left, at best, with a paltry 0.2%.434
The “limited [t]imes” requirement of the Copyright Clause, says
429. See id. at 39-45.
430. See First Amended Complaint at 3-4, 13, 18-19, 40-41, Golan v.
Ashcroft, (D. Colo. filed Sept. 19, 2001) (No. 01-B-1854).
431. A claim brought by Golan regarding another aspect of copyright law
may have far more merit, however. In § 514 of the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 1994 U.S.C.A.A.N. (108 Stat.
4809) 3773 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 104A (1996)), Congress restored copyright
protection to certain foreign works that remained under copyright protection
in their source countries but had fallen into the public domain in the United
States because of certain designated reasons, including a failure to file for a
necessary renewal of copyright and a pre-1989 failure to use the then-required
copyright notice on copies distributed in the United States. Id.; see also
Copyright Act of 1909 supra note 1; Copyright Act of 1976, supra note 2.
Prior to 1989, U.S. law provided that copyright protection on a work was lost if
the copyright owner failed to employ a proper copyright notice on publicly
distributed copies of the work. 17 U.S.C. §§ 401, 405 (as amended 1988). Since
a change that took effect in 1989, such a failure to use a copyright notice does
not jeopardize the validity of the copyright. 17 U.S.C. §§ 401, 405 (2000).
Golan contends that Congress acted unconstitutionally in removing certain
works from the public domain and in restoring them to copyright protection.
First Amended Complaint at 2-3, 4, 8-11, 14, 17, 35-40, Golan (No. 01-B-1854).
The fact that the works affected by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act were
in the public domain—as opposed to being near the public domain entry point,
as in the CTEA scenario—may give Golan’s claim in that regard a strong
chance of success. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See also Dastar Corp. v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 29 (2003) (once formerly
copyrighted work enters public domain, any party may make unrestricted use
of work). Further discussion of the claim regarding the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act is beyond the scope of this article.
432. See First Amended Complaint at 2, 6-7, 8-13, Golan (No. 01-B-1854).
433. See First Amended Complaint at 12, Golan (No. 01-B-1854) (noting
that only a small fraction of all copyright work received the maximum term of
protection, which also indicates that most work lose their commercial value
within the maximum copyright term).
434. See id. at 2-3, 4, 8-11, 14, 17, 35-40.
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Golan, means that a work’s total value is to be divided between
the author and the public.435 If authors are receiving 500 times
the public’s share, then it is hardly a division at all. This
unevenness results, Golan contends, from the term’s length;
therefore, the “time” is not “limited.”436
Golan mistakenly assumes that authors and public are
interested in, and entitled to, the same thing: the incentivevalue of all the royalties collectible under a work’s hypothetical
perpetual copyright.
This assumption leads to absurd
consequences.
It suggests, for example, that a 28-year
copyright term on a work that lost its commercial viability
before the copyright’s expiration would also be effectively
perpetual. In such a case, the author would have collected all
of the work’s value, and the public none of it. The merit of a
renewal requirement, which is meant to allow commercially
depleted works to fall into public domain, would also be called
into question.437 Interestingly, however, some of the strongest
supporters of a renewal requirement have involvement with
Golan’s case.438
Another hypothetical reveals the flaws in Golan’s
argument. Suppose that the interest rate were 2%. In that
case, the average term of copyright under the current regime
would be dividing works’ value about as “fairly” as the old 28year terms would under a 7% interest rate.439 Should we really
take the deal between author and public to rise and fall with
the interest rate in such a way? One suspects that we should
435. See id. at 40.
436. See id. at 2-3, 4, 8-11, 14, 17, 35-40.
437. Golan would surely respond—correctly—that even commercially dead
works can retain significant non-pecuniary value. But in that case, the 0.2%
estimate of the public’s share in a work’s value loses a great deal of its
meaning, as the economic estimation of who gets what is smothered in
unquantifiables.
438. The Cyberlaw Clinic at the Stanford Law School Center for Internet
and Society (CIS) filed the case on behalf of Golan and the other plaintiffs in
the
case.
See
Golan
v.
Ashcroft
Case
Page,
at
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/about/cases/golan_v_ashcroft.shtml (CIS website)
(last visited Apr. 9, 2004). Professor Lawrence Lessig is the director of the
CIS. See id. at http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/about (last visited Apr. 9, 2004).
As noted earlier, Professor Lessig suggested shortly after the Eldred decision
that Congress should lessen the Eldred’s long-term damage by requiring
copyright owners to pay a nominal tax 50 years after their works were
published, if they wished to have copyright protection continue. See supra text
accompanying notes 416-421.
439. On Golan’s terms, the division would be roughly 85% to the author
and 15% to the public.
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not, and for a number of reasons. For one thing, the public
benefits from, and has some ability to use, works even before
they enter the public domain. And once the works have
entered the public domain, the public is indifferent as to the
much smaller past value of whatever resources it is able to
retain due to the works’ being competitively priced. Granted,
the public does suffer when a work’s competitively priced (i.e.,
post-public-domain-entry) accessibility is delayed, but common
intuition tells us that the suffering, which worsens with the
wait, is a function of the passage of time rather than of the
interest rate.
Moreover, it is questionable at best that the public is even
entitled to any part of the creation-time-value of a work’s
hypothetical royalties. The great majority of works have
commercial life spans so short that even a founding-era
copyright would outlive them.440 So far as these works are
concerned, the public, under a 1790 regime, would collect not
0.2%, but 0%, of the works’ creation-time value. Yet even with
respect to those short-lived works, the 1998 regime presents a
rougher deal to the public than the 1790 regime would, for the
public is concerned with things other than the works’ creationtime values. If the public were entitled to any part of them,
then only an exceedingly short copyright term would be
permissible, for only that kind of term would expire soon
enough for exceedingly short-lived works to spend any
commercially viable time in the public domain.
The Copyright Clause presumably seeks to allow authors a
chance to be reimbursed for the costs involved with authorship
and to earn other sums if their works carry value in the
marketplace. The “limited [t]imes” provision ensures that the
monetary rewards will end at some point. What entices the
author to write, it should be remembered, is not money itself,
but rather (among other motivating factors) the possibility of
monetary gains. So far as it is useful to the “progress of
Science,” this possibility is considered only before the time of
publication, and in assessing the value of the sum total of all
royalties, that sum total must be “gathered up” and assessed
before publication. Interest rates and the concept of presentvalue enable this gathering-up and thus are critical to a
determination of the incentive-value of a term of copyright.
But while an author’s inducement to write can be realized at
440. See supra text accompanying notes 214-216, 337.
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only one point in time—namely, the time when the author
decides whether to write—the public’s interest in having the
period of possible monetary rewards ended is the same at all
points in time. So far as the prospective author is concerned,
then, the interest rate is quite relevant to the consideration of
term length. To the public, however, only the term’s length
itself matters. The economic analysis of perpetual copyright’s
incentive-value, we fear, speaks nothing of a term’s limited or
unlimited nature.441
We find Golan’s argument inadequate. This is not to say,
however, that the CTEA-regime term of copyright is beyond
critique.
One commentator has suggested an appealing,
intuitive sort of limit: that a “limited [t]ime” be defined in
reference to life span.442 In his Eldred dissent, Justice Breyer
suggested that the common-law rule against perpetuities might
be used as a reference point for limitedness.443 And of course,
one should consider that the original duration of copyright was
limited to 28 years, and to only 14 if the author did not live
long enough to qualify for the renewal term. Perhaps some
simple perspective would be instructive. Would the Framers
ever have regarded a life-plus-70-years duration as a “limited”
time?444
In our view, whether the copyright term is a “limited” time
should be determined in the context of a renewed emphasis on
the Copyright Clause’s “to Authors” provision.445 We would
take the “to Authors” language to mean that the benefits of
copyright are meant to target only prospective authors, and
that any copyright-related benefit bestowed upon any party
must work, at least in part, to better prospective authors’ view
of the benefits of producing a work. Our interpretation of “to
Authors,” then, would not rule out reasonable post-death
441. It says a great deal, however, about the CTEA’s prospective
fruitlessness.
442. See Solum, supra note 298, at 31-38.
443. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 251-52 (2003) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). In the majority opinion, Justice Ginsburg noted that “ [w]hether
such referents mark the outer boundary of “‘limited Times’ is not before us
today.” Id. at 210 n.17.
444. We address this question in more depth elsewhere in the article. See
supra text accompanying notes 410-415; infra text accompanying notes 457458.
445. The Copyright Clause authorizes Congress to “promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
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protection, for those extra years of future rights may be seen as
by the prospective author as a benefit when he or she is
considering authorship. Neither would our interpretation go so
far as to make copyright nontransferable, for without the right
of transfer, the prospective author would see scarce potential
benefit in authorship.
Our “to Authors” doctrine would, however, demand that
the grant to the prospective author be reasonably efficient. For
example, suppose that one is a prospective author, that the
interest rate is 7%, and that if he publishes, he can expect to
pull in a $100 royalty payment one year from now. Application
of the present value concept tells us that those royalties are, at
this time, worth $93.46.446 This is the value of the grant to the
author, for a year from now, when the grant would be worth
more, the prospective author would be past considering
authorship of the work in question. Let us say, then, that the
grant “to [the] Author[]” is approximately 93.5% efficient, with
the difference between that figure and 100% being considered,
for Copyright Clause purposes, a deadweight loss to society.
It can be seen from this example that even an optimal term
of copyright can only be so efficient.
For purposes of
illustration, the 28th year of copyright could only be about 15%
efficient,447 given a 7% interest rate, and over the entire term,
the copyright could only be 46% efficient.448 But now consider
the extra 20 years added to the term by the CTEA—in a typical
case, the last 20 years of a 95-year copyright. Assuming
constant revenues, the royalties given over that 20-year span
could be only 0.33% efficient.449 This means that only one-third
of a cent from every CTEA dollar would go to an author of a
perfectly enduring work. In fairness, though, we should point
out that the later years of extension bring down the overall
446. If invested at an annual interest rate of 7%, $93.46 would yield a
fraction of a cent more than $100 after a year.
447. We reach this figure through the following formula, in which e
represents the efficiency rating, r the interest rate, and n the year: en = [1 / (1
+ r)n]. The formula is identical to that for the present value of a future dollar.
448. We reach this figure by adding the efficiency ratings for each year in
an interval and then dividing by the number of years. The idea is to divide the
sum of the present values, which decline, by the sum of the future values,
which remain constant. But the figure is also a mean efficiency rating. The
variables retain their prior meanings, see supra note 447, but we introduce m,
which represents the first year of the interval. If we were to gauge the
efficiency of the renewal term under the 1790 regime, m would be 14, and n
28. Thus: e(m, n) = { [1 / (1 + r)m] + [1 / (1 + r)m+1] . . . [1 / (1 + r)n] } / (n - m).
449. See supra note 448.
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efficiency rating significantly, and that copyright owners who
see 75 years of commercial viability for their works will collect
the bulk of the royalties in the more profitable earlier years. If
the copyright owner were to cease collecting royalties entirely
after the 75th year, for example, the efficiency of his or her
CTEA grant could be as high as 0.63%.450
To be sure, these are ugly numbers, but even so, any
additional year of copyright gives some benefit to authors. The
authors provision itself, moreover, does not demand
The limited times provision, however, does
efficiency.451
require that the exclusive rights come to an end. It thus
requires that exclusivity’s costs, so far as they are affected by
the length of the interval of exclusivity, be minimized. When a
term’s length causes the public to be charged $300 in the form
of monopoly pricing for every $1 that goes to the prospective
author, there is reason to question seriously the term’s
compliance with the “limited [t]imes” provision.
Shifting emphasis from the progress of Science provision to
the authors provision strengthens the case against the CTEA’s
constitutionality in a number of ways. For one, it rules out any
possible revisitation theory of copyright-related benefit.452 For
another, it allows critics of the CTEA’s constitutionality to get
by on much less than they could if they were emphasizing the
progress provision. The standard progress of Science argument
involves a discussion of the public domain and its progressrelated centrality as a repository of material for derivative
works.453 We, of course, do not intend to dispute that progress
may necessitate a healthy public domain, and we in no way
wish to understate its importance. We do, nonetheless, believe
term extension opponents face an uphill battle if they seek to
establish to a wary judiciary that progress is dependent on the

450. Id. In that case, of course, the term of the right, reaching past the
profitable years, would have other problems.
451. This seems so unless one appeals to intuition. To draw an analogy,
consider a hypothetical salad dressing company—say, “Alfred Neumann’s”—
that advertises its policy of passing on a portion of its profits to charity and
encourages consumers to “do their part” by stocking up. Neumann’s, however,
does not disclose that under this policy, it passes on only 0.3% of its profits.
Most people, upon learning out how little of the profits went to charity, would
seem likely to regard the Neumann’s marketing strategy as misleading.
452. To be more precise, the emphasis on the “to Authors” language does
not rule out the upkeep theory entirely. But where an incentive-theoretic
justification is absent, an upkeep-theoretic one alone will not do.
453. See supra text accompanying notes 299, 324.
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public domain to such a degree that no term extension
impoverishing the public domain while creating no new
incentive could ever be progressive, or that the progress of
Science language refers specifically and exclusively to the
public domain’s enrichment. Term extension opponents could
ask much less of a judge by arguing, closer to the text of the
Copyright Clause, that: (1) as long as an exclusive right in a
work endures, its continuation must be meaningful to the
author; and (2) the longer the period of exclusivity, the wider
the gap between the right’s benefit to the author and its costs
to the public in the form of monopoly pricing—costs that may
be imposed only for the purpose of rewarding the author, and
that at some point must be lifted.454
D. NO MORE TERM EXTENSIONS, PLEASE
The above subheading’s recommendation, which might
more accurately be termed a plea, follows logically from the
earlier discussion and analysis in the article. It remains logical
even if one rejects our view that the CTEA violated the
Copyright Clause and, instead, prefers the Eldred majority’s

454. What might seem at first glance a weakness in our efficiency
argument is actually not a problem. Because efficiency deteriorates so
quickly, the duration extension included in the Copyright Act of 1976 looks
nearly as constitutionally questionable as the CTEA. Recall that the 1976 Act
extended the copyright duration for pre-1978 works from 56 years to 75 years.
On average, then, the 1976 extension was a mere 0.81% efficient, see supra
notes 447-448, meaning that over the extension period, the average dollar
delivered to the prospective author cost the public $123.46. Because the CTEA
and the 1976 extension are inefficient on the same order of magnitude, a
challenge to the CTEA based on its inefficiency might risk, for some, proving
too much: that the 1976 Act, only twice as efficient as the CTEA, is itself
invalid. The authors doctrine points meaningfully to a downward slope, but
the slope is smooth, and lacks any sort of spike or downward pitch that would
single out a point when the copyright no longer belonged to the author. As
noted earlier, however, other considerations may indicate that the 1976 Act’s
term extension was constitutional even if the CTEA is not, and that even if the
1976 extension was also unconstitutional, given the minor economic incentive,
a court would be able to fashion a decree in such a way that any longstanding
reliance interests of potentially affected parties would be protected. See supra
text accompanying notes 262, 381; supra note 194. It should also be noted
that Eldred may pose minor difficulties for our theory. In Eldred, the Court
cited “upkeep” arguments as part of Congress’ “rational basis” for enacting the
CTEA. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 207. These arguments, which have little to do
with incentive, may be hard to reconcile with our emphasis on the Authors
provision. Nevertheless, they were not primary points of emphasis in Eldred
and, in any event, are further removed from the Copyright Clause’s text than
is our approach.
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position that the CTEA was unwise but not unconstitutional.455
Notwithstanding our many criticisms of the Court’s handling of
the constitutional issues, Eldred will have done some good if it
helps expose the lack of wisdom demonstrated by Congress
when it enacted the CTEA.
When the expected push for another copyright duration
extension begins a few years before 2018, Congress will need
some institutional memory in regard to the CTEA debacle. It
must remember that the public interest is a key component of
the copyright balance. If it does so, Congress will decide that
enough is enough, and that yet another term extension would
be beyond the pale. Being realistic, however, we cannot predict
with confidence that Congress will reject the extension
overtures that are sure to come. We therefore offer, in the next
subsection, suggestions for courts faced with deciding a
constitutional challenge to a future extension of copyright
duration.
E. WHAT IF CONGRESS AGAIN EXTENDS COPYRIGHT DURATION?
If Congress again takes the unfortunate step of
lengthening copyright duration, the enactment should be
attacked on constitutional grounds.
In deciding the
constitutional challenge, the lower courts and ultimately the
Supreme Court must take proper account of the Copyright
Clause as a whole and must give effect to all of the language
therein. Doing so will involve heeding our earlier criticisms of
Eldred’s treatment of incentive-related issues and of that
decision’s adoption of a lenient, overly deferential standard of
review.456
It will also be important to interpret the Copyright
Clause’s limited times language in light of the meaning the
Framers reasonably would have contemplated. As explained
earlier, the almost-contemporaneous-construction principle
should be applied. Under that principle, the Copyright Act of
1790 and its establishment of a maximum duration of 28 years
would be seen as a reliable indication of the general length the
Framers probably had in mind when they used the limited
times phrase in the Copyright Clause.457 If the drastically
455. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221-22.
456. See supra text accompanying notes 325-372, 386-415.
457. See supra text accompanying notes 410-415. See also Karjala, supra
note 44 at 244-45 (discussing importance of considering 28-year duration
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lengthened durations called for by the CTEA are supplemented
by yet another extension, that extension would place the
copyright term at a point exceedingly far removed from what
the Framers presumably envisioned when they spoke of limited
times. Such a state of affairs should not be ignored by a court
(or the Court) in the quest to give meaning to constitutional
language.
Judicial examination of the next copyright duration
extension, if there is one, should involve another feature we
suggested earlier: a more careful consideration of the “to
Authors” language in the Copyright Clause. As indicated in
our earlier explanation, a focus on the “to Authors” phrasing
would complement the analysis of the “limited [t]imes”
language, would inform the analysis of incentive issues arising
under the Copyright Clause, and would help give effect to the
Clause’s overall language and objectives.458
Worth noting, also, is Justice Ginsburg’s narrow handling
of the concern in Eldred that retroactive term extensions could
be strung together to create an effectively perpetual term. She
wrote that “ [n]othing before this Court warrants construction
of the CTEA’s 20-year term extension as a congressional
attempt to evade or override the ‘limited Times’ constraint,”459
but offered no elaboration on the point. She did not attempt to
dismiss the stringing-together argument altogether. It could be
simply that demonstrating the argument to be inapplicable to
this case was more economical than demonstrating it to be
impermissible in any case regardless of its context, and Justice
Ginsburg acted accordingly. But it could also be that Justice
Ginsburg and the Court wished to leave open the possibility of
a determination that Congress, in passing some future term
extension, was consciously providing the next “installment”460
on
a
perpetual
term,
and
was
thereby
acting
established by 1790 Act in determining what limited times means).
458. See supra text accompanying notes 445-454.
459. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 209.
460. Hearing on S. 483 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (statement of Peter Jaszi, Professor of Law,
American University) (voicing the suspicion that the CTEA “represents a
down payment on perpetual copyright on the installment plan”). In Eldred,
Justice Ginsburg observed that whether referents such as the rule against
perpetuities “mark the outer boundary of ‘limited Times’ is not before us
today.” Eldred, 537 U.S. at 210 n.17. This statement may be a further
indication that another copyright duration extension by Congress could
present such an “outer boundary” issue. See id. at 208-10.
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unconstitutionally.
Such a determination would be difficult to make. If
nothing else, the length of the intervals that may pass between
term extensions may complicate an attempt to identify
legislative misbehavior. By the time Disney and the Gershwin
estate begin working on the next term extension,461 enough
new faces will occupy Congress that it will be difficult to single
out a continuous group of legislators to whom the conspiracy
But even if there is no conscious
can be attributed.462
congressional intent to subvert the limited times provision,
Congress may do so inadvertently, and likely will unless
checked by the judiciary.463
In our view, courts revisiting the issues of the sort
considered in Eldred should take note of one point frequently
overlooked: namely, that even as the theoretical reasons to
extend the term of copyright diminish with each successive
extension, the practical reasons not to extend the term of
copyright diminish likewise. That is, as the baseline term of
copyright grows longer and longer, two things occur. First, the
public domain becomes more and more literally a thing of the
past.
Recall one of the article-opening hypotheticals,
concerning which we wrote that a work authored in 1923
would, under the CTEA’s terms, enjoy a 95-year term of
copyright and would not enter the public domain until the year
2018 ends. By that time, the work of course would be
significantly older than it would have been at the end of 1998,
when it would have become public domain-property if not for
the CTEA, and far older than it would have been in 1979, the
public domain entry year originally scheduled under the

461. Let us say 2015, 20 years after the CTEA’s initial prototype was
proposed. See supra note 50.
462. Of course, there is the institutional memory that Congress should be
expected to have regardless of the identities of the individuals who make up
that body at any given point. Some courts, however, might be reluctant to
regard mere institutional carryover as furnishing a sufficient basis for
congressional accountability on an attempt-to-evade basis.
463. As suggested by the textual statement to which this footnote is
appended, whether Congress intended to act unconstitutionally may not be
nearly as important, in the end, as Justice Ginsburg’s statement in Eldred
seemed to indicate. Whether a government action is unconstitutional should
depend primarily on the action’s effect rather than on what the underlying
intent was or was not. Cf. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 256 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(questioning “why the Court considers it relevant” that Congress supposedly
was not involved in an attempt to evade the limited times constraint).
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Copyright Act of 1909.464 When the public domain becomes
occupied only by the ancients, the relevance of the public
domain to the citizenry appears so slight that retroactive term
extensions receive little notice. This surely accounts in large
part for the relative silence surrounding the CTEA’s passage.
By way of contrast, imagine the noise that a 20-year retroactive
extension could generate now if, for instance, the maximum
term of copyright were still 28 years, and the movie Star Wars
were slated to enter the public domain in 2005.
A longer and longer baseline duration may have a second
effect: that the baseline term becomes so long as to drain all
practical significance from objections to further extensions.
Suppose, for instance, that in 2018, Congress extends copyright
duration another 100 years. By 2115, if Walt Disney himself,
roused from cryogenic slumber, petitions for another extension,
legislators would likely be unconcerned about slowing future
works’ entry into the public domain. For after all, the average
term of copyright would then already be 195 years,465 an
interval in which anything could happen, and projections so
basic as the survival of the intellectual property system, of the
U.S. Constitution, and even of the human race itself, become
speculative to varying degrees. If the date of entry into the
public domain were already so far off, a further postponement
would seem only to have theoretical importance. Additionally,
although the baseline term of copyright is not yet 195 years,
one could reasonably characterize the 95-year term as already
so long that the additional century of protection would make
only a theoretical difference to the prospective application.
These factors add up to make term extension a less
consequential decision each time. There is no sign, however,
that the copyright owners’ lobby will ease its pressure.
Furthermore, if the Supreme Court requires that a finding of
intent to create a perpetual term must be found in order for a
term extension to be invalidated,466 then legislators will see
little reason not to support new term extensions every time the
matter comes up.
One possible remedy for this domino effect would be to
disallow any argument in supposed justification of a particular
extension if that argument would seem to apply to term

464. For the earlier explanation, see supra text accompanying note 59.
465. This assumes no changes in life expectancy.
466. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 209 n.16.
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extensions generally. In order to determine whether an
argument for term extension was permissible, a court would
abstract from the particulars and suppose a baseline term of
length x, an extension of length y, and only the contextual
factors that can reasonably be expected never to change. If an
asserted basis for term extension appears to apply just as well
to any term extension as to the one at hand, then that basis
would not be given credence. For example, if it were argued
before a court that Congress had chosen to extend the term of
copyright from 95 years to 100 years in order simply to afford
authors a greater incentive to publish, the court should ignore
that justification, for any extension of any finite term would
increase the incentive somewhat. If it were argued, on the
other hand, that the above-mentioned extension was meant to
increase the incentive to authors by 0.046%,467 the court should
examine the argument on its negligible merits.
This test would have to be at least indirectly based on
these acknowledgments by courts: that the pressure on
Congress to stop extending copyright durations will not
increase as a function of the term length, but may indeed
decrease; that, so long as the word “limited” in the Copyright
Clause is taken to mean merely finite, then any one term will
be just as limited as the last; and that, if a certain line of
reasoning justifying an extension this time around could
reasonably be expected to work equally well next time, and the
next, and so on, then it would be likely to carry the working
terms of currently copyrighted works into perpetuity. If courts
are unwilling to specify how far Congress can go and still have
a copyright duration that is a limited time, the courts must be
careful not to approve of any particular term extension on
grounds that could be generalized to any future extension. To
allow use of such generalized grounds would be to give tacit
approval to a hypothetical indefinite series of term extensions,
and thus a perpetual working copyright.
A difficulty in implementing such a scheme would be to
decide when a term extension is really justified by special
circumstances. Some examples may be helpful. The 1831 and
1909 extensions would both be justifiable on the specific ground
that they provided significant marginal incentive.468 The 1976
467. See supra notes 447-448.
468. Significant marginal incentive is non-generalized because it focuses on
the meaningfulness of the incentive provided by the extension at issue, as
opposed to the largely theoretical added incentive that any extension might be
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extension could be justified on the ground that the
requirements of the Berne Convention, a unique event, made it
imperative.469 Notwithstanding Eldred’s unconvincing reliance
on the minimal harmonization with European Union copyright
duration as a supposed justification for the CTEA,470 we believe
that courts are generally up to the task of distinguishing
between meaningful special circumstances and those of the
makeweight variety.
F. OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS
Elsewhere in the article, we have predicted that as the
year 2018 approaches, there will be efforts to persuade
Congress to enact yet another copyright duration extension.471
We would be pleased if that prediction does not prove accurate.
If such efforts occur, however, the public will have to be vigilant
in order to make certain that Congress does not enact Bono II.
By the public, we mean not only ordinary citizens but also a
broad range of associations, organizations (for-profit and notfor-profit), and educational institutions. All of these parties
share the interest in a proper copyright balance and in a
vibrant public domain from which to draw. This broadly
defined public will have to watch for signs of extension-related
lobbying efforts and for other early rumblings that might signal
future legislative developments in that regard. It must weigh
in with senators and representatives regarding the lack of need
or justification for another term extension, in case Congress
forgets in the intervening years about the shortchanging of the
public interest that the CTEA accomplished.
Perhaps it is idealistic to think that the public will assume
this monitoring role, but perhaps not. Even if Eldred was
wrongly decided, the Court’s lukewarm approval of the CTEA
and the media coverage generated by the decision472 probably
asserted to have.
469. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 257-61, 263-64 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
470. See id. at 256-61 (Breyer, J., dissenting). For further discussion of
this point, see supra text accompanying notes 319-320.
471. See supra text accompanying notes 422-424, 455-456.
472. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221-22 (crediting the petitioners for having
“forcefully urge[d] that Congress pursued very bad policy,” but holding that a
supposed lack of “wisdom” on the part of Congress did not render the CTEA
unconstitutional). For examples of post-Eldred media coverage that gave
attention to the objections raised against the CTEA, see Greenhouse, supra
note 415, at A22; Amy Harmon, A Corporate Victory, But One That Raises
Public Consciousness, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2003, at A24. See also Lessig,

LANGVARDT

288

05/12/2004 12:52 PM

MINNESOTA INTEL. PROPERTY REVIEW

[Vol. 5:2

have made the public more aware of copyright issues and of the
reality that term extensions are not cost-free. One assumes,
moreover, that media attention to a future move to extend
copyright duration would be greater than the minimal press
coverage given to the CTEA prior to its enactment.
Creators, would-be creators, and copyright owners could
also be part of the broadly defined public that would send a nomore-extensions message to Congress. These parties, however,
will not decide to join in that message unless they develop a
more expansive vision of what is good public policy regarding
copyrights.473 Those who create and those who own copyrights
should recognize that what goes around comes around. One’s
CTEA-lengthened copyright may operate in a certain instance
to prevent another party from using the work or to require that
the user pay a licensing fee. In another instance, however, the
creator or copyright owner who “benefited” from the CTEA will
be disadvantaged by it when that party wishes to use, for
creative purposes, another’s work that would have been in the
public domain for free use if not for the CTEA. The good
public—and constitutional—policy of maintaining a rich and
accessible public domain thus may be seen as consistent with,
not contrary to, the interests of creators.474 Perhaps as we get
closer to 2018, the venerable quartet of Quincy Jones, Bob
Dylan, Don Henley, and Carlos Santana will come to that
realization and decline to provide congressional testimony in
support of a possible Bono II.475
Regarding Congress, we have already made plain our
primary recommendation: Congress should get out of the
In addition, we
copyright term extension business.476
recommend the previously discussed PDEA, or an enactment
similar thereto, as a sensible way of lessening the harm done
by the CTEA.477 We now close this section with a proposal for a
supra note 416, at A17.
473. Though they may not think of it in that sense, the more expansive
vision would also be closer to the constitutional policy established by the
Copyright Clause, which contemplates rights not only for creators but also for
the public. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (creators’ exclusive rights must
expire after limited time).
474. See generally supra parts III.B, III.C, IV.A, IV.B.
475. As noted earlier, Jones, Dylan, Henley, and Santana testified before
Congress on the pro-CTEA side. See supra text accompanying notes 108, 279281; supra note 50.
476. See supra text accompanying notes 455-456.
477. See supra text accompanying notes 416-424.
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narrow statute that speaks to a specific situation touched upon
by the Supreme Court in Eldred.
When works such as films or audio recordings are
“restored” in one way or another, copyright protection often
extends to some new element of expression present in the
restored edition.478 Protection does not extend, however, to the
grunt work—the cleaning of the print, the remastering of the
soundtrack— that is likely the most arduous and costly, and in
the case of older films with deteriorating prints, the most
urgent, part of the restoration project.479
We suggest here that a new, narrow right be recognized for
restorers of public-domain works. This exclusive right, which
would exist for a definite period of time such as 20 years, would
extend only to the restored edition of the work; the right-holder
would have no rights over the underlying public domain work
itself. Nor would the holder of the restorer’s right be able to
prevent others from making their own restored editions.480
Digital watermarking technologies481 could serve to safeguard
against free-riders who would simply copy the protected
restoration and market it as their own.
One of the principal justifications advanced in favor of the
CTEA was that 20 more years of exclusivity in the oldest works
would give those works’ copyright owners an incentive to

478. For instance, the restorer might produce a DVD that includes not only
a restored version of the underlying film but also commentary on the film by
an expert.
479. See 17 U.S. C. § 102(b) (2000). Earlier, we referred to the film
Metropolis as an example of a restored public-domain film. See supra text
accompanying note 317. The film’s restorers would have copyright protection
regarding a number of their additions and changes—for instance, some
“intertitles” that explain what is happening between scenes—but they have no
copyright rights regarding the physical restoration labor and process. See 17
U.S.C. § 102(b). For more information regarding the restored edition of
Metropolis, see Michael Janusonis, Fritz Lang’s Classic Metropolis is
Captivating, PROVIDENCE JOURNAL-BULLETIN, Nov. 1, 2002, at E2.
480. By “making their own restored editions,” we mean employing filmrestoration technology and equipment to the public domain film in a manner
that reflects time, effort, and expense comparable to what the previous
restorer would have had to devote to the project, as opposed to simply making
copies of the earlier restorer’s version.
481. See, e.g., Sarnoff Lab Says Studios are Interested in Copy-Tracing
Watermark, AUDIO WEEK, February 17, 2003. Typically, digital watermarking
is discussed in the anti-piracy context as a means of tracing a file back to a
particular user. In the context of our proposal, the invisible watermark would
be used to trace a file back to its true restorer.
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restore them.482 With its narrower scope, the restorer’s right
would provide the same incentive to prospective restorers while
leaving valuable material available to the public. Through
allowing diverse parties the opportunity to restore a work, the
restorer’s right would allow for a degree of competition among
restorers that copyright term extension cannot, while also
doing a better job of seeing that a greater and more diverse
number of works would likely be restored. Finally, by coming
into play whenever the restorer decides to restore the work, the
incentive of the restorer’s right would outpace the temporary,
ever deteriorating, and largely theoretical incentive of a term
extension.
VI. CONCLUSION
When Congress enacted the CTEA, it set two dubious
records: first, the shortest length of time since a previous
extension of copyright duration (22 years) and second, the
longest single duration extension (20 years). Applying both
prospectively and retrospectively and coming so closely, in a
relative sense, on the heels of the 19-year extension granted in
the Copyright Act of 1976, the CTEA has produced striking
effects. Copyright duration is now set at 95 years for pre-1978
copyrighted works that qualified for the CTEA’s duration, even
though the law in existence at the time those works came
under copyright called for a maximum duration of 56 years.
For works created in 1978 or thereafter, the average postCTEA duration is presumably 95 years, with many works
receiving a far longer period of protection. Ninety-five or more
years of copyright protection stands in marked contrast with
the maximum of 28 years of protection established in the
Copyright Act of 1790. That statute, of course, was enacted
shortly after the ratification of the Constitution, whose
Copyright Clause sets the ground rules with which
congressional enactments regarding copyright must comply.
In enacting the CTEA, Congress demonstrated a
disturbing willingness to do the bidding of Disney et al., the
outspoken CTEA proponents whose concern was that some of
their copyrights on important properties would soon expire if

482. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 206-07. As Justice Stevens suggested,
however, the need to furnish incentives to restore old works could have been
accomplished by a measure that stopped far short of a blanket extension of the
duration of all copyrights. See id. at 239-40 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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no duration extension were granted. Preoccupied with the
interests and wishes of copyright owners, Congress seemingly
gave little or no thought to preservation of the proper
Copyright Clause-mandated balance in this area of intellectual
property. That balance calls for a rich public domain from
which all may freely draw. The CTEA, however, has frozen the
public domain at its 1998 composition until January 1, 2019,
and has established a massive giveaway to copyright owners at
considerable costs—economic and non-economic—to the public.
Congress acted both unwisely and unconstitutionally, in
our view, when it established the CTEA jackpot for copyright
owners. In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court upheld the
CTEA against constitutional attack but suggested strongly that
the CTEA was not an example of good policymaking. As we
have shown here, the Court erred in holding that the CTEA
passed constitutional muster. The Court’s overly deferential
approach paid insufficient attention to the flimsiness of the
justifications offered for the CTEA. Sacrificing analytical
soundness for expediency, the Court did not properly address
the controlling components of the Copyright Clause, including
its incentive requirement, its “limited [t]imes” requirement and
other relevant language placing checks on congressional power,
and its contemplation of a vibrant and accessible public
domain.
Despite its extremely deferential thrust and its seemingly
broad sweep, Eldred may not have resolved all questions
regarding the CTEA’s constitutionality. Moreover, Eldred
appears to have allowed an opening for possible constitutional
challenges of later copyright extensions (should they be enacted
by Congress). Perhaps the embarrassment factor produced by
media coverage of Eldred’s commentary on an apparent lack of
congressional wisdom will cause Congress not to enact further
extensions of copyright duration; perhaps Congress will
otherwise recognize the error of its duration-extending ways.
But this may be wishful thinking. If Congress fails to learn
from the CTEA debacle and again succumbs to the termextension lobbying machine that seems likely to be cranked up
as 2018 draws nearer, courts—and possibly the Supreme
Court—will
become
involved
in
determining
the
constitutionality of yet another term extension. We have
therefore offered recommendations for proper judicial handling
of the constitutional analysis. If Congress sensibly decides to
reject any future duration-extension overtures, it should also
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consider the recommendations we have offered for legislation
that may lessen the damage done by the CTEA and
simultaneously further the creative process.
Because of the CTEA, the copyright on this article will last
for the duration of the co-authors’ lives plus 70 years. Would
we still have had ample incentive to write if the controlling
legal rule had continued to call for a copyright duration of life
plus “only” 50 years? Of course, though the article would have
dealt with some other topic. We would not have written this
article, for if the rules were still life-plus-50, there would have
been no CTEA, no Eldred, and, accordingly, no related article.
So, in that sense, the CTEA did provide us an “incentive” to
write. Perhaps we owe Congress a thank-you note after all.

